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This is a history of the mechanisation programme in the British postal service in the 1960s and 1970s, 
providing a record of the first six years of the network restructuring project known as the Letter Post Plan. 
This involved the introduction of automated sorting and coding machines and the creation of large, 
mechanised sorting offices. This brought fundamental changes to mail operations and was the subject of 
much disagreement and discussion within the industry. The key groups involved were unions, 
management and engineers, and their roles are considered through planning, negotiation and 
implementation of the plan. The central theme of the thesis is the interrelation of new technology and 
industrial relations. The main issues addressed include: the reasons for commissioning the plan in 1969; 
the preparations made for organisational change including R&D, financial modelling, training and 
consultation; the effects of the political and economic troubles of the 1970s; the introduction of new 
consultation arrangements following an embargo on new technology by the Union of Post Office Workers 
in 1972; and the course of negotiations which led to agreement upon a revised plan in 1975. 
The Post Office has been criticised over the introduction of mechanisation in this period, including 
charges of naive management, inadequate engineering and union obstruction. The limited attention the 
subject has received from historians has echoed this. This thesis contests this interpretation by arguing 
that the Post Office deserves more credit for the design and implementation of the plan, and that its 
problems were largely caused by external political and economic forces. It offers a detailed account of the 
workings of the postal service and the political and technical challenges faced in changing its operations, 
documenting several progressive and constructive aspects of this process. This therefore contributes to a 
historiographical reinterpretation of 1970s industrial politics and questions the negative portrayal of the 
nationalised industries in this period. 
The research is based primarily on the archival holdings of the British Postal Museum & Archive in 
London, including policy papers and board minutes, scientific and technical reports, union newspapers 
and publications, diagrams, photographs and correspondence. Other resources include the Modern Record 
Centre in Warwick, the National Archives, the works of modern postal historians and literature in the 
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Terms and Abbreviations 
 
BMC   Buildings and Mechanisation Committee 
COPOU Council of Post Office Unions. Umbrella group for the twelve major unions 
representing nearly all PO staff. 
DCF Discounted Cash Flow analysis. A costing method used in forecasting financial 
returns on capital expenditure. 
EC Executive Committee. The elected leadership of a union. 
IR Industrial Relations 
JWGIR Joint Working Group on Industrial Relations 
LPP Letter Post Plan. Formal title of the capital project begun in 1969 to restructure 
the postal system and mechanise sorting. 
LPR   London Postal Region 
MAC   Mechanical Aids Committee 
MLO Mechanised Letter Office. Sorting office designated under the Letter Post Plan 
operating code-sort equipment 
MUA Mail Users Association. Lobby group representing large commercial users of 
mail. 
OCR   Optical Character Recognition 
PMB   Postal Mechanisation Branch 
POEU Post Office Engineering Union. The second largest PO union representing 
telephone and postal engineers. 
POMB   Post Office Mechanisation & Buildings Division 
POMSA Post Office Management Staff Association 
POUNC Post Office Users National Council. Industry regulator representing the public 
interest. 
SPLSM  Single Position Letter Sorting Machine 
UPW Union of Post Office Workers. The largest PO union representing c. 175,000-





Overview of the thesis 
 
This thesis is a study of how the British Post Office tried to mechanise the sorting of letters in the post-
war period, with an emphasis on the period 1969-1975 when long-made plans for new technology 
transitioned into implementation. The goal is to offer a detailed account of the relationship between 
technological change and industrial relations in the postal service. New technology entered the workplace 
in the form of sorting machines and coding desks during the 1960s and 1970s, based on a plan set in 
motion after the Second World War to mechanise sorting and restructure the mails network by building 
Mechanised Letter Offices (MLOs) and issuing every address in Britain with a postcode. This amounted 
to the largest structural change to the system in the twentieth century. More than twenty years of research 
and development (R&D) went into creating the scheme, titled the “Letter Post Plan” (LPP), which was 
approved by the Board in 1969. However, implementation was not smooth. There followed a major 
breakdown in relations between staff and management, including the largest strike in Post Office history 
in 1971 and the withdrawal of union cooperation over the introduction of new technology in 1972. A 
major review of mechanisation policy ensued, leading to a new plan in 1975. These developments came at 
a time of unprecedented organisational change in which the Post Office was removed from the civil 
service and reconstituted as a public corporation following the Post Office Act, 1969, in the wake of 
which a new framework for industrial relations was devised. Many of the records generated by these 
events have been preserved, offering an opportunity to study the politics of technological change in a 
nationalised industry in mid-twentieth century Britain. The connections between new technology and 
industrial relations became especially prominent and explicit in the postal service during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, and, in what follows, this period is addressed closely while being considered in the wider 
context of post-war British social and economic history. 
The overarching argument is that the Post Office has been unfairly maligned over the introduction 
of new technology and that, although the mechanisation programme encountered severe delays and 
substantial political problems, these were largely caused by external pressures. In the context of a 
troubled economy and an acrimonious industrial relations climate, the planning and implementation of 
technological change was, overall, characterised by greater competence and ingenuity than has previously 
been recognised. The delays and disputes which followed the inauguration of the plan in 1969 have 
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attracted strong criticism, and yet, in the long run, the decision to mechanise has been justified. From its 
establishment as a permanent field at the PO after 1945, the goal of mechanisation was to reduce the 
postal service’s dependency on high levels of labour and to improve the efficiency and reliability of its 
increasingly sprawling and unwieldy mails network, and, over the following decades, it went a long way 
to achieving this. The planning undertaken before 1969 was thorough, considered, in-depth and of a long 
term nature, with its roots in sorting machine trials in the 1930s, rather than the faddish appeal of new 
technology associated with the “White Heat” of the 1960s. A thread of cooperation between staff and 
management can be traced throughout the post-war planning phase and, although this appeared to break 
down temporarily in the early 1970s, there is much evidence that new forms of cooperation emerged 
during a joint effort to mend the situation. The disputes, delays and alterations to the plan during the early 
1970s required substantial efforts in consultation and negotiation in order to reach a cross-industry 
agreement in 1975. While the reasons for these difficulties need to be assessed critically, an undercurrent 
of beneficial changes in industrial relations and improvements in mechanisation strategy is also evident. 
Exposing the extent of the collaborative and constructive efforts required in the mechanisation of 
the mail offers reasons to question whether the role of nationalised industries in post-war Britain has been 
adequately understood by historians. The negative portrayal of British industrial politics in this period has 
led to a popular account in which the problems of industrial politics have been identified as contributing 
to the crises of the state in 1974 and 1979. Although this is understandable, given that industrial action in 
the public sector was closely associated with the fall of two governments, it has served to obscure some 
important and worthwhile changes in the nationalised industries. This thesis demonstrates that although 
major industrial conflicts were an important element of the wider economic and cultural crisis, it is 
possible that this masks ongoing beneficial developments behind the scenes. Trade unionism was in this 
period at its peak in terms of membership and political prominence and has attracted much historical 
study as a result. Assessing the course and significance of pay disputes in the nationalised industries 
benefits from a better understanding of attitudes towards technological change and industrial 
reorganisation, as these were important elements of the political economy of the time. An attempt to 
improve the reputation of 1970s industrial relations and to expand analysis to get to the heart of 
interactions between the different sides of particular industries has been advocated as a desirable direction 
for this field of history.
1
 Exposing the PO’s commitment to sophisticated and humane technological 
change under severe external pressures is also intended to rehabilitate a period of postal history 
commonly regarded negatively. As with the wider account of nationalised industries in the 1970s, there 
                                                     
1
 John McIlroy, Nina Fishman and Alan Campbell ‘Introduction: Approaching Post-War Trade Unionism’, in 
McIlroy, Fishman and Campbell (eds.) British Trade Unions and Industrial Politics: The High Tide of Trade 
Unionism, 1964-79 (1999), pp.1-19. 
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are understandable reasons it has been characterised as a troubled decade for the postal service, and postal 
mechanisation has been implicated in this. The following chapters critically examine this portrayal. 
During the period 1969-1975 the PO experienced unprecedented organisational upheaval in 
which both Telecoms and Posts were removed from the civil service and were re-formed as semi-
autonomous enterprises in a single public corporation. This coincided with a severe downturn in the 
increasingly inflationary British economy, wreaking havoc in the labour-intensive postal industry. This 
led to an unfortunate situation in which the postal service endured its most acute industrial relations crisis 
just as a radical restructuring of the national mail network based on mechanised sorting got underway. 
While the long-made plans for a concentrated, postcoded, mechanised system were beginning to be 
implemented, the industry descended into a bitter and lasting dispute over pay. Soon after its inauguration 
in 1969, the Letter Post Plan was for a time derailed by an increasing trend of industrial confrontation in 
Britain. Early in 1971 there was a national postal strike which was the first great strike of the 1970s and 
the largest in PO history. Its causes were not related in any strong sense with mechanisation, but its 
repercussions were enormous. This thesis documents some effects of the strike on the mechanisation 
programme and argues that it had a major influence on the decision taken by the Union of Post Office 
Workers (UPW) – the largest PO union representing c. 175,000-200,000 postal staff2 – to issue an 
embargo on cooperating with the introduction of new technology, lasting from 1972-1975. This was a 
period in which the grievances expressed by the UPW during the strike (to do with low pay and the 
emergence of commercial management attitudes within what was previously a civil service tradition) did 
not go away, but were transferred to other areas over which the union had a say, including negotiating a 
deal for cooperation with mechanisation. This not only continued the strike figuratively, it resumed it 
literally, in a restricted way. Postal workers, rather than withdrawing from sorting/conveyance/delivery 
entirely, restricted their withdrawal of cooperation to a highly specific but strategically valuable new 
method of sorting. A major issue underlying the embargo remained pay, but this slower paced dispute 
increasingly encompassed the issues of working methods, system organisation and a contested future. In 
the context of the overall dispute, those aspects concerning working conditions and the long term future 
of the industry became more prominent between 1972-1975. This led to a paradox in which, although the 
terms of the mechanisation programme were under dispute, attempts to resolve the problem led to a 
constructive joint-reappraisal through which some trust was restored. 
I therefore argue that although management underestimated the human problems of 
superimposing a mechanised system onto the traditional manual network during the 1960s planning 
phase, the design of a second generation of machines and the re-evaluation of the wider project in the 
                                                     
2
 Figures vary depending on the source and how part-time staff are counted. 
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early 1970s helped to build bridges between management and staff. This was achieved through more 
consultation, contributing to agreement over better machines and working conditions, and to a special pay 
award in 1975 to resolve the conflict. The UPW not only succeeded in securing this sizeable special 
payment for postal staff, but also a greater degree of involvement in the production of a revised 
programme for mechanisation. The payment alleviated the pressure on industrial relations by acting 
outside wage restraint agreements with the government, while the greater involvement in the reappraisal 
of the plan was an important step in establishing the ongoing extension of consultative provisions which 
helped pave the way to an industrial democracy experiment at the end of the decade. This phase of 
reappraisal and consultation helped check the hard-line element in senior management and permitted the 
UPW a longer-term means of increasing wages in the postman grade. At the same time, it provided 
forums in which industrial relations could be repaired through detailed negotiations over decisions which 
were central to the future operations of the industry. 
Though politics in the postal service was heavily influenced by wage bargaining in this period, 
several parts of this thesis also highlight the role of engineers in shaping industrial relations. I will 
demonstrate that postal engineering became a scientific and systematic field at the PO after 1945 and that 
the designs which were implemented after 1969 were the product of an ambitious, long-term plan based 
upon what was referred to as the “code-sort concept”. The design of sorting machines, postcodes and the 
restructuring of mail circulation was premised on this concept which, by 1969, had become a coherent 
package of reforms with the ultimate aim of automating all aspects of sorting. The distinctiveness of the 
British approach is emphasised in this regard, including comparisons with parallel developments in postal 
mechanisation abroad, with references to America, Canada, Europe, Japan and Australia. For much of the 
post-war period, the British were widely believed to lead the world in this field, though this began to 
change in the 1970s, and some reasons for this are suggested. However the role of engineers was not 
restricted to the design of machines and systems. Key figures in the Engineering Department sat on, or 
advised, the PO Board on issues such as financial modelling and staff training, and examples of this with 
connections to the mechanisation of letter sorting are discussed. PO engineers in this period designed new 
types of work, negotiated changes with unions and tended to view the pursuit of healthy industrial 
relations as an important element in their Department’s principal purpose: to increase the efficiency and 
productivity of mail operations. The importance of political considerations in their work is documented 
throughout, though the focus is mostly on their roles in the development of the first two generations of 
code-sort machinery: the technology at the heart of the Letter Post Plan. 
The first generation of machines slowly came into service after trials in the 1950s and 1960s, 
leading to the formation of hardware capable of making the code-sort concept a reality. The second 
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generation of machines was designed during the early 1970s and came into operation from 1975 onwards. 
In developing the second generation, the role of engineers as mediators between the two conflicting sides 
of industry was more pronounced, as their energies increasingly focussed on improving the human 
problems of the changing sorting office environment. The ergonomics and cost-effectiveness of the 
second generation “Easy-View” coding desk were significant in being explicitly adapted to staff and 
management needs respectively. As will be shown, the design of sorting machines was largely the work 
of in-house engineers, but their work was conditioned by requirements established in committees on 
which both staff and management were represented. This corporate tradition of consultation over new 
technology meant that unions had a say in the R&D process throughout the post-war period and it is clear 
that the views of staff were taken more seriously in the design process after the UPW embargo was 
announced in 1972. Nowhere is this clearer than in studying the changes incorporated in the Easy-View 
coding desk. The story of its design leads to insights into the psychology of the workplace and the 
economics of restructuring the network under increased financial constraints. The history of the coding 
desk plays a central role as the key “human-machine interface” in the emerging mechanised system of 
mail sorting, and as the technology of most strategic and political significance. But, more broadly, senior 
engineers exerted increasing influence over management strategy as the industry committed to a 
technological future. 
In summary, there are two distinct contributions this thesis seeks to make. The first is to fill an 
empirical gap on a major period of technological change in the history of a socially and economically 
important British institution. Relatively little has been written about the history of the Letter Post Plan and 
this thesis presents new primary research for the critical period of its development, organised around a 
thematic framework concerned with the intersection of technological change and industrial relations. The 
second is to recognise that what has been written on this subject has tended to give a pessimistic 
impression of events at the Post Office, contributing to the wider negative portrayal of nationalised 
industries in the post-war period, discussed below. By contrast, this case study offers insights into the 
nature of organisational change that suggest there are positive and constructive aspects of the subject yet 
to be considered. This thesis therefore presents evidence that, though severe problems plagued the LPP 
and the postal service more generally in this period, these difficulties are better understood in a wider 
context characterised by improvements to the industry jointly secured by three of its major stakeholders: 
staff, management and engineers. The sources used for this, an outline of the chapters and the overall 




Historiography and contemporary commentary on postal mechanisation 
 
Until recently the modern Post Office received relatively little attention from historians. Given the scale 
and diversity of its societal impact in twentieth century Britain, and considering the wealth of relevant 
primary documentation now available to scholars, this has meant that significant aspects of the PO’s 
recent history, worthy of enquiry, are not adequately understood. Other formerly nationalised industries, 
such as coal mining and rail transport, have been studied more thoroughly and received greater attention 
in synthetic works such as William Ashworth’s The State in Business.3 This has begun to change in recent 
years following the publication in 2011 of Duncan Campbell Smith’s Masters of the Post, which added a 
second commissioned history to Martin Daunton’s Royal Mail, published in 1984. This, alongside recent 
doctoral theses by Helen Glew and Mark Crowley on women’s employment, has reinvigorated PO 
historiography.
4
 The other major publication with which I engage is Alan Clinton’s Post Office Workers, 
an exhaustive study of PO trade unionism published in 1984.
5
 However, the influence of engineers and 
new technology on industrial relations at the PO is so far little understood. Daunton and Clinton 
established a framework for understanding the 1970s PO focussed on a national economy in crisis, 
government incomes policies, TUC policies and the growth of working class unrest. Both alluded to the 
sizeable political and operational changes involved in mechanisation but chose not to address them while 
they were still unfolding. Daunton’s treatment of the PO’s post-war experience was limited to sketching 
the main issues faced by postal management in the 1960s-1970s. Clinton’s treatment was in greater depth 
but confined to union issues. Of particular relevance is his account of the 1971 strike and appraisal of the 
UPW campaign against the Conservative Industrial Relations Act and incomes policies of 1970-1974. 
Both historians singled out changing technology as a major challenge to industrial relations on the postal 
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side, but detailed study was left to future historians as neither then had access to the relevant management 
or engineering files.
6
 These single-volume works have therefore noted the importance of mechanisation 
without offering the subject substantial coverage. Their few remarks on mechanisation are discussed in 
the chapters which follow. 
 In Masters of the Post, Duncan Campbell-Smith, a former management consultant for McKinsey 
and Financial Times journalist, addresses the early history of sorting machine trials and the importance of 
the modernisation drive in the 1960s. He dwells briefly on the history and significance of postal 
mechanisation at two points in a long narrative which, for the modern period, is largely concerned with 
boardroom personalities and the big issues they faced in running the PO. The first is in the opening 
passages of Chapter 9, titled “Bright hopes blighted, 1949-64”, in which he introduces some of the 
reasons mechanisation was first pursued, some of the engineering personalities at the forefront of research 
and some key events in the early history of sorting machine design and the pursuit of an operable 
postcode. I flesh out some of his findings in chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, introduce new evidence with a 
bearing on long-term industrial relations and question certain aspects of his characterisation of the R&D 
process. This section of the thesis is mostly based on primary documents relating to the emergence of 
postal mechanisation in the PO after 1945, though empirical work on the details of sorting machine 
development, postcode concentration schemes and related philatelic matters has been published by the 
Postal Mechanisation Study Circle, most notably in an introductory handbook edited by Douglas N. Muir 
and in the PMSC’s quarterly journal Ident.7 Some elements of this specialist literature are integrated in 
what follows. 
Campbell-Smith’s second engagement with mechanisation is found in a five-page passage in 
Chapter 11, “A dismal decade, 1969-79”, in which he casts the implementation of the Letter Post Plan 
after 1969 in an unflattering light. By incorporating discussion of the field’s most prominent obstacles 
into a chapter designed to convey the deep problems faced by the PO in this period, Campbell-Smith 
understandably gives the strongest contemporary criticisms a lot of weight.
8
 On this view, mechanisation 
‘looked in danger of falling flat on its face’ and ‘the correct and courageous decision, some now argued, 
would be to can it’.9 Engineers are referred to as ‘predictably not much interested in the politics of the 
workplace’,10 negotiations with the UPW ‘descended into a tortuous wrangle’ and the scale of the re-
evaluation of mechanisation in 1973 (known as the revalidation) is taken as evidence that the case for 
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abandoning the LPP was strong.
11
 Though he acknowledges in passing that the decision to persist with 
mechanisation during crisis periods was, in hindsight, vindicated by the ‘march of technology’, he goes 
on to recite sympathetically various other contemporary criticisms, covering the putative poverty of 
public relations, management confusion and union obstinacy. As will be shown, many of these were ill-
founded, marginal or the product of an ideologically-inflected, blame-seeking agenda. The result is that 
the problems encountered in this period are emphasised without consideration of counter-balancing 
evidence, such that a misleading impression of technological change and industrial relations is given. In 
particular, he refers approvingly to the views of Michael Corby, a former PO executive turned critic who 
spent seven years on the postal side before leaving in 1976 to become Director of the Mail Users’ 
Association (MUA), which lobbied on behalf of large business users. Corby argued, in provocative terms, 
that the incorporation of the PO left it in the hands of career civil servants charged with running it in the 
style of a commercial business, who obstinately pursued their plans regardless of commercial justification 
while exacerbating delays by pandering to the unions. He later wrote The Postal Business, 1969-1979: A 
Study in Public Sector Management, a book based on a variety of published sources and private 
conversations with some senior PO and government officials, resulting in a forthright critique of postal 
management in the period. It includes critical examinations of the organisation’s structure, finances, 
service alterations, staffing policies, and relations with government, as well as an extremely negative 
appraisal of the mechanisation programme. 
Mechanisation, Corby argued, was characterised by incompetent planning, naive strategy and 
avoidable delays. The Board were wrong to place their faith in technology in 1969 and should have 
abandoned mechanisation entirely after its first major review in 1973. The PO and its auditors at the 
Department of Industry were, he wrote, ‘prisoner[s] of the type of thought that is uncritically receptive of 
technological change’.12 He considered the centralisation of sorting as the greatest organisational change 
of the period, but held that the pre-existing system of smaller offices functioned relatively well and that 
moving work to larger offices created a range of new problems including a loss of management control, 
operational inflexibility, more stoppages, and more working days lost. The alleged inflexibility of the 
mechanised system was, in Corby’s view, the outcome of a rigid and ill-informed approach to planning. 
Planners were frequently surprised at objections raised by both public and staff and attempted to dismiss 
them as standing in the way of progress. Attempts to alter or question plans internally were stifled, and 
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The only mitigating factor he offered was recognition that the postal service was hamstrung in this period 
by a squeeze on capital expenditure and political short-termism, applicable to most public service 
organisations.
14
 However his portrayal of mechanisation was otherwise wholly negative. ‘A miasma of 
ineptitude seems to pervade every area involved in mechanisation’, he concluded. ‘Government and the 
POUNC [Post Office Users National Council, the industry regulator] appear to have fallen down in their 
roles as guardians of the public interest.’15 These views were derived from the MUA’s lengthy critique 
submitted to the Carter Commission in 1976, which I assess critically in Chapter 5. This was one of two 
major commissions of inquiry in the 1970s, taking a panoramic view of the whole of the PO’s operations. 
The first was the Hardman Inquiry following the 1971 strike, while the Carter Inquiry was prompted by 
the collapse of PO finances amidst unprecedented levels of national inflation in 1975. Both resulted in 
reports critical of management complacency and union obstruction. The latter included a substantial 
appendix published in 1977 and remains the most comprehensive audit in PO history.
16
 Corby’s main 
complaint was that in the 1970s the PO did not adequately deal with declining productivity, a symptom of 
the wider failure to apply the principles of private sector commercial management. This general line of 
argument is implied throughout the final chapters of Campbell-Smith’s Masters of the Post, who 
comments that ‘nowhere was the lack of [managerial] drive more conspicuous than in the melancholy 
plight of postal mechanization’.17 
This highlights the importance of contemporary commentary for historians wishing to understand 
developments in the modern PO. During the 1960s and 1970s, assorted studies by industrial sociologists, 
journalists and economists investigated developments in the postal service. This has left a range of 
descriptions of the industry, including some incisive analyses of its political and economic make-up, and 
some of this has addressed questions of new technology in general, the mechanisation programme 
specifically and many relevant contextual issues. The most thoroughgoing academic analysis of the period 
was that of the sociologists Eric Batstone, Anthony Ferner and Michael Terry. In 1975, at the prompting 
of the newly elected Labour government, the PO opened discussions with the Industrial Relations 
Research Unit at Warwick University about the potential for an experiment in industrial democracy at the 
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PO, an arrangement in which unions and management would be equally represented on the Board and at 
regional and local levels. The trial was initiated in January 1978 but was discontinued the following year 
by the incoming Conservative government, to the approval of management and the disappointment of the 
unions. As the evidence in this thesis attests, the PO was chosen because it had developed a suitable IR 
framework. This led Lord Ponsonby in the House of Lords to describe the experiment as ‘an extension of 
the Post Office's rich history of participation through extensive consultative arrangements at all levels, 
built up over many years’.18 From beginning to end, Batstone, Ferner and Terry conducted theoretical and 
empirical research, sat in on meetings, and conducted interviews, the results being published in Unions on 
the Board in 1983.
19
 Their findings were so extensive that they subsequently published a supplementary 
book, Consent and Efficiency: Labour Relations and Management Strategy in the State Enterprise, which 
described the political economy of the postal and telephone services through a “processual” lens. A 
central theme was the relationship between commercial and labour relations strategies, leading to an 
analysis of the effects of public ownership and of its political environment, in particular the role of the 
government’s sponsoring department and external lobbies such as the MUA and POUNC – referred to 
collectively as the ‘political contingency’.20  
 Consent and Efficiency did not contain much of substance on postal mechanisation per se, but its 
authors cited it as part of their wider observations about the political and operational changes then 
underway, and their conclusions are of significant contextual relevance to this thesis. They argued that the 
provisions of the PO Act, 1969, facilitated a fundamental shift in the prevailing managerial ethos from a 
service to a commercial paradigm. The Act established profit targets and applied more commercial 
criteria to the rate of return expected on capital expenditure. This was more demanding for Telecoms than 
for Posts, which was recognised as having special social obligations and an unusually heavy dependence 
on labour. This led the Board to apply techniques and practices common in the private sector, leading to 
more bullish approaches to commercial strategy, finance, marketing and personnel management. The 
Batstone team found that in practice this was applied more vigorously in Telecoms than in Posts where 
longstanding traditions were more difficult to overturn, though they found evidence that ‘important 
elements’ had changed on the postal side, citing new services, marketing drives and mechanisation.  
Commercialism had to be taken seriously; to have done otherwise would have been to risk political attack 
and unwelcome intervention... [Posts] had become sufficiently marginal to the concerns of governments 
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and powerful commercial and consumer interests for it to be able, through the deployment of political 
skills, to avert the full-blooded implementation of the commercial paradigm.
21
 
The radical restructuring of 1969 established the Postal Management Board as a separate entity from the 
main PO Board, as part of an enlargement of the Directorate to include separate departments for 
Operations, Finance, Personnel, Pay & Grading, and Mechanisation and Buildings. All staff were re-
graded between 1971-1974. Batstone et al. believed the size and centralised structure of the early 
corporation produced a range of problems which often left regional and local managers ‘fire-fighting’ to 
keep the service free from disruptions that might ‘cause embarrassment’.22 
The importance attached to operational matters reflected the importance of operational continuity for 
continued freedom from political interference... The relative and political insignificance of the postal 
business meant that its relationship with the state was essentially a passive, arm’s-length one based around 
an unstated status-quo of a trouble-free service, operating at given levels of performance, roughly breaking 
even financially, and not exposing the state to criticism from consumers or politicians. In exchange, the 
state did not press too hard for reformed change. In particular, it had not pursued the implementation of 
commercial strategies with great determination.
23
 
At the time of their research, Posts appeared to be heading into long-term decline as, since the 
early 1970s, annual volumes of mail stopped their historic rise and were believed to be heading into long-
term, irreversible decline as other mediums such as telephones, fax and data transmission increased their 
share of the communications market.
24
 Later, new services, pricing arrangements and innovative 
marketing combined with a surge in economic activity to recover mail volumes in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but when they wrote in the early 1980s, the damage appeared to be terminal. Similarly, with 
mechanisation, the delays, reviews and alterations to the programme of the 1970s meant that the full 
benefits of a system of Mechanised Letter Offices (MLOs) had not yet come into effect, leading Batstone 
et al. to note the shortcomings of the LPP and to echo the criticisms of Corby, albeit in softer tones. 
...in virtually all respects the mechanisation programme fell short of targets. For a variety of reasons it 
failed to meet all its deadlines for implementation, the manpower savings were insignificant, the financial 
savings... negligible, the increase in efficiency minimal or non-existent, and public utilization of the 
postcode far below hoped for levels.
25
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They went on to state that mechanisation unhelpfully reduced the flexibility of the sorting system and that 
there were political motivations behind the continued support for the project which included a desire to 
appear modern and show determination in dealing with postal problems. This followed the Carter 
Committee in voicing scepticism over whether the LPP would have been approved in 1969 had 
subsequent data been available.
26
 The question of whether these remarks are accurate or fair, or whether 
they are an appropriate way to frame a debate about the process of long-term automation in a nationalised 
industry, is considered in the conclusion of this thesis. An important point to note here is that these 
criticisms, like Corby’s, were made some years before the LPP was completed and the wider systemic 
benefits of the plan were felt. As is made clear in the following chapters, some criticism was justified on 
the basis of the narrow financial criteria favoured by some – but not all – economists and journalists. 
(Others, such as the economist Alec Nove, flagged up the inappropriateness of applying commercial 
criteria in the absence of market competition and noted that almost every postal administration in the 
world was, in the early 1970s, a Government Department with a public service remit. He also recognised 
that many of the financial models used in the private sector could not come to grips with the complexities 
of nationalised network industries).
27
 However, as the PO pointed out at the time, the reasons for pursuing 
a change in technology were multi-dimensional; forming part of a complex package of reforms connected 
with a strategy which sought to restructure the organisation, reduce its dependence on labour and to foster 
healthier and more sustainable industrial relations. 
 The limited historiography bearing on postal mechanisation has therefore been influenced by the 
industrial commentary of this period. Moreover, these contemporary criticisms of the mechanisation 
programme often formed part of more general critiques of the Post Office. These, in turn, tended to be 
shaped, either explicitly or implicitly, by the left-right ideological divide concerning the legitimacy of 
state-owned enterprise.
28
 In the case of the postal industry, the major areas of debate centred around the 
extent its operations should be subsidised by the state and the extent to which it should be managed 
according to commercial criteria; that is, whether it was a business or a service. Unlike other parts of the 
public sector, postal services were not provided for free and so questions over its pricing and management 
were disputed.
29
 Those opposed to nationalised industry on principle tended to see problems in the postal 
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service as evidence of the fundamental weakness of public enterprise. Debate about where the 
organisation fell on the business/service continuum was longstanding
30
 and became especially salient 
from the 1960s onwards. Alan Clinton has suggested that this increased focus was connected with the 
extraordinary growth of inflation in the 1970s coinciding with profound organisational change. 
‘Throughout these years, unprecedented technological development and profound external economic 
crisis created long-term problems for the Post Office which were accompanied by a level of public 
criticism at least as great as in the 1830s and the 1920s’.31 R.J.S. Baker, who ran various headquarters 
departments in the 1950s-1970s, highlighted how this criticism repeatedly returned to disagreements over 
how the organisation should be run. ‘The Postal Service has many problems including finance, services 
and organisation’, he said, ‘but at the root of them all is the problem of fundamental uncertainty as to 
what the organisation essentially is and what it ought to be: a “business”, a “public service” or whatever – 
and of what these words mean’.32 His own view was that the postal ‘business’ ought to be renamed the 
postal ‘service’.33 The debate was reignited during the Carter Inquiry which, addressing the large and 
complex problems of PO structure and strategy, concluded that the organisation’s relationship with the 
government compromised attempts at commercially sound decisions on pricing and operations.
34
 
Douglass Pitt, an academic commentator, aptly summarised the dilemma in his review of the Carter 
Report. ‘The basic environmental paradox presented by such evidence is that the Post Office has been 
explicitly enjoined to act commercially since [1969], but has had this goal subverted by constant 
governmental interference’.35 This resulted in slowly evolving compromise arrangements, which in 
general had seen a long-term shift ‘from a public service-based equity conception of the Post Office’s task 
to a commercial conception of it’.36 
 
New technology and industrial relations in context 
 
This section is intended to provide further historical and historiographical context by highlighting wider 
developments in Britain in this period with relevance to the themes and events addressed in this thesis. 
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The 1960s and 1970s saw important reforms to industrial relations and major changes involving new 
technology. Along with other public sector organisations, the Post Office was involved in and affected by 
these developments and so an understanding of the Letter Post Plan is enhanced by being considered in 
this light. Drawing on the work of historians and contemporary academics, a range of contextual issues 
which characterised the period are summarised, having been selected for their relevance to questions of 
new technology, industrial relations and the postal service. These include such matters as the economic 
crisis, government policy, large-scale strikes in the public sector, reforms to the British system of 
industrial relations, the spread of computing and automation, debates about the “labour process” and the 
role of trade unions in technological change. 
The key issues in the public sector in the late 1960s and 1970s were problems associated with pay 
and state attempts to control rising inflation. Acute industrial relations problems were at the time posited 
as a contributory factor in exacerbating low productivity and this came to preoccupy economic and 
industrial commentators. There were three common arguments. First, from the right, that the unions had 
become too powerful and were acting irresponsibly. Second, from the left, that structures of inequality led 
to conflicts of interests that ultimately harmed industrial efficiency. Finally, from the more centrally 
inclined “liberal pluralists”, the argument that the fundamental balance of power was not the problem, 
rather incremental changes to institutions and the law might act to reduce conflict and secure order. This 
was how Eric Batstone, the academic most familiar with the PO, characterised the debate.
37
 Low 
productivity was in his view caused by several factors characteristic of the period, including lack of 
investment, labour supply problems, approaches to management, the global economic crisis of the early 
1970s, high oil prices and heavy-handed government economic policies. The view that militant unionism 
and fraught industrial relations were a major cause was also widely promulgated and yet, as Batstone 
pointed out, the correlation between productivity and restrictive practices was slight.
38
 
 Nevertheless, a highly visible feature of this period was the increased incidence, scale and 
duration of strikes in the public sector and the postal service played a part in this trend. David Winchester, 
a prominent scholar of IR in the public sector, was unequivocal about the salience of public sector 
industrial relations to the fortunes of the British economy:  
The control of public expenditure and its most substantial component – public sector pay – was one of the 
most important issues in British economic policy in the 1970s. In a context of high inflation and deepening 
economic recession, traditional patterns of public sector industrial relations were transformed by a series of 
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changes in government, management and trade union policies. The most visible evidence of a substantial 
breakdown in the system of public sector collective bargaining can be seen in the series of major pay 




The problem of large strikes in the public sector, including previously mostly strike-free groups, was, in 
part, precipitated by government incomes policies in which the state imposed wage caps applied directly 
to public sector employees.
40
 The dilemma therefore centred around working class resistance to 
Conservative interventions in public sector pay, which began in 1970 and went through two phases. 
Unions found the so-called N-1 policy, in which public sector pay would be capped and thereafter 
annually lowered by 1%, to be arbitrary, crude and unfair. Its original aim was to incrementally scale 
down public sector wage settlements to 8% by the end of 1971, which was the figure offered to postal 
workers prior to the strike.
41
 The following two years saw over 1.5 million workers involved in large 
strikes in local authorities, postal services and coal mining as well as restrictive practices in electricity 
supply and railways. All led to large pay increases, except for the postal service
42
 The second phase 
followed the 1972 miners’ strike when the government pursued a formal incomes policy involving two 
long phases of pay restraint. Almost half (43%) of the 70 million working days lost due to strikes between 
1970-1974 were in the public sector.
43
 Workers tended to struggle to maintain real wages, while 
employers felt greater pressure on profits.
44
 Some looked abroad and realised that events in Britain were 
by no means out of step with the USA and Canada.
45
 The 1971 postal strike in Britain, for example, bore 
a resemblance to events in America the previous year, where postal staff in New York – protesting at 
political interference in wages, organisational change and the mechanisation of mail centres – initiated a 
wildcat strike which spread nationwide, involving 600 post offices and 200,000 workers.
46
 Events in 
Britain therefore need to be considered in global context. The worldwide strike wave of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s put workers’ control in the foreground and invigorated academic interest in paid work, giving 
impetus both to the rise of segmentation theory in America and labour process theory in Britain.
47
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The conventional view of post-war industrial relations is therefore that the late 1960s and 1970s 
form a coherent phase defined primarily by instability, especially in the public sector.
48
 A significant body 
of work has focussed on the seismic effects of industrial confrontation and the history of IR has been 
viewed unfavourably as a consequence
49
 However, some historians have argued that these accounts 
exaggerate Britain’s uniqueness in experiencing industrial unrest.50 Jonathan Zeitlin has warned against a 
teleology which has tended to obscure a rich and diverse range of case studies which do not fit so easily 
into the conventional framework.  
The postwar history of British industrial relations is increasingly written as a tale of doom foretold, in 
which the ascendancy of trade-union power and shopfloor militancy from the 1950s through the 1970s 
inexorably prepared the ground for the Conservative counterrevolution of the 1980s and 1990s. Viewed 
from the left the tale reads as a tragedy, viewed from the right as a morality play, but absent from both 
versions is a sense of contingency and strategic choice: the possibility that the plot might have turned out 
differently depending on the sequence of events and the decisions of the key actors.
51
 
Jim Tomlinson has similarly argued that viewing the public ownership of industry as a ‘failed 
experiment’ has some value but can also be one-dimensional, while John McIlroy and Alan Campbell 
have agreed that the prevailing view of IR in this period is today coloured by the putative demise of the 
British labour movement after 1979.
52
 As historians of the PO have recognised,
53
 and as this thesis attests, 
spiralling inflation was the key economic force driving union militancy and ever more contentious wage 
claims in 1970s Britain and so there has arisen a strand of historiography seeking to exculpate the major 
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stakeholders in British industrial performance – i.e. governments, unions and employers – by emphasising 
the severity of external shocks to the economy.
54
 
 Others have considered the evolution of IR through documenting the history of British industrial 
sociology and its influence on government inquiries and legislation.
55
 In the post-war period a number of 
Oxford academics with ties to the Labour Party and the TUC continued a tradition begun by Sydney and 
Beatrice Webb of applying social scientific methods to understanding the role of unions in British 
industry and the frameworks in place for collective bargaining. The leading figures of the so-called 
“Oxford School of Industrial Relations” were Allan Flanders, Hugh Clegg, Alan Fox and George Sayers 
Bain who mentored the likes of Eric Batstone and David Winchester who would go on to study the public 
enterprise in considerable detail. Clegg and Flanders were known as the foremost experts on the empirical 
and theoretical aspects of IR, respectively, and were the ‘intellectual architects’ of the 1968 Donovan 
Commission: a monumental inquiry into the state of IR in Britain in the 1960s, which found that there 
were two systems predominating in Britain – the formal and the informal.56 The Donovan Commission 
was charged with analysing IR in both public and private sectors but ended up dwelling almost 
exclusively on the private sector.
57
 There, especially in manufacturing, the formal system referred to 
bargaining between employers’ organisations (representing multiple employers) and trade unions 
(representing mostly engineering and general workers).
58
 However, the informal system dominated, with 
no legally enforceable bargains, and this distinguished the British system from many foreign 
arrangements. The decentralisation and informality of bargaining created a tendency to resist 
technological change, according to the Report. However generalisations were difficult. Clegg, after the 
                                                     
54
 Richard Coopey and Nicholas Woodward (eds.), Britain in the 1970s: the Troubled Economy (London: 
Routledge, 1996); Andy Beckett, When the Lights Went Out: Britain in the Seventies (London: Faber and Faber, 
2009). 
55
 Peter Ackers and Adrian Wilkinson, ‘Introduction: The British Industrial Relations Tradition - Formation, 
Breakdown and Salvage’, in Peter Ackers and Adrian Wilkinson (eds.) Understanding Work and Employment: 
Industrial Relations in Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.1-30; Peter Ackers, ‘Collective 
Bargaining as Industrial Democracy: Hugh Clegg and the Political Foundations of British Industrial Relations 
Pluralism’, in British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 45, 1 (2007), pp.77–101; ‘The Changing Systems of 
British Industrial Relations, 1954–1979: Hugh Clegg and the Warwick Sociological Turn’, in British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 49, 2 (2011), pp.306–330; Brian Harrison, ‘Oxford and the Labour Movement’, in 
Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 2, 3 (1991), pp.226-271; William McCarthy, ‘The Involvement of 
Academics in British Industrial Relations’, in British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 32, 2 (1994), pp.202–217; 
Jim Phillips, 'Industrial Relations, Historical Contingencies and Political Economy: Britain in the 1960s and 1970s', 
in Labour History Review, Vol. 72, 3 (2007), pp.215-233; Jonathan Zeitlin, 'From Labour History to the History of 
Industrial Relations', in The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 40, 2 (1987), pp.159-184. 
56
 Ackers, 'Collective Bargaining as Industrial Democracy’, p.77. 
57
 Report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (Donovan Report), Cmnd. 3623 
(London: HMSO, 1968). 
58
 Keith Sisson and William Brown, ‘Industrial Relations in the Private Sector: Donovan Re-visited’, in Bain (ed.), 
Industrial Relations in Britain, p.137. 
27 
 
Commission concluded, referred to British IR as ‘complex beyond belief.’59 An outcome was a concerted 
effort both by the state and by students of industrial society to bring order to this complexity by enlarging 
the sphere of formal bargaining in ways meant to secure wider and deeper consultation, stable wage 
bargaining and ongoing productivity improvements. This was an interventionist strategy with sizeable 
effects on the postal service. 
In the post-Donovan period, a distinctive model of what constituted good industrial relations was 
promoted by the government and by state agencies such as the National Board for Prices and Incomes and 
the Commission on Industrial Relations. Recommendations for recognising union legitimacy and 
formalising IR procedures were highly influential in the public sector.
60
 The increasing specialisation and 
formalisation of IR management were widespread trends in the 1960s and 70s, attributed to the growth 
and concentration of workforces in large multi-divisional corporations. This coincided with wide-reaching 
government interventions in many aspects of the employment relationship.
61
 Workplace industrial 
relations were thus ‘reconstructed’ in the 1970s, involving the formalisation of procedures for negotiation, 
consultation, grievances and collective disputes, discipline, health and safety and other programmes 
designed to stabilise the management/union relationship, though this was later acknowledged to have 
created unhelpful rigidity.
62
 The underlying philosophy behind was that endorsed by the above-mentioned 
“liberal pluralism”, cultivated by the Oxford School and embodied in the Donovan Report. The central 
idea was that divergent interests in industry were legitimate and necessary, and that the institutionalisation 
of industrial conflict - embodied in collective bargaining – should be protected and made more orderly 
through legal and institutional reforms.
63
 Some even argued that strikes in the public sector were an 
indication of the validity and vitality of collective bargaining, rather than its breakdown.
64
 
Something similar to the Donovan model was adopted in the postal service, encouraged by the 
PO Act, 1969, which brought wholesale reforms to IR machinery. This formed part of a wider programme 
of refitting the PO for a post-civil service future, elements of which are discussed in this thesis. Much of 
this was mediated by a greatly enlarged Personnel Division, established to facilitate and co-ordinate 
communication between different staff groups. In 1967 there was a functional split in the management of 
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personnel when different departments were created for Posts and Telecoms. In Posts, this created the 
separate functions of Staffing, Training, Pay and Organisation. Beyond this, regional departments were 
established to handle recruitment, promotion, appointments, discipline and health matters.
65
 It was 
stressed that the creation of negotiating procedures was a flexible and organic process in which 
Headquarters, Regional and Union representatives should be in constant communication. The 
department’s prevailing philosophy was one of balancing the systematic gathering of data with constant 
informal conversations in building up a practical knowledge of IR before attempting any changes. It was 
believed that this was in keeping with wider post-Donovan developments.
66
 
This period therefore saw a large increase in the number of IR specialists and in the incidence of 
negotiations and written agreements over working practices.
67
 This should not obscure the profound 
nature of the political and economic shifts occurring after 1968, for which the Donovan recommendations 
were not designed. An ironic course of events ensued in which IR practices were improving on a wide 
front at the same time as industrial conflict increased. This was most obvious in the clash over incomes 
policies and legal reform to unions, beginning with the 1969 White Paper, In Place of Strife, which 
sought to use the law to restrict trade union power but was eventually defeated. When the Conservatives 
were elected in 1970, they pursued an equally bullish Industrial Relations Act, a hugely complex and 
strenuously opposed piece of legislation which took up about a third of all parliamentary time during 
1970-1. It had major ramifications for the British political climate, for the law and as a divisive issue 
between unions and government.
68
 The Office of Population Censuses & Surveys investigated workplace 
attitudes to IR in 1972, and uncovered a sizeable shift nationally. Antagonisms had grown more acute, 
shop stewards had become more militant and influential, and much other data in the Donovan Report was 
rapidly becoming obsolete.
69
 The survey found that the reasons given by people who joined a union still 
included the desire for better pay and conditions and for other collective benefits, but this had shifted to 
accommodate a growing need to resolve grievances and disputes.
70
 In the postal service the UPW 
represented all postal staff, and the ways in which it offered its members collective solidarity in times of 
crisis – including financial assistance, medical advice and moral support – is documented throughout the 
                                                     
65
 R.J.S. Baker, ‘Some Tasks and Processes of Personnel Management in a Very Large Public Utility’, in Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. 8, 1 (1971), pp.28-29. 
66
 Ibid., pp.32-33. 
67
 M. G. Wilders and S. R. Parker, ‘Changes in Workplace Industrial Relations, 1966-72’, in British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 13, 1 (1975), pp.20-21. 
68
 Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience of the British System since 1911 (London: André 
Deutsch, 1979), p.444; S.R. Engleman and A.W.J. Thomson, ‘Experience Under the British Industrial Relations 
Act’, in Industrial Relations: a Journal of Economy & Society, Vol. 13, 2 (1974), pp.131-132; Joseph Garbarino, 
'The British Experiment with Industrial Relations Reform', in Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 26, 2 
(1973), pp.793-804. 
69
 Wilders and Parker, ‘Changes in Workplace Industrial Relations’, p.14. 
70
 Ibid., p.19. 
29 
 
work of Alan Clinton and was studied from a sociological perspective by Michael Moran.
71
 Alastair Reid 
has observed that this scenario was common to most process workers who in this period shared a 
perspective of ‘gritty realism’ concerned with pay, conditions and standards of living, and they tended to 
be keenly aware of their position in the pay league for public workers.
72
 
Therefore, for public enterprise workers, the question of how the annual wage round was 
calculated came to the foreground. David Winchester focussed especially on the erosion of “fair 
comparison” which had been the traditional principle of wage determination for much of the twentieth 
century and was formally endorsed by the Priestly Commission in 1955. 
The overall direction and magnitude of the changes cannot be in doubt. For two decades after World War 
II, the stability of public sector industrial relations was based on an implicit understanding that as long as 
government and senior management discharged their responsibility to be “good” employers, then 
employees and their union representatives would accept a reciprocal obligation to avoid industrial conflict. 
The central institutional expression of this tacit agreement was the system of “fair comparison” for civil 
service pay... Most of the unrest in public sector industrial relations has arisen from government 
intervention in collective bargaining; in particular, from the way in which different forms of incomes policy 
have disturbed customary pay relativities and undermined the principle of comparability that for a long 
time was the foremost influence on public sector pay determination.
73
 
The principle of fair comparison was always complex and imperfect and became more so in the 1960s 
when, under Labour, various attempts at linking wage agreements with productivity measurements were 
pursued which, alongside other interventions, led to the deterioration of pay relative to the private 
sector.
74
 Again, this issue was pronounced in public, labour-intensive industries such as the postal service. 
 All these developments took place against a backdrop of long-term structural and technological 
shifts in the British economy, most notably the decline of blue collar and the rise of white collar 
employment, and the concomitant automation of several industrial sectors. Research by George Sayers 
Bain first showed in detail that the rise of the service economy was one of the major shifts of the 
twentieth century. He found that changing technology was of central importance to shifts in Britain’s 
occupational structure, influencing the growth and decline of different industries.
75
 Public sector 
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industries had, since the late 1950s, increasingly responded to technological change with new IR policies 
and productivity agreements. This applied equally to a number of industries, namely gas which had made 
the switch from coal to oil; the railways which had undergone electrification; coalmining which had 
extended the use of power loading; and the ongoing evolution of the electricity supply network. This 
removed the need for millions of jobs, on the whole successfully planned and managed via natural 
wastage using methods of recruitment control, retirement, voluntary redundancies and retraining. Each of 
these industries therefore made changes to the utilisation of labour, creating new payment systems 
designed to elicit cooperation from their workforces.
76
 
 The Oxford School took an interest in how this applied in modern workplaces and boardrooms 
and tended to argue there was room for greater consultation over technological change, though there was 
some acknowledgement that this risked compromising unions’ chief task of defending their members’ 
interests, while management would tend to defend their autonomy. Worker participation in technological 
change was thus triumphed by some while others saw it as no more than an ‘adjunct’ to the more 
important role of collective bargaining.
77
 The historian Mark Bufton has argued that joint consultation 
was the most effective form of worker participation in this period and was successful in several European 
economies in binding labour and management into a common cause.
78
 Its chief merit was the 
improvement of productivity by fostering clearer communications between groups. This was held to 
strengthen workers’ morale by including them in discussing changes to their jobs and providing a forum 
to express grievances and suggest improvements which made better use of tacit knowledge. It also 
encouraged a workforce to be proactively involved in organisation and planning.
79
 From a management 
perspective, Joint Productivity Councils were time-consuming and undermined their scope for 
autonomous action. From the workers’ perspective, the benefits were not always apparent in practice. As 
a result, the track record of JPCs was patchy during the 1960s and 1970s. As Stephen Deery found in his 
research into the role of joint consultation in the process of technological change in this period: 
The basic difficulty for unions seems to lie in their inability to gain entry to the process of management 
decision-making at a sufficiently early stage to participate in the questions affecting the design and 
application of new technology. Invariably their role has been confined to ex post facto bargaining about pay 
and related issues once the technological systems have been implemented.
80
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As will be shown, this was less of an issue in the design of sorting machinery in the postal service, where 
union involvement had a significant effect on the process over the long term and increased once problems 
were encountered. 
The automation of industrial processes was clearly a major political issue throughout the western 
world in the twentieth century. The influx of micro-electronic technology into British industry gathered 
pace from the mid-1970s and prompted much debate among scholars. A landmark work was Harry 
Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (1974), 
which appropriated Marx’s theory of class conflict and argued that industrial technology had been used as 
a tool to control the workforces of large corporations.
81
 By deskilling jobs, automation weakened labour’s 
bargaining power and so the appeal to technological “progress” was in reality a fig leaf for capital’s 
continued exploitation of labour in the pursuit of profit. The extent to which this applied in Britain was 
much debated. Empirical work in the 1960s by Joan Woodward suggested that there was a clear pattern in 
the relationship between strategies of managerial control and choice of technology. Studying changing 
organisational structures and technologies in British firms, she found that managerial control could be 
either personal or mechanical. Personal control relied on the authority and influence of one person or 
group over another in a process of task supervision, a style best suited to small firms engaged in unit or 
small batch production. Mechanical controls were better suited to large organisations where the machines 
of production were designed to excerpt control over human operators. This was more often associated 
with the largest firms utilising process technology as opposed to unit or batch technology.
82
 However, 
beyond these general observations it was unclear how far the Braverman thesis applied in Britain, where 
it was criticised for being one-sided and lacking evidence. Several industrial sociologists argued that, in 
Britain, the labour process was likely to involve cooperation as well as conflict. Moreover, the 
introduction of automation or work-study programmes tended to de-skill labour and underestimated the 
complexity of “skill”, which covered both technical and social spheres and involved various forms of tacit 
knowledge.
83
Contrary to Braverman, some believed that automation brought the potential to democratise 
hitherto adversarial employment relationships. Writing in 1986, Richard Harris argued for the progressive 
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potential of changes based on micro-electronics when allied to participatory politics.
84
 He was joined by 
other students of the production process such as Ian Benson, John Lloyd and Harley Shaiken in believing 
that industrial institutions were defined by the technical division of labour and ‘the human-technology 
relationships that make up the core structure of organizations’.85 At the same time, worker participation in 
the design of technology was much discussed with reference to British firms such as Lucas Aerospace.
86
 
Many likeminded scholars were enamoured with the democratisation of innovation, carried furthest in 
Swedish and Norwegian organisations.
87
  
The Economic and Social Research Council, the largest funding body for economic and social 
research in Britain, sponsored a major multi-industry survey into the effects of automation on the labour 
process in this period. The findings were published and analysed by William Daniel in Workplace 
Industrial Relations and Technical Change (1987).
88
 This found that technological change was not as 
divisive, and unions not as hostile to it, as many had suggested. Workers and managers at 2,000 British 
firms were interviewed in 1980 and, contrary to expectations, workers and shop stewards generally did 
not oppose technological change but were more likely to welcome it, even where it created redundancies. 
In other words, while public perception of worker resistance to technological change was strong, the 
reality was different.
89
 Although some workforces did contest technical change, resistance to 
organisational change – that is, alterations in working methods or relocations of staff not involving any 
changes in technology – was far more widespread. This trend was more marked than other variables, such 
as the sector of the economy involved, although resistance to all forms of change was more likely in large 
organisations and nationalised industries. Subsequent studies indicated that supportive attitudes were due 
to several factors including a belief that new technology represented progress; that the benefits of new 
machinery were immediate and tangible; that advanced technology conferred competitive advantage and 
prestige; that it offered assurances of a healthy future for the workplace concerned; and that new 
technology was attractive because it helped people to master skills of increasing usefulness outside of 
work. In summary, a clear trend towards the perception of new technology as progressive and inevitable 
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 The study also shed light on the role of worker participation in the choice and 
implementation of new technology. Daniels emphasised that there was a wide consensus over the benefits 
of worker participation over the introduction of new technology which included the CBI, the TUC and the 
main political parties. Yet, overall, British management remained resistant and so in many cases there was 
little workforce involvement in technological change.
91
 Such consultation was more prevalent in 
nationalised industries than in all other economic sectors.
92
 
These findings were consistent with public statements by the TUC in the 1970s, which were 
generally encouraging of technological change, asking for full disclosure of plans and consultations with 
the people affected, leading to mutual agreements between workers and management.
93
 Common 
arguments were that redundancies should be minimised; financial savings should be shared with the 
workforce; and computers should not be used to monitor work performance. The TUC consistently 
stressed the importance of investing in new technology to secure employment in the long-term.
94
 Similar 
statements were the norm in most individual cases in this period, while a MORI poll found that only 2% 
of rank and file union members believed new technology should be resisted, while managers responded 
that investment decisions were rarely scuppered by union opposition.
95
 Although New Technology 
Agreements were commonplace, especially towards the end of the decade, they were often incorporated 
with wider agreements over wages and conditions. Significant influence over technical and job design 
was rare. Mark Dodgson and Roderick Martin observed that questions of technology were generally 
included in existing collective bargaining procedures and typically revolved around traditional issues such 
as pay, grading, redundancy and safety rather than the choice of technology or its specifications.
96
 Mark 
Bufton has established that, overall, unions in this period influenced technological change in diverse 
ways.
97
 A union’s past record of obstruction might affect the decision over what sort of technology to 
choose or whether to invest at all. The financial outcomes of particular projects were altered by differing 
technology-related productivity agreements and pay disputes. The pattern of implementation and the way 
this altered working techniques often changed through negotiation and consultation. There was no single 
predictable effect of unionism on the process of technical change or on its productivity outcomes. 
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Quantitative studies provide no safe conclusions about whether, in general, unions have a positive or a 
negative effect on investment in technology or productivity performance in post-war Britain.
98
 
Several studies of automation in particular industries have shown that mechanisation in the postal 
service was, in many respects, not unique. For example, strong parallels exist between technological 
change in the postal and printing industries. Roderick Martin has documented simultaneous technological 
changes in Britain’s major newspaper groups in the 1970s, when Fleet Street struggled with the 
introduction of computerised printing presses.
99
 As with postal mechanisation, this was the first 
fundamental technical change to the core process since the nineteenth century and involved both conflict 
and consultation between management and unions. It also involved new types of data-entry via keyboards 
and comparisons with this study are made at various points in this thesis. Alan Booth has shed light on 
various examples of technological change in the post-war British economy. In office and clerical work, 
automation was prompted in part by the increasing volume and complexity of work generated by growing 
economic activity and by an increasingly problematic labour market. Large organisations felt the greatest 
need for a combination of computerised tools and work-study programmes. Moreover, they were the most 
likely to equip managers with huge amounts of data and statistics on all manner of operational matters. 
This led to a preference for highly sophisticated operational simulations being used to guide decisions 
over investment decisions and organisational change.
100
 In banking, the mechanisation of the mass-
handling of documentation (such as cheques) was coupled with an influx of “systems thinking” in the 
1960s, the stepwise improvement of technology over successive “generations” and the massive use of 
computing, bringing with it the introduction of larger work centres and the centralisation of decision-
making.
101
 These are all features of technological change which feature in the following chapters. 
The sociologists Jon Clark, Ian McLoughlin, Howard Rose and Robin King have highlighted the 
role of social and technical forces at work in the development of British telephone exchanges in the 
1980s. They found that maintenance engineers were split between two different technologies: the older, 
mechanical Strowger system and the newer, electronic TXE4 system.
102
 The Strowger system required 
maintenance engineers to use manual dexterity and linear problem solving. They might begin their careers 
fixing the more common, straightforward faults before moving on to more complex cases. Contrastingly, 
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the TXE4 system had fewer faults but maintenance engineers needed to think laterally and in greater 
depth to identify them, requiring detailed system-knowledge from the outset. Both systems achieved 
similar results but technical differences in the hardware had a determining influence on the design of jobs 
and the structure and hierarchy of the workforce.
103
 They echo a point made by the historian Thomas 
Hughes,
104
 that, once frozen into a particular configuration, technology itself has its own properties and 
momentum and needs to be incorporated as a central feature of a rounded explanation. 
Finally, there has been a tradition in the social history of technology of attempting to situate the 
emergence of technological systems in their cultural and economic context and this has led to certain 
theoretical insights of relevance to this thesis.
105
 Thomas Hughes has written extensively on the history of 
electricity networks and the role of engineers, inventors and corporations in the formation of American 
industrial capitalism.
106
 In his preoccupation with networks and systems, Hughes challenges common 
assumptions about the role of the ‘individual inventor genius’ by delineating the structural forces that 
shape the processes of design, innovation and implementation of what he terms ‘technological 
systems’.107 In this spirit, some have thought of entire postal systems as a form of technology.108 As will 
be shown, the systems concept became hugely important in postal engineering as well as in operational 
fields at the Post Office in the twentieth century. Hughes also identified distinguishing characteristics of 
institutionalised systems engineering, focussing on the “Reverse Salient” in which long-term problem-
solving across a wide front is, at historical junctures, threatened by critical technical problems which may 
appear to jeopardise the feasibility of the emerging technical paradigm. All efforts are then expended in 
removing this reverse salient to get the project back on track and this, too, applies to the British project of 
developing coded sorting, for instance in the early chemistry research intended to solve the problem of 
imprinting codes on envelopes. This has ties with the theory of “path dependence” and “lock-in” 
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originally founded in economic and evolutionary sciences, in which historical contingency may establish 
a single path of development among many equally viable (in principle) alternatives.
109
 The establishment 
of the design-path described in Chapter 1 sheds light on how something like this phenomenon played out 
in the postal service. 
 
Structure, sources and methodology 
 
The thesis is organised into six, roughly chronological, chapters. Each has a theme which, taken together, 
give an indication of the arc of the thesis. These are: design, planning, conflict, reappraisal, consultation 
and training. The first two chapters are concerned in different ways with explaining how and why the PO 
approved the Letter Post Plan in 1969. The first chapter summarises the pre- and post-war history of 
postal mechanisation, explaining why the PO became interested in automated sorting and the role of the 
Engineering Department in designing machines which would have long-lasting political implications. The 
second chapter considers the political and bureaucratic context in which planning the LPP was 
undertaken. The third chapter describes the effects of the 1971 strike and the reasons why the UPW voted 
to withdraw their cooperation in 1972. The fourth and fifth chapters address how this dispute was 
resolved. Chapter four describes the negotiation and remodelling involved in revalidating the LPP, while 
chapter five provides an account of the design of a second generation of machines with improvements in 
joint-consultation. The final chapter draws closer to the practical questions of implementing new 
technology by tracing the history of staff training in preparation for mechanisation. The conclusion 
returns to the issues discussed above, and reviews the conclusions reached in the chapters leading to ask 
again how the PO should be judged in its record of managing technological change. 
A set of overarching, preliminary questions guided the early research for this thesis. i.e. What 
were the major events and developments characterising the mechanisation of the mail? Why did the PO 
pursue mechanisation and were they right to do so? How did this decision affect industrial relations – was 
it divisive or constructive? It soon became apparent that the history of postal mechanisation was too broad 
and complex to address thoroughly in a single study, and so research increasingly focussed on the critical 
period 1969-1975. Though this period continued to be the main focus, there is some overlap, especially in 
chapters one and two which summarise elements of the back-story to the formal approval of the LPP in 
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1969. As research progressed, new questions arose concerning the nature of systems planning in the post-
war period; how design engineering interacted with industrial politics; the relationship between corporate 
strategy, structural change and technological innovation in a network industry; the effects of government 
policy and inflation on public sector capital investment; and the nature and course of negotiating 
workplace change between staff, engineers and management. These are outlined in more detail in each of 
the chapters. 
The primary archival resource has been the documentary holdings of the British Postal Museum 
& Archive (BPMA) in London, also referred to as the Royal Mail Archive. The BPMA has catalogued its 
material into around 150 classes according to the National Archives’ records management criteria. Each 
“POST” class encompasses a particular theme, such as buildings, uniforms, mail circulation or 
publications, and the files are organised according to their originating department and by period. Many 
types of documents were consulted including committee reports and minutes, official publications, 
research papers, correspondence, magazines, journals, newspaper cuttings, departmental histories, 
scientific and technical reports, manuals, diagrams, maps and photos. I had free access to all open records 
and was able to view some closed files under the Freedom of Information Act and in consultation with 
archivists. I was also provided with access to the internal cataloguing system and, under the guidance of 
archivists, to much uncatalogued material. The bibliography contains a list of the main classes and 
records involved. The BPMA search room also holds many informally collated “portfolios” containing 
miscellaneous cuttings on various subjects and personalities. There is a substantial specialist library with 
books on all aspects of PO history, and back issues of specialist journals in philatelic and local postal 
history. I also visited the BPMA’s warehouse in Debdon, Essex, where the Royal Mail museum 
collections are currently stored and viewed dozens of artefacts including sorting machines, vehicles and 
post boxes. The BPMA is currently located on the site of Royal Mail’s eight-acre Mount Pleasant Sorting 
Office, with other offices on site, which provided many opportunities to observe postal operations first-
hand. 
 Other archival resources included the trade union records held at the Modern Record Centre in 
Warwick (identified in the footnotes as MRC) and governmental papers held at the National Archive 
(TNA). The National Sound Archive at the British Library (BL, NSA) is home to “An Oral History of the 
Post Office” including recorded interviews with many former PO employees, executive managers and 
senior engineers. These provided an important human counterpoint to an otherwise mostly documentary 
source base, which I augmented with conversations and correspondence with former PO employees, 
engineers, managers and unionists whom I met through the BPMA or in the course of presenting papers 
in various seminars and lectures. Secondary sources are discussed above and are referred to throughout 
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the thesis, but it should be noted that the period under study is relatively recent and so there is a great deal 
of published material from sociological and organisational journals which is a hybrid between primary 
and secondary material. 
 





In May 1969 the Post Office Board convened to consider what had come to be known as the Letter Post 
Plan (LPP). A case was presented for reshaping the letter post system involving the most radical and 
wide-ranging changes to the network in modern history. The idea of concentrating the mail onto new 
types of mechanised sorting offices had long been discussed within the industry and had been formally 
examined by the Treasury. Indeed certain major preparatory policies – the limited introduction of sorting 
machinery, the two-tier (first and second class) service and the issuing of postcodes – were already in 
place before 1969. However the Board was now ready to receive a formal proposal for how 
mechanisation might be implemented nationally. Most of the nation’s correspondence was then sorted at 
thousands of locations in the network; the LPP proposed that this flow of mail should instead be 
concentrated in 120 Mechanised Letter Offices, each equipped with sorting machinery capable of rapidly 
processing large quantities of mail. Added to this, every address in Britain was to be issued with a code 
which householders and businesses should attach when addressing their correspondence, so that letters 
could be registered by a machine operator when entering the system and subsequently sorted by machine 
at every point along their journey. This arrangement was termed “code-sort”: a simple and elegant 
concept intended to modernise the increasingly complex and unwieldy infrastructure which had evolved 
over the preceding century. The Board heard of the efficiency and labour-saving benefits promised up to 
the end of the century and beyond, and, satisfied with the plan’s economic, technological and political 
prospects, gave formal approval. In context, this decision was one of a series of wider changes marking 
the year 1969. These were the final days of the old General Post Office, or “GPO”, with the entire 
organisation on the brink of having its status changed from that of a government department, whose staff 
were civil servants, to a public corporation with putatively greater autonomy from government, more 
explicit profit targets and a commercial management ethos. Mechanising the mail was envisioned as part 
of a wider movement to modernise the postal service and equip it for the future. It promised fundamental 
changes to the technology at the heart of postal infrastructure and to the working environment. The 




This chapter provides a brief history of automated sorting up to the 1960s, focussed mostly on 
technological developments. The purpose of this and the following chapter is to point out that the LPP 
approved in 1969 was the culmination of more than twenty years of technological, economic and political 
planning. The present chapter focuses on technological aspects of planning, while the following chapter 
focuses on the political aspects. This establishes the groundwork for arguing that the characterisation of 
the PO’s management of change in this period as inept is flawed. While some naivety and mistakes are 
acknowledged, these are viewed in the context of the achievements of planning and the good reasons that 
existed for choosing to mechanise in 1969, remembering that British preparations were widely held to be 
the most advanced in the world. This section of the thesis therefore challenges existing assumptions about 
the causes of postal mechanisation and, by extension, about the relative failure of mid-twentieth century 
nationalised industries to plan for change. There is little appreciation of the scale and duration of 
technological planning in Post Office historiography. Martin Daunton and Alan Clinton both followed the 
former-executive-turned-critic Michael Corby in believing that mechanisation was a product of the 1960s 
fashion for technological modernisation.
 Daunton stated that ‘the benefits were certainly exaggerated in 
the contemporary enthusiasm for technology for its own sake, so characteristic of the 1960s’. Clinton’s 
view was that ‘the changes in the Post Office after 1964 should be seen in the context of exaggerated faith 
in the efficiency of … technological innovation and administrative reform’.1 In his recent narrative 
history of Royal Mail, Duncan Campbell-Smith includes some perceptive passages on the design of 
sorting machines, although his interpretation is questioned here. He has also assessed the impact of Benn 
and the consultants McKinsey, although he focussed on how they helped shape the Corporation Act 1969 
rather than on their advocacy of mechanisation.
2
 
Discussion of planning specifically related to technological change remains undeveloped in PO 
historiography and where judgements have been made about why the PO chose to mechanise sorting and 
about the suitability of its plans for doing so, they have been superficial. In this chapter the origins of 
technological planning are traced back to experimentation with the first sorting machines in the 1930s and 
the post-war decision to expand research and development, arguing that long-term industrial relations 
were critical to establishing the design path. The evolution of postcodes is highlighted to show that 
planning for the mechanised era took into account not only the convenience of public and commercial 
users, but also the wellbeing of postal workers. In chapter 2 the context of the 1960s modernisation 
movement in which the plan gained momentum is assessed, showing that preparing for new technology 
and new industrial relations had connections with the wider institutional upheaval associated with the 
Post Office Act, 1969. In tracing the long and short term factors shaping the LPP, some of the salient 
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characteristics of the industry are explained and these chapters provide a framework for the thesis by 
summarising the history of the main technological and political issues underpinning mechanisation. 
Commercial strategy, system planning, machine design, and union consultation were central themes of the 
political economy of the 1970s postal service and of the chapters which follow. Understanding of these 
issues is enriched by appreciating their history and interrelation. In doing this, a principal theme of the 





Sorting the mail has long been one of the major functions of the postal service, alongside collections, 
conveyance and delivery. The Royal Mail established the basic methods for this in the seventeenth 
century. Although these were honed over time as the system became more elaborate, the fundamental 
principles involved were unchanged by the mid-twentieth century. Based primarily on the simple sorting 
frame, mail was divided between dozens of pigeon holes, or “selections”, denoting the next stage in the 
journey of each letter. Frame-sorting techniques were refined during the Victorian expansion of postal 
services, when a labyrinthine system of timetables and trains connected a growing number of Head Post 
Offices and Forwarding Offices where most of the sorting took place. The system continued to evolve on 
this basis through the first half of the twentieth century when new technology was slow to make any great 
impact on the core techniques. Frame-sorting took place in rural post offices, large city buildings and 
even specialised train carriages – the famous Travelling Post Offices celebrated in W.H. Auden’s poem, 
Night Mail. Critical points in the network such as London’s Mount Pleasant and the King Edward 
Building were sited within reach of major railway stations and became home to specialised sections (i.e. 
Inland and Foreign) where the traditions of frame-sorting were perfected. Ideas for mechanising letter 
handling were aired speculatively in the nineteenth century but gained little traction until, first, motorised 
conveyance and, second, new computing and mechanical handling technologies became available during 
the first half of the twentieth century.
3
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 The mechanisation of conveyance in the early twentieth century in particular altered the dynamics 
of postal operations in ways to which later mechanisation had to adapt. Although much of the material 
infrastructure of the early twentieth century was a developed version of Victorian arrangements, such as 
bags, trolleys, sorting frames, tables, lists and directives etc., key elements of logistics were progressively 
mechanised primarily in the form of a growing motor transport fleet between offices,
4
 and conveyor belt 
installations within offices. Such mechanical handling systems were highly developed and widely adopted 
throughout European postal administrations in the inter-war period.
5
 In the 1930s London’s largest sorting 
office, Mount Pleasant, was fitted with chutes and lifts transporting mail between floors, while conveyor 
belts shuttled the mail above the heads of sorting clerks.
6
 At the Bristol Head Post Office, large conveyors 
ran through a tunnel connecting the building with train platforms. Under the streets of London the largest 
offices were connected by an unmanned, subterranean railway, opened in 1928 and later known as Mail 
Rail, running between Paddington and Whitechapel. During this period the PO fortified its global reach as 
it established airmail services with Imperial Airways.
7
 Methods of conveyance were continuously refined 
to maintain service levels in the face of a national annual letter volume that doubled from 5 to 10 billion 
items through the middle third of the twentieth century.
8
 Increasing the speed and reach of transport went 
hand in hand with various service alterations such as the reduction of the numbers of daily deliveries and 
the concentration of sorting onto larger offices. The building of a 4,000 strong motor fleet had, by the 
1930s, rendered permanent changes to circulation and sorting arrangements. While statistical research 
made contributions in the 1950s, followed by computer-aided routing in the 1960s, sorting remained in 
large part a trade craft based on memory, dexterity and team work. ‘It was always a pleasure to watch a 
team of expert sorters under pressure’ remembered former Regional Postal Director W. MacKenzie in 
1976. 
Without so much as a glance at the sorting lists they would pump out a steady 40 a minute, with an 
occasional query about the whereabouts of some obscure address – the query and the answer from a 
colleague made without a break in the rhythm – the sorters reading the address on one letter as they were 
putting the previous one in the appropriate box...The early 1900’s probably saw the heyday of circulation as 
an art; those were the days of the legendary circulation wizards in the Surveying offices, chaps whose Bible 
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was the railway working time-tables and their Prayer Book, the works of Bradshaw, alas now no more. 
Colleagues long since dead used to tell how they had only to suggest a mail from anywhere to anywhere 
and the wizard invariably knew a train on some obscure branch line, almost forgotten by the railway 
authorities themselves, which would provide just the connection required.
9 
This was manual sorting, and by the middle of the twentieth century it continued to be the 
predominant method. All dispatching offices received a daily influx of mail which was segregated first by 
physical qualities (letters, newspapers, parcels etc.) and then by geographic destination (regions, cities, 
towns and streets). This depended on the manual sorter who typically stood, or was perched on a stool, at 
one of many 36- or 48-box sorting frames, filling each pigeon hole with letters according to their 
destination. Mail was brought to one of roughly 1,200 Dispatch Offices and sorted for delivery to its next 
destination. Each listed a set of other offices to which it sent mail, and each had a unique distribution 
pattern tied to the historic characteristics of that area’s mail flow. If the intended destination for a letter 
coincided with one of the destination offices on the list, it was dispatched there directly and become part 
of the flow of mail for the inward office. Inward sorting would then take place, again by hand, breaking 
the mail up into smaller and smaller units down to street level, ready to be bundled up and assigned to a 
postman’s delivery round. However, much of the mail might have to travel between several offices en 
route. Where an item was not bound for one of the prescribed destination offices it was sorted by county 
and moved on to one of two dozen intermediate offices until reaching that catering for the intended 
destination. These interim points, or Distribution Offices, were positioned by major transport hubs. Where 
these did not deliver to each other, a higher layer of a dozen General Forwarding Offices ensured a 
connection. Beyond these three main office types were Local Forwarding Offices (performing the same 
function as General Forwarding Offices but at the district level) and, on the railways, Travelling Post 
Offices. At every point in the network the mail needed segregating and sorting into different divisions 
meaning that letters might be handled numerous times before delivery.
10
 
Before the 1930s a handful of inventions had brought modest changes to manual sorting. This 
applied in particular to the preliminary stages of letter sorting. Stamp cancelling machines improved 
considerably upon the first hand-powered patent of Pearson Hill (son of the famous postal reformer 
Rowland Hill) in 1856-57. Letters were stacked and faced in the same direction before sorting and fed 
into the canceller, imprinting a mark – and often a date and place – across each stamp. Thereafter 
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engineering companies from Germany, America and Canada provided alternatives. Incremental 
improvements from the 1880s were submitted by experienced officers and surveyors, but in 1901 the PO 
purchased ‘The Columbia’ from an American firm, with around 60 used in London, Liverpool, Bristol 
and elsewhere by 1909.
11
 In 1937, a sorting clerk described for the Post Office Magazine how sorting aids 
were used to prepare mail for frame-sorting. 
The “Impress Machines” are set in motion, and as the evening “collections” rattle through the folls I hear a 
porter checking out the London mail. The evening’s work has begun. Every man on the floor has a job. 
Collectors empty their loads on tables, - indoor postmen sort out and face up “flat” correspondence,- 
packets are placed in rows (stamp upwards) and above the rattle of the impress machines can be heard 
porters yelling the arrival and departure of connecting mails. 
Letters are first sorted on upright 48 pigeon-holes placed back to back and in a row. Each pigeon-hole is 
labelled in geographical order with the name of an “area” or large town in the British Isles. The quickly 
filled “Foreign” box reflects the rapid increase in foreign correspondence. The extreme monotony of this 
work is brightened by discussions on almost every topic of the day, and “spicey” rumour of, say, a rise in 
wages is heard with eagerness. On “Primary” conversation often mixes with work and mirth sometimes 
drowns the whirr of the impress machine.
12 
By the late 1930s physicists at Dollis Hill were fitting photo-electric cells to cancelling and stamping 
equipment capable of sensing the position of a stamp on an envelope. This increased their output to 500-
700 items per minute. Other innovations included table conveyors which moved the mail along during 
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Notwithstanding the introduction of supporting mechanical aids, the first significant steps in 
mechanising the core activities of sorting occurred in the 1930s when the PO trialled a machine called the 
Transorma, which proved to be a defining moment in the history of postal mechanisation. The PO had 
spent years making speculative enquiries, dating back to 1910 when Major O’Meara, the Engineer-in-
Chief, and Sir Robert Bruce, Controller of the London Postal Service, witnessed various mechanical 
devices in American postal depots and returned convinced that these could increase efficiency and reduce 
costs in the British system.
16
 O’Meara realised that, for mechanical aids to be effective, their design must 
be informed by local operational knowledge and he requested mail flow estimates for towns in which new 
buildings were planned. Operational experience and statistical knowledge of mail flow thereafter came 
increasingly to bear as the search for mechanical solutions became more focussed. Following the First 
World War, John Doherty, a determined but ultimately frustrated Head Postmaster who worked at both 
Manchester and Maidstone, submitted consecutive schemes which were trialled but found wanting on 
operational and economic grounds; as were attempts by engineers from America and New Zealand.
17
 The 
American engineer, M. C. Voigtlander, first fitted a keyboard to an automatic facer/canceller to direct 
letters among numerous selection boxes, but was similarly unable to persuade the British of his ideas. 
Meanwhile Joseph Witherup, a postman from Liverpool, also fascinated by the potential of keyboards, 
imagined a rotating drum lined with slits to segregate small from large items of mail. Again, his ideas 
were thought impractical, although both keyboards and segregating drums would later become crucial 
features of mechanised sorting.
18
 Dissatisfied with even these more sophisticated designs, the PO turned 
in January 1928 to the Federation of British Industries and met thirteen firms to explain their needs. Of 
the trio that stepped forward, a proposal by Jackson & Co in Glasgow for a mechanical clearance fitting 
for facing and cancelling was trialled. However, after two years, this was similarly discontinued, again on 
operational and financial grounds. 
Meanwhile, in 1922, the PO formed a Mechanical Aids Committee (MAC) to add impetus to 
their investigations. Funding was a problem and the disparity between resources for telephone and postal 
research was identified by the MAC following its formation. It was later felt that the incentive to increase 
funding was missing in the inter-war period owing to the ready availability of ‘cheap’ labour and that the 
national volume of letter traffic, though growing, was more manageable.
19
 Nevertheless, MAC research 
was renewed when the PO moved its R&D from cramped offices in central London to the Dollis Hill 
Research Station on the outskirts of the city, opened by Prime Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, in October 
                                                     
16
 POST 69/28... BP 25 (46), Appendix: Mechanical Appliances, Section 2.  
17
 Ibid., Appendix Section 3.  
18
 Douglas N. Muir, ‘Early British Sorting Machines’, in Muir (ed.) PMSC Handbook, section C. 
19
 POST 69/28... BP 25 (46), Appendix: Mechanical Appliances, Section 4; Daunton, Royal Mail, pp.339-41. 
47 
 
1933. The new site provided separate laboratories for physics, chemistry, metallurgy, telephony, 
telegraphy, spectography and short-wave radio, as well as a library, lecture hall and construction park.
20
 
Though it was mainly used for telephone research, work on postal projects was undertaken in 
collaboration with Sovex Ltd, a contractor who built the mechanical parts of a new facing machine – 
comprising a table with drives, rollers, belts and scanning units.
21
 These developments moved in step with 
events abroad, as the Post Office took an interest in a machine developed in Holland and operating in 
Rotterdam sorting office since 1931. 
Now regarded as ‘the world’s first successful letter sorting machine’, the Transorma was 
designed by J. Marchand and J. Andriessen in the 1920s.
22
 Marchand began his career as a postman in the 
Dutch Post Office, later becoming an overseer, engineer and eventually Board member, before taking 
early retirement to build his machine with Andriessen, a professional mechanical engineer with whom he 
went into business, selling various Transorma models in several countries.
23
 The British Post Office 
purchased two 20-tonne machines to run in tandem at a suitable office in Brighton, beginning trials in 
October 1935 in the hope this might ‘prove an inspiration to British firms to design a superior type of 
sorting machine’.24 Sitting with colleagues on the upper deck of the machine, operators received spring-
loaded trays of letters already cancelled, stacked and faced. They lifted the front letter from the stack with 
the right hand, read the address, and dropped the letter into a slot. The left hand entered a code on the 
keyboard as the right hand was freed to fish out the next letter in line. Any one of hundreds of codes 
denoting Brighton streets and districts was recalled by memory, the operators drawing on their training 
and overhead code lists. Each letter was then carried by the machine on a fixed-pace “endless chain 
carrier” delivering to one of 250 selection boxes according to the operator’s code which set nine steel pins 
on the carrier corresponding to the unique release settings for the correct selection box. Thus the routing 
information was stored and transmitted mechanically. Duncan Campbell-Smith has perhaps captured the 
essence of the machine best: ‘The keys were attached to a highly ingenious series of levers, push-rods, 
conveyor belts, flaps and buckets that clattered around inside the body of the machine like the workings 
of some giant fairground attraction’.25 
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In several respects, the machines were successful in providing local operational benefits, and, 
consequently, remained in use well into the 1960s. Sorting rates were automatically recorded and 
marginally higher than frame-sorting, and operator ‘ident’ stamps allowed errors to be traced back to 
source. The chief advantage of the Transorma was that a large increase in the number of ‘pigeon holes’ to 
which a sorting clerk could divide the mail was enabled without reducing the rate of sorting. 
Nevertheless, the PO declined further purchases because the initial outlay exceeded long term savings and 
due to a range of technical and ergonomic flaws. Difficulties with letter stacking, sorting errors, 
maintenance, and the replacement of parts created frustration, while keyboard design, machine size and 
noise levels were also problematic. But two flaws in particular were fundamental. The first was that the 
coding technique enabled only local mechanical sorting. No machine-readable code was added to the 
letters themselves, so manual sorting was still necessary during the letter’s journey. The second was that 
the pace at which operators worked was rigidly fixed by the speed of the endless chain carrier, a type of 
mechanism commonly used in process manufacturing since the industrial revolution.
26
 This monotonised 
the work of the operator and precluded his improving future sorting rates. The machine’s limits were still 
governed by human abilities, now located not in average physical capacity as in frame sorting, but in the 
average memory capacity. Experiments suggested that the average mind could quickly recall about 250 
numbers corresponding to place names, and imaginative methods of training in this skill were devised. 
Marchand later published an operator training manual, with a timetable scheduling rounds of choral 
singing for trainee ‘Transormists’, combined with other techniques, such as the instructor pointing out 
successive cities and demanding instant recall of the correct numbers, in unison.
27
 Singing and chanting to 
help the work along was already practiced by some at the sorting frame, as postman Jerry O’Connor 
explained in the Post Office Magazine in 1938: 
Music has a sustaining power, and should be harnessed to the other arts to lighten the labours of those who 
perform rhythmical jobs such as sorting. There was once a Superintendent who, when the work was 
flagging, would tap the electric light shade in front of his desk, and the staff, taking the note (which was G), 
would proceed to sing quietly a verse of a well-known hymn.
28
 
However, it is unlikely Transormists will have identified with this scene. John Piggott, an early pioneer in 
postal engineering, remembers that the union was ‘seething’ in the Brighton area at the time and that 
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operators resented losing control over their pace of work. ‘What they hated was that the machine 
controlled them, they did not control the machine’.29 
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In summary, the early history of postal mechanisation shows that an aspiration to mechanise the 
mail became a persistent PO policy at least fifty years before the enthusiasm for technological renewal of 
the 1960s. From a technical perspective, during the inter-war period several of the techniques which later 
became vital to the field emerged, including the use of belts and rollers for physical manipulation; of 
photo-electrical devices for sensing; of keyboards and codes for rendering the mail intelligible to 
machines; and of mechanical forms of memory storage for linking the coding and sorting stages. 
Likewise, from a political perspective, the PO had its first experiences of acclimatising to the use of 
mechanical aids; of coordinating the expertise of contractors, field officers and engineers; designing 
training courses that delivered efficient performance; and consulting staff over the integration of new 
working methods with long-established routines. The culmination of these developments is seen in the 
Transorma experiment, the significance of which was that it provided the PO with a template upon which 
to improve. Douglas N. Muir, Curator of Philately at the British Postal Museum & Archive, has described 
the experiment as a ‘test bed for the future’ in proving the possibility in principle of an economical sorting 
machine and furnishing a body of knowledge about its ‘real world’ workings. It also helped the PO gauge 
the reactions of staff and, above all, displayed in its shortcomings the technical issues for future 
investigation.
32
 The Transorma also highlighted the limits that reliance on outside contractors placed on 
finding a broader solution. Moving to that level required in-house, systematic, R&D, drawing on 
resources that only a large institution could provide. Though capable of one-off automatic sorting, the 
Transorma could not mechanise the mail in the widest sense on account of the need for re-sorting by hand 
elsewhere in the system. It was an isolated success in speeding up the work of sorting clerks in a 
particular location, but it was an expensive and problematic investment only suitable for particular types 
of offices. By the 1940s, PO engineers were thus prompted to consider a system-wide solution, 
recognising that this was a longer road, lined with more formidable obstacles, but promising to lead much 




Pre-war, both the emergence of motorised conveyance and mechanised sorting aids owed much to the 
increasing influence of the Engineering Department. Post-war, the influence of engineers on postal 
services became greater still, partly because letter sorting had at last demonstrated a susceptibility to new 
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types of mechanical control, but also because engineering had in the first half of the century grown into a 
powerful force at the Post Office thanks to the role of technicians in building and maintaining the national 
telephone network. Engineering was established as a PO profession when the telegraphs were 
incorporated in 1870. When telephones were later similarly nationalised there was a surge in the 
employment of electrical engineers, many of whom after the First World War joined together to form the 
Post Office Engineering Union (POEU).
33
 In the interwar period the Engineering Department was 
preoccupied with installation and maintenance, while increasing resources were devoted to research and 
development. While the majority of R&D in telephony continued to come from the Bell Laboratories in 
America, in Britain the establishment of the Dollis Hill labs fostered more in-house innovation, 
particularly in cabling, transistors and radio.
34
 In the mid 1930s, the Engineer-in-Chief commanded a 
workforce comprising dozens of research and design staff, nearly 1,500 provincial engineering 
supervisors, and hundreds more in London working on lines and exchanges, supplies and fittings and 
maintaining the motor fleet.
35
 During the Second World War, PO Engineers Tommy Flowers and Gordon 
Radley contributed to code-breaking at Bletchley Park through the construction of “Colossus” (the first 
electronic, programmable computer developed by the British to read encrypted German messages) based 
on the valve-switching used in telephone exchanges, an experience that enriched both telephone and 
postal R&D after the war.
36
 By 1946 the Department was regarded as a global leader, with more than 
6,000 established engineers, tens of thousands more unestablished staff, and a significant R&D 
establishment of 40 research engineers and 14 scientists.
37
 Before 1945, R&D therefore related to 
establishing, expanding and making more efficient telegraph, telephone and radio communications. 
Modern postal engineering grew partly out of this context, able from the outset to draw on telephone 
expertise. Moreover, the PO’s involvement in military operations during the Second World War meant 
that its leading engineering personalities had firsthand knowledge of the power of massive, centralised, 
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operational research. Thereafter, these factors ensured that a better resourced and more systematic attempt 
to mechanise the mail was possible. 
 Increasingly during the 1930s and 1940s, contacts were made between Britain and America over 
the development of postal and telephone systems, and leading figures at the British PO were influenced 
by both technical and intellectual shifts occurring across the Atlantic. The burgeoning of national 
telephony resulted in new, systems-oriented conceptions of how R&D should proceed and the ideas 
similar to those of Theodore Vail, Chief Executive of AT&T in the interwar period, became prominent 
among senior British PO engineers. Vail understood the Bell System as ‘an ever-living organism.’38 He 
promoted ‘the ideology of systems engineering’ in which all elements needed to be coordinated and 
considered in a network context. Vail was instrumental in fostering what has been termed ‘network 
mystique’, in which, to be successful, new ideas needed the backing of a powerful scientific and 
engineering establishment and a period of adaptive development in which constraints imposed by the 
wider system were recognised.
39
 As a result, R&D in the Bell system was more gradual and methodical 
than market conditions would otherwise permit and this became a self-conscious virtue at AT&T, which, 
thereafter, acted according to ‘a strategy that looked far into the future and measured progress in decades 
instead of years’.40 The British PO in this period came to realise that a similar, long-term and systems-
oriented philosophy was required for the postal service if a new platform of sorting technology was to be 
successfully introduced. Experience with the Transorma only reconfirmed the British PO in its decision to 
apply a sustained in-house, systems-engineering approach to R&D in postal mechanisation. The best 
available machines on the international market did not meet PO requirements and although the general 
direction of the research that was needed was clear, the next stage was to decide whether to commit to this 
path and, if so, to specify the long-term target while figuring out what initial steps to take. These were 
questions for operational and engineering experts, but they would have to wait as, in 1939, all 
mechanisation research was shelved for the duration of the war. 
The Engineer-in-Chief in this period was Sir Stanley Angwin, appointed to the position in 1939 
having first joined as a Second Class Engineer in 1906. After the war he turned his attention to 
mechanisation and became convinced that conditions were ripe for a more concerted approach. During his 
career he saw that a shift had occurred in postal economics. The financial position had changed from the 
pre-war era when wages were 55% less costly. Mechanisation was financially justified where it had not 
been before and, in Angwin’s view, this made it ‘a matter of urgency to get an influx of new people and 
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get them at work on the outstanding problems’.41 As one of four Assistant Director Generals sitting on the 
PO Board,
42
 he was able in November 1946 to recommend a significant injection of funding, arguing that 
the success seen in telephone research could be replicated in postal engineering. The extra resources 
would provide the basis for a more sustained and systematic approach. ‘It has now been realized’ read his 
report to the Board, ‘that many of the problems of Postal Mechanization require the application of 
scientific principals not hitherto applied.’43 
The move to tackle postal mechanisation with greater ambition while keeping the needs of 
workers in mind coincided with the post-war Labour Government’s encouragement of innovative 
productivity policies. The President of the Board of Trade, Stafford Cripps, speaking in September 1946, 
urged ‘the use of every device of ingenuity and invention by organization, mechanization, improved 
layout and more skilled and scientific management to increase the capacity of our industries without 
putting a greater load on our workers’.44 In 1946 the Engineering Department for the first time listed 
postal mechanisation as one of the 39 major technical projects ongoing at Dollis Hill (alongside 
established telephone-related fields such as switching circuit theory and thermionic valve research) and 
£50,000 was allocated for the recruitment of additional scientists.
45
 Meanwhile, an enlarged Mechanical 
Aids Committee was formed on which every major postal department was represented including Postal 
Services, Power and Research Engineering, Finance, Personnel, various regional directors as well as 
Union/Staff-side representation.
46
 The new MAC stressed the importance of interdepartmental 
collaboration and, in particular, sought to offer a forum for dialogue between experienced postal 
managers and technologists. 
The main motive is close and constant discussion and interchange of ideas between practical postal officers 
and engineers. While progress must finally depend in the main on the resource and ingenuity of the 
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A commonly held assumption about the creation of industrial technology is that a dominant group, 
usually management, sets the agenda and the goals. For example, Val Dusek’s textbook on the philosophy 
of technology remarks that ‘[typically], the interests of owners and managers determine the design of 
factory technology to the almost complete exclusion of the desires and interests of labourers’.48 At the 
PO, management and engineers were the driving force in directing postal R&D, but the records of the 
MAC make it clear that the staff-side became firmly established as a persistent and influential voice in the 
major issues surfacing through the 1940s, 50s and 60s. The Chairman was Sir Alexander Little, Director 
Postal Services, who described the MAC as ‘a clearing house for ideas’. The first meeting was held in 
May 1946 where it was agreed that ‘the committee must get away from the past and break new ground’ 
and promote ‘pioneering work’. It was also made clear at the outset that staff-side concerns should be 
central, as outlined by the UPW representative Mr G. Stevens who remarked that sorting machines should 
‘ease the staff’s burden rather than be used to drive the staff’. The other members agreed that ‘a major 
object should be to improve the conditions of staff’.49 This became a well established design policy 
throughout the 1950s and 60s, and, in one crucial respect, one that engineers were locked into from 1946. 
This was the commitment to free human operators from the rhythm of the machine. It was believed that 
higher levels of productivity were possible if individual operators were not limited by a uniform, 
mechanised rhythm, catering to the (s)lowest common denominator, as the Transorma had done. Creating 
a system that successfully synchronised human-paced coding with subsequent (but interlinked) 
rhythmically-paced mechanical sorting became a defining feature of the post-war R&D effort. It was a 
hugely difficult but worthwhile problem to solve, as it enabled the workforce to operate in relative 
comfort and thereby achieve higher output. The more politically acceptable mechanised sorting could be, 
the more effective its contribution to productivity in the long-term. In this way staff wellbeing became 
integral to the pursuit of efficiency. 
Two documents were produced in 1946 outlining the long-term vision and the short-term 
programme of R&D. These represented what Duncan Campbell-Smith has termed ‘the Gemmell-Carter 
vision’.50 Assistant Staff Engineer for Research, Mr R.O. Carter, ‘put forward certain suggestions 
regarding the possible ultimate development of letter sorting, not ten years, but perhaps thirty or even fifty 
years hence’. He made an analogy with telephone R&D, pointing out that if, in the early years of 
automatic switching on local networks, there had been a clearly articulated long-term plan to create a 
nationally integrated system – even though certain technical problems then seemed insoluble – later 
problems in making the transition to long-distance trunk dialling might have been avoided. 
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In the same way, if the future trend of mechanization of letter sorting can be foreseen, it may be possible to 




Carter therefore believed that R&D should not lose sight of the ultimate goal: a nationally integrated 
system of mechanised sorting offices in which the public would add a code to their letters in order that 
machines could do the sorting. ‘It is envisaged’, he wrote, ‘that every street, or possibly even every 
address would have its individual code, which would be noted or remembered with the name and address 
of a correspondent in the same way as are telephone numbers at the present time’.52 Like staff wellbeing, 
the long-term goal of comprehensive and integrated sorting office mechanisation was appealed to time 
and again over the next twenty years.
53
 It formed the basis not only of the main MAC but of its sub-
committees such as the working parties responsible for major development fields such as coding and 
sorting machine design. For example Mr J.E. Yates of the Postal Services Department, overseeing sorting 
machine R&D, was explicit about this from the outset: 
…the basis of the Working Party’s programme was to mechanise all processes … from the time of arrival 
… to the bagging off stage… Letter collections would be fed, via hoppers, into a mechanical segregator and 
facing machine, whence the letters would pass mechanically through a stamp cancelling machine, thence be 
fed automatically to a machine sorter who would read the address, and code for … subsequent mechanical 
sorting… It [is] hoped that bundling would eventually be done without human intervention. It was with this 
ultimate picture in mind that the Working Party was proceeding.
54 
It was nevertheless acknowledged that this would take many years to accomplish. The medium-term 
challenge – within ‘the next one or two decades’ – was to produce a viable sorting machine. 
Power Engineer Mr. W.T. Gemmel provided the near-term blueprint. His key concept was that 
the coding of letters should be separated from the sorting. That is, ‘the reading of the address and the 
translation of this information into the appropriate selection’ should be treated separately from ‘the 
placing of the letter in the box corresponding to this selection’. The first stage required that the 
information in an address be expressed as a machine-readable code and, as a distant prospect, there was 
hope that the public might reliably append standardised markings or, even more speculative, that 
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machines might be designed that were capable of reading human handwriting. But ‘with the normal 
variations in the handwriting and manner of addressing letters, it is difficult to conceive a method of 
performing [this] operation by machine, without the intervention of human intelligence’.55 As with the 
Transorma, operators would still be needed to attach the code. However by separating this coding stage, 
Gemmel saw prospects for creating chains of coding stations to feed a single stream of code-marked 
letters into one sorting machine. Moreover this meant that once code-marked, a letter could in principle be 
re-sorted by machine at any office during its journey. 
For example, a coding operator in London can apply a different coding to letters for Glasgow and Greenock 
respectively. Letters for both destinations will be placed in the same box by the sorting machine in London. 
On reaching Glasgow, they may be passed through the Glasgow sorting machine which will place letters 
for local delivery and letters for Greenock in different boxes.
56
 
Gemmel concluded by summarising and prioritising the required R&D: 
Technically the most difficult operations involved in the proposed system are those of recording the coding 
on the letter and of reading it subsequently in the sorting machine… The continuance or abandonment of 
the scheme will depend on the finding of satisfactory solutions to these problems. All of the suggested 
methods of coding may have to be investigated, possibly with variations which may suggest themselves as 
the work proceeds… Allowing for the necessary field trials on experimental models, the production of the 
first complete prototype equipment for service trial is likely to be a ten-year project.
57
 
At the outset, they faced a series of complex mechanical problems including how to separate 
letters into streams, to face them in the same direction, stack them in uniform piles and manipulate their 
movements with belts and diverters.
58
 The challenge was to create letter handling systems that could 
process many different sizes, shapes, weights and textures of mail with high reliability and speed. R&D in 
the 1950s therefore focussed on ‘evolving’59 a variety of segregating, facing, stacking, and sorting 
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 Improvement of mail handling techniques continued for the rest of the century, reaching a remarkable state of 
sophistication. In the early 1970s, academic mathematicians took an interest in letter-turning and stacking in sorting 
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methods to replace human labour in each discrete phase of the overall process.
60
 Many of the mechanical 
breakthroughs came in designing what was known as the “Interim Machine”, in which six sorting 
positions were linked, outputting a single aggregated stream of mail. Testing took place in the basement 
of London’s Mount Pleasant Sorting Office, beginning with the feeding and stacking of letters: a 
‘particularly difficult problem’ said Alexander Little, which had ‘baffled Postal Administrations for over 
20 years’.61 Improved belt and roller systems were developed and the machine’s framework was 
constructed at a factory in Birmingham. By the end of the decade, however, tests on the prototype led to 
concerns that the six-position format could not be brought up to operational standards with existing 
technology. Little vocalised this in October 1949: ‘We must face up to the hard conclusion’, he warned, 
‘that the machine must be practically fool-proof and must deal with all types of small correspondence’.62 
By the following October, Gemmell wanted to continue testing, but his frustrations were mounting. A 
device for separating letters had to prove that it could handle hundreds of thousands of letters reliably, but 
he reported that ‘some 2,000 or 3,000 were handled without a fault then, for no apparent reason, a 
particular item would fail to be picked up’.63 The most intractable problems stemmed from having the 
machine simultaneously accommodate six operators, and so although testing and refinement continued 
through the early 1950s, plans for alternative designs were put forward. Geoff Copping was one of those 
who believed a change of course was needed and in late 1952 argued that a single-position machine held 
out better prospects for operational viability. The Single Position Letter Sorting Machine – or “SPLSM” – 
was envisioned as a stand-alone sorting machine to be operated by a single keyboard position built onto 
one end. Copping believed that ‘the problems involved in the design and construction of the single unit 
machine were very much more susceptible of solution than those of the interim machine. Furthermore 
there was a vast reserve of experience gained during the development of the interim machine on which to 
draw’.64 Development on both projects ran in parallel but, by mid-1955, Little judged that if the SPLSM 
could be proved in a live trial the six-position design could be dropped.
65
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Meanwhile, chemists, physicists and mathematicians at Dollis Hill set about creating the 
materials and system for a code. Whether this was attached to envelopes by the public or by the machine 
operator (from a memorised list or by using prescribed rules for deriving a code from the written address, 
a technique known as “Extract Coding”), each item of mail had to end up with an imprinted machine-
readable code containing enough information for automated sorting. Early ideas for an ink-based 
chessboard pattern in black and white were abandoned because this might clash with other envelope 
markings.
66
 Instead, variations on the theme were investigated. A working group designed various binary 
codes and pursued methods using fluorescent materials for imprinting these onto dummy mail. Setbacks 
in the first two years were such that, for a time, the entire future of code-sorting was thought to be 
vulnerable, as Yates explained to the MAC. Envelopes were made from many types of paper, some of 
which presented seemingly impossible complications to fluorescent marking. ‘The chemists [are] not yet 
ready to say that the task assigned to them [is] impossible but they [are] forced to admit that the outlook 
[is] very unpromising’.67 A considerable amount of basic and applied research led to increasingly 
sophisticated chemical solutions. Simultaneous innovations included improved photo-electric scanning, 
the creation of machine languages and the application of coding theory. 
The long evolution of the postcode drew also on sustained and in-depth psychological and social 
scientific research. The choice of the shape and form of code required an understanding of how the public 
and commerce were likely to respond. The public were already familiar with London district codes,
68
 and 
analogies were drawn with car number plate schemes in search of a format that balanced familiarity with 
the optimal arrangement of numerals and letters.
69
 Research into the likely commercial response revealed 
that 800,000 businesses used post, 5% of these were heavy users posting approximately 25,000 items per 
month, and the majority were in favour of the code, citing the potential for lowering costs and improving 
internal administration.
70
 A four year study by outside consultants offered no new insights and concluded 
that ‘in general, Post Office thinking on, and study of, the problem of coding addresses was at an 
advanced stage’.71 Such market research was an ongoing theme of technological planning at the PO and 
played its part in shaping the R&D development path, contrary to assumptions found in industrial 
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sociology that large organisations, when making long-term decisions about automation, tended to 
downplay market research in favour the prevailing bureaucratic ideology
72
  
British accomplishments in postcode research were such that foreign postal administrations were 
advised by consultants to adopt similar alpha-numeric systems for the benefits they offered. The British 
system improved on European, American and Japanese schemes in accommodating not only outward but 
inward addressing. That is, the first part of the code gave city or town information (outward), while the 
second part gave street and house information (inward), allowing more flexibility in subsequent system 
planning.
73
 More generally, the inclusive approach to staff-side involvement in R&D was also noted by 
foreign observers of the British efforts to improve industrial productivity. The mere existence of staff 
consultation was noteworthy when compared with some other administrations. In 1960, the American 
Study Group to the European Productivity Agency cited British postal mechanisation as an example in 
which union representatives were consulted at all stages of testing and implementation of new machinery. 
Some consultation was undertaken in Belgium, however, unlike in Britain, postal unions had no veto 
power over installation. In Germany, unions also had less power to alter technological plans and were 
consulted less. In the French Post Office there were no productivity committees during this period. 
Rather, unions were advised that management had considered their needs before installations began.
74
 
An important characteristic of the R&D process was that within the limits set by what 
contemporary technology could be expected to realistically deliver, decision-making was further 
constrained by the various interests of staff, management, public and commercial habits, as well as the 
levels of performance required in the typical sorting office environment, not to mention the PO’s public 
commitments to standards for speed and accuracy of delivery. For instance, reflecting on the origins of 
the postcode, the PO explained to the Carter Committee (a 1976 parliamentary inquiry into all aspects of 
the postal service) that strict parameters were placed on its design in the 1950s. The public needed 
something memorable and uniform, but compatible with the old city district codes. Operationally the code 
needed flexibility to accommodate ad hoc revisions to circulation and delivery, and would have to form 
two parts reflecting outward and inward sorting. The characteristics required of the code therefore had to 
mesh with the demands of the economic and psychological aspects of letter writing, something that PO 
officials later remembered: 
                                                     
72
 Peter Senker, ‘Technical Change, Work Organisation and Training: Some Issues Relating to the Role of Market 
Forces’, in New Technology, Work and Employment, Vol. 4, 1 (1989), p.47. 
73
 Carter Report, p.79; Appendix to the Carter Report, p.324; POST 92/17, PO Report and Accounts 1970-71, p.15; 
POST 17/454... MAC, 04/04/57. 
74
 Bufton, Britain’s Productivity Problem, pp.52-3. 
61 
 
This financial requirement was a major factor in determining the type of equipment developed which 
affected the shape of the postcode. For example, the method envisaged for imprinting the codes in machine 
language was by means of an operator using a keyboard; and there was a limit to the capacity of the code 
‘translator’ device that could be developed at economic cost.75 
The financial viability of any code-sort system depended on high throughput rates at coding desks – the 
‘man-machine interface’ at which staff would sit and type each letter’s code for subsequent automatic 
sorting – and the chosen code structure was thus partly determined by which variants fitted best with the 
average mental and physical capacities (short-term memory and keyboard transcription) of operators. As 
Copping put it, ‘the longer the public code the longer the keying operation; this has a direct effect on the 
number of operators and coding machines the system will require’.76 Copping also stressed that finding 
the optimal format was a long-term and organic process, remembering that ‘the code had to be evolved, 
introduced and the public educated to use it, a lengthy process’.77 Similar explanations were heard by the 
Carter Committee: 
The development of the British Postcode in its final form was a lengthy process which evolved over a 
period of time. The considerations the postcode was required to satisfy and the most acceptable method of 
doing so were identified continuously as ideas about the theory and practice of postal coding and 
mechanisation crystallised in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
78
 
Indeed by the end of the 1950s each of the sub-disciplines in the maturing field of code-sort research had 
overcome the major barriers set before them in 1946. Working prototypes were in place for each of the 
key phases of sorting, from isolating a machinable stream from the mass of incoming mail, to the final act 
of automated sorting. Appropriate chemicals and techniques had been found for imprinting codes on 
envelopes. The complexities of twisting and turning letters accurately and at speed had been tamed, and 
the art of picking up, queuing and presenting letters of different shapes and sizes was producing useful 
results. Thermionic valve and threaded core matrix systems offered the computation to track and 
manipulate items of mail between the human coding and mechanical sorting phases. And a coding format 
had emerged, promising to balance the needs of machines, operators, the public, commerce and in-house 
demographic analysts whose job it would be to issue towns and cities with unique but consistent coding 
plans. The next step was to put these elements though a series of “live” tests. If it was to be operationally 
viable, mechanisation needed to perform reliably and economically under working conditions. 
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Three trials were particularly important in proving viability. Tests with a SPLSM at Bath Head 
Post Office in 1955 enabled the act of coding by staff to be examined from a psychological perspective.
79
 
In his preliminary research Dr Floyd, contributing experimental psychologist from the Medical Research 
Council, used slow-motion filmed footage to analyse operator movements and reactions. This prompted 
Sir Gordon Radley, senior engineer and Director of Postal Services, to pose the following questions of the 
research committee: What constitutes difficulty in deciphering and difficulty in coding a destination? 
Which kinds of codes are easiest to learn and use? What is the relationship between number of codes in a 
series and learning time? How far ahead would sorters read addresses given unlimited freedom? What are 
the determining factors? What is the relationship between coding time and the number of possible codes 
to choose from? How long does plural coding take relative to simple coding? What is the best training 
method?
80
 A trial with live mail at Luton in the summer of 1960 showed that the information contained in 
a written postcode could be reliably transposed into machine-readable markings composed of phosphor 
dots imprinted onto each envelope under ‘real world’ conditions.81 The most comprehensive trial was 
carried out in Norwich where, from 1959, all of the city’s addresses were allocated postcodes which the 
local population was asked to add to their correspondence. The Head Post Office was effectively turned 
into a pilot Mechanised Letter Office with local staff operating the full range of facing, segregating and 
code-sorting machinery. ‘It is from this installation’ wrote design engineer Geoff Copping in a 1959 paper 
on the future of automated sorting, ‘that it is expected to obtain the most valuable experience and to learn 
the fundamental economics of operating letter sorting machines’.82 The Norwich experiment proved that 
code-sorting could work in practice. Public and commercial addressing habits could be altered with 
appropriate publicity. Staff-side cooperation could be retained through effective consultation. And 
financial savings and increased productivity could be secured. When a further trial in Croydon began in 
1966, all local residents received a booklet from their Head Postmaster encouraging the use of their new 
codes. It read: 
Sorting letters by hand is time-consuming and expensive: it now costs many millions of pounds every year 
and occupies a lot of people. We need to mechanise it and thereby improve our productivity. This is 
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important for us in the Post Office. It is also important for us as a nation. If we are to get the most out of 
postal mechanisation we must have coding.
83
 
The success of the live trials was due not only to the smooth operation of the machines at the Head Post 
Offices involved, but also to the wider political and economic elements of the system working in harmony 
with the hardware. It was largely on the strength of the most substantial of the trials in Norwich that the 
Board approved the extension of postcoding nationwide in 1965, marking the point at which momentum 









                                                     
83
 POST 17/157, Postal Coding: An Important Message from the Head Postmaster, October 1966, p.2. Similar 
publicity in the Norwich trial was augmented by a survey which gathered data about why people chose not to use 
codes. POST 17/168, Analysis of Postal Enquiry into the Use of Postal Codes: Scope for Further Encouragement, 
1961. 
84
 POST 69/75, PO Board 1965: Board Paper 11, Postal Codes, January 1965. 
85
 POST 110/4089. 
64 
 
Nevertheless, the foremost achievement of post-war mechanisation was the successful 
development of the hardware, which, by the early-1960s, was both highly sophisticated and operationally 
sound. This was the heyday of British postal engineering and the profession produced some remarkable 
documents detailing its achievements, the best being the papers submitted for an international conference 
held in London, published in 1971 by the Institute of Mechanical Engineers under the title British Postal 
Engineering.
86
 These are addressed in some detail in a later chapter, which focuses on the political and 
ergonomic aspects of design and how this was carried forward to create a “second generation” of 
machines in the 1970s. Table 1.1 outlines the first generation of code-sort machines and their functions in 
order. The accompanying photographs and diagrams introduce the machines and indicate how they were 
joined to form a ‘suite’. 
This demonstrates, in basic terms, the functioning of hardware in the trial offices such as Norwich 
and Croydon. There, the flow of incoming and outgoing mail through the office followed a path not 
dissimilar to the traditional practice in that, functionally, the distinct sorting phases were similar to those 
under manual conditions. In both scenarios, when mailbags entered the office, the contents was 
segregated into different streams for letters, packets and parcels. Once isolated, letters were faced in the 
same direction, dated and had their stamps cancelled, before being stacked ready for sorting. Whether 
manual or mechanised, sorting was according to destination, letters being grouped into selections. 
However, if both systems had functional similarities, these did not extend to the hardware. Under 
mechanised conditions, tables and frames were used not for the bulk of the mail, but to mop up what was 
not machinable. 
The code-sort suite began with a segregating drum (SEG). Mail was loaded into SEGS as it 
entered the office. These were large, tilted, rotating drums separating large from small items of mail. The 
remaining letter stream was fed into the Automatic Letter Facer (ALF), which scanned each letter for 
stamp class and position before facing each in the same direction into uniform piles. (The postcode was 
not necessary for this preparatory phase of the process). Once stacked, surviving letters could be 
automatically presented to coding operators at the SPLSM, who typed in the appropriate code, triggering 
a printing unit which applied a series of phosphor dots to the envelope. After the Luton experiment, the 
keyboard end of the SPLSM was separated to form two distinct machines: the Coding Desk and the 
Automatic Sorting Machine (ASM). The workings of both were linked and controlled by a computer 
called a Translator. Once coding operators had imprinted the unique machine-readable code, the ASM 
was ready to sort the mail rapidly to the selection boxes housed in its frame. These were periodically 
emptied and sent on to the next sorting office, or grouped for a particular delivery round. Taken together, 
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this whole process represented the successful automation of five discrete phases of the sorting process – 
segregation, facing, coding, translation and automatic sorting. Each stage in this sequence was connected 
and controlled by systems of electro-mechanical sub-units, manipulating the flow of letters in synchrony, 
progressively winnowing machinable from non-machinable mail. As early as 1961, PO engineers T. 
Pilling and P.S. Gerrard summarised the integrated nature of this achievement and pointed out its 
significance for the future of the postal system. ‘One outcome of these experimental installations’, they 
wrote, ‘is that a number of well-tried mechanical and electronic units or “building bricks” have emerged 
which permit, without further experiment or trial, the planning of complex mail-handling systems’.87 In 
view of this they went on to note the importance of separating away the keyboard end of the SPLSM to 
create the coding desk. ‘In this form the coding desk becomes a “building block” of the whole 
structure’.88 S.C. Knowles, Chief Draftsman at GEC-Elliot Precision Controls Ltd who manufactured the 
coding desk, later emphasised the centrality of ergonomics in its design, especially in the mechanical 
complexity invested in giving the operator control over the momentum of work. This ‘building block’ 
was thus itself divided into several modules including destacker, orientation, presentation, side-laying, 
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Table 1.1: The main phases of automatic sorting, noting the machinery and workings in use in the late 1960s 




separation of letters 
from packets and parcels 
into distinct streams. 
Segregator (SEG) Mail bags were emptied into a hopper. The 
contents travelled up a short conveyor belt to 
the mouth of an angled, rotating drum with 
slits in the side. The centrifugal force of the 
drum caused items of mail small enough to 
pass through the slits into a separate stream 
from larger items which tumbled out of the 
lower mouth of the drum. 
Facing: facing letters in 
the same direction, 
dating and cancelling 
each one and stacking 
them in piles. 
Automatic Letter 
Facer (ALF) 
The stream of letters flowing from the SEG 
was passed through a unit comprising belts, 
rollers and photo-electric sensors. The 
presence and position of each stamp was 
detected and used to turn and face all letters 
in the same direction. The mail was stacked, 
dated and cancelled. 
Code 
Sorting 
Coding: Turning the 
address information on 
each envelope into a 
machine-readable code. 
The coding desk Stacks of letters were fed into the coding 
desk and presented one at a time to a human 
operator. The operator, sitting at a keyboard, 
saw each letter through two viewing 
windows. When a new letter entered the top 
window, the operator read the address and 
entered a code. This was checked and 
confirmed in the lower window as a fresh 
letter dropped into the top window. Each 





manipulation of each 
code, and the 
synchronisation of the 
coding and sorting 
phases. 
The Translator The Translator was the ‘brain’ of the system. 
It could be programmed with different 
‘sorting plans’ in which each code was 
detected and interpreted, generating routing 
instructions for each item. Tracking utilised 
‘pulses’ tying the location of letters together 
with their unique routing instructions. 
Automatic Sorting: 
Mechanical sorting to 





Driven belts and diverters were used to 
rapidly transfer the coded mail into 144 
selection boxes spread over five levels, each 











                                                     
90
 POST 118/6087, Croydon, Segregator Interior, 1970 
68 
 




                                                     
91
 POST 118/6162, Croydon, Automatic Letter Facer, 1972 
69 
 




                                                     
92
 POST 118/6029, Elliot Automation Letter Coding Desk, 1970 
70 
 









                                                     
93
 SPLSM interior, BPMA search room portfolio 
94
 POST 118/6027, SPLSM, King Edward Building, c. 1971 
71 
 








                                                     
95
 POST 76/173, Specification PR 401, c. 1955-58 
96
 de Jong, ‘Introductory Paper’, p.3. 
72 
 
Spectacular progress in postal mechanisation was achieved in the first twenty years after the war, 
culminating in this first generation of code-sort machines in the mid-1960s. Duncan Campbell-Smith has 
argued that this was partly the result of the PO’s ‘jam tomorrow’ philosophy: they could have settled for 
the original SPLSM in the 1950s, which functioned by using memorised codes in a similar way to the 
Transorma, but opted instead to search for a design capable of operating the universal postcode. The 
Luton Trial was a turning point in this regard, when PO engineers succeeded in wiring a SPLSM up with 
a Translator, proving that the public postcode could work in practice; the coding and sorting functions 
could be separated, just as W.T. Gemmel had envisioned. On this interpretation, the wider code-sort goal 
was revived by Copping and Langton, who published a paper detailing the Luton achievement in 1959.
97
 
Campbell-Smith suggests that there was a disparate, haphazard quality to the various live trials, leading 
the PO only slowly to put its full faith in the universal code-sort system. 
Planning for the adoption of mechanized letter-sorting turned out to mean preparing the postal service for a 
complete overhaul of its core activity, which would one day necessitate a physical rearrangement (if not 
rebuilding) of every post office and a conceptual redesign of every postal address. In the late 1940s, the 
high noon of mechanization was still many years away, and even a sense of what it would entail was going 
to take a long time to dawn in St Martin’s-le-Grand.98 
It is true that fresh approaches were periodically adopted and lucky breaks occurred.
99
 But the coherence 
of the overall R&D programme, guided by the overarching goal of a national code-sort system, is a 
striking feature of the MAC papers. Research on the universal postcode was continuous throughout the 
1950s and the Interim Machine and SPLSM were developed explicitly in coordination with this.
100
 In 
1961 K. S. Holmes, Director of Postal Services, went even further in defining the ultimate goal as being 
the ‘perfect sorting machine’, one that might read and understand human hand-writing. In an article for 
the journal Engineering, he acknowledged the doubts about whether this would ever be technically or 
economically feasible, but believed that ‘despite the uncertainty, it would be wrong to dismiss the idea of 
a robot sorter – it must clearly be the ultimate goal, and research and development must be directed 
towards it’.101 It was thought that the necessary technologies for this – optical character recognition and 
                                                     
97
 Campbell-Smith, Masters of the Post, pp.398-408. 
98
 Ibid., p.398. 
99
 The idea for the double-viewing window on the SPLSM came about by chance when, during trials, a panel on the 
presentation unit was inadvertently removed and higher keying rates were then observed. POST 122/1565... 
Copping and Langton ‘Sorting Letters by Machine’, p.23. 
100
 Remarks to this effect are littered throughout POST 17/463... Fluorescent Coding Study Group.When the 
Canadian Deputy PMG visited Britain in 1957 he visited the experimental installation at Southampton. On the way 
there he talked with S. Scott who reported to the MAC: ‘Canada are working on almost identical lines to us with 
regard to coding and the substance to be used for impressing the code on the letters … I formed the impression that 
[they] have still a long way to go’. POST 17/454... MAC, 05/06/57. 
101
 POST 122/1565... K. S. Holmes, ‘Mechanization of the Postal Services’, in Engineering (1961). 
73 
 
more sophisticated computing techniques – were decades away from becoming viable (an early paper 
wondered if it was ‘beyond human ingenuity’),102 and so the public postcode and the coding desk were, in 
one sense, interim solutions. The key to making this a success was high throughputs in coding rates. The 
best means of achieving this was to provide coding operators with freedom in their work. 
Finally, as the 1962 Annual Report noted, the PO were keen to cast this as a global phenomenon, 
noting that ‘sorting machines are limited by the speed at which operators can think. Ways must, therefore, 
be found of freeing them from this limitation... The problem is not confined to Britain’, it continued. ‘All 
progressive postal administrations are turning to machines for processing and sorting their mail’.103 The 
following year a booklet for staff made the link between progressive design and efficiency explicit: 
The machine has no set rhythm which the operator must follow; instead, he controls the speed of the 
machine. This is an important feature. It means that if the operator gets a letter which is badly addressed he 
can pause while he deciphers it. If on the other hand he gets a run of letters similarly addressed, as 
frequently happens, he can put on a burst of speed.
104
  
This stood in contrast to developments in America, where similar plans were in motion. There, an early 
decision was made to use the introduction of mechanised sorting to increase managerial control of the 
labour process. This decision is attributed to engineering studies shown to management in 1961, 
following which R&D proceeded along a different design path in which operators would not be given 
control over their pace of work.
105
 In Britain, although R&D would continue, the goal set in 1946 of 
evolving a machine that accommodated freedom for the operator within a system capable of processing 




In summary, it is clear that the R&D necessary for the technology at the heart of the Letter Post Plan took 
place not in response to a faddish optimism for the technological renewal of industry in the 1960s, but 
during the 1950s, following the decision in 1946 to vigorously pursue an ambitious, long-term project 
around which a series of short-term, incremental sub-projects were established. This decision built upon 
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insights gained during the inter-war period when experiments with a foreign-designed sorting machine 
demonstrated the need for an in-house, systematic and scientific approach if a nationally integrated 
system of mechanised sorting was to stand a chance of success. Thereafter, the concept of “code-sorting” 
took root. Research committees directed various sub-projects on machines, codes, chemistry and 
psychology, which were coordinated with this long term goal in mind. Though the ingenuity of engineers 
and the judgement of management were salient, this was also a corporate process in that, throughout, 
weight was given to the views of union representatives as well as outside consultants. A major challenge 
was managing the tension between the pursuit of efficiency and productivity on the one hand, and 
worker-wellbeing on the other. This was demonstrated in the lengths to which engineers went to create 
machines which placed control of the pace of work in the hands of their operators. This long-term 
political choice was built into the design path when the technical foundations were laid. For the 
technologists at the heart of the process, it has been noted that an evolutionary ‘philosophy of 
development’ was cultivated as the profession matured, in which schemes for machinery and systems 
were adapted to their intended environment, often in step-wise fashion. As engineers came to appreciate 
from the early 1960s, this included a recognition that they were working within a socio-technical system 
and needed ultimately to defer to the dictates of politics, finance and operational policies if code-sorting 
was to move beyond the planning table and into wider operation. The next chapter addresses these 
political and financial aspects.
Chapter 2 The 1960s modernisation movement and the political and financial 




This chapter continues the assessment begun in chapter 1, of how and why the PO came to adopt the 
Letter Post Plan in 1969, by shifting the focus from technology to the politics and economics of 
mechanisation. Many of the necessary technical elements of the 1969 plan were established in the 1950s, 
but it was in the 1960s that automation and the modernisation of industry came to the foreground of 
British politics and this had considerable effects upon the Post Office. As Alan Clinton put it: 
The new marvels of economic communication that appeared every year were but particular manifestations 
of the general expansion of high technology industry, which a new generation of scientific technique 
brought with it a phase of economic growth unparalleled before or since. The ‘white heat’ of the ‘scientific 
revolution’ promised by Harold Wilson before his election as Labour Prime Minister in 1964 has long since 
dimmed and disappeared. Nevertheless, such phrases did accord with contemporary perceptions of 
economic reality, as well as with conventionally approved solutions to the economic problems of the time. 
They certainly had considerable effects on the Post Office.
1
 
In the postal service this meant that mechanised sorting came to be viewed as part of a multifaceted 
strategy to reduce labour-dependency and increase operational efficiency, all of which fed in to decisions 
in the late 60s over the scale of implementation. In this period, certain assumptions were applied in the 
financial and political forecasting underpinning the LPP and critics later claimed that its judgement in this 
area was undermined by a less than sober enthusiasm for technological change. The approval of the LPP 
has therefore been linked with an optimistic futurism held to be characteristic of the 1960s.
2
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This chapter seeks to explain the role this increased focus on technology had on the PO in the 
1960s; in particular, the extent to which these conditions influence the scope and content of the plan. The 
effects of Labour coming to power were immediate for the PO due to the appointment of Anthony 
Wedgewood Benn as Postmaster General in 1964, who was a strong advocate for the rapid introduction of 
technology in general and mechanised sorting specifically. This was a period in which the human 
consequences of automation was much discussed in Britain, and the PO’s role in this is traced to show the 
different opinions on this issue then in existence within the organisation. During Benn’s tenure, the 
American Management consultants, McKinsey’s, came to the PO to study its core operations. They 
proved to be an influential voice in encouraging the PO to view postal mechanisation as part of a wider 
package of long-term modernisation reforms which included restructuring postal tariffs and combining 
mechanisation with work-study schemes. Mechanisation and efficiency drives were thus viewed as a two-
pronged attack on the problem of low productivity in the postal service. Overall, this chapter continues 
the argument that the LPP had firm foundations in the depth and scope of the preparations made in this 
period and also provides important information about the reasons underpinning the approval of the LPP. 
 
McKinsey’s and the “White Heat” 
 
Mechanisation research had reached a critical point by the early 1960s, but the political and economic 
context of the period between 1964 and 1969 also helped to shape the Letter Post Plan. Though the 
Norwich trial was ongoing, it was clear that an era of widespread code-sorting was a realistic prospect and 
policies were needed for deciding how to proceed, with the most important questions concerning scale 
and timing. Should implementation be cautious and gradual, or fall under the direction of a more 
ambitious, overarching plan? Writing in the automation journal Control in 1964, PO engineer T. Pilling 
pointed out that crossing the technical threshold had raised complex financial and operational questions. 
Research in the UK has shown the technical possibility of an almost completely automated system for 
processing letters, from the time they are delivered at the sorting office to the time they leave, date-
stamped, cancelled and sorted. With automatic character recognition, all but packets and large letters could 
be handled entirely by machine. But economics will decide whether a completely automatic office is ever 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Industrial Modernisation under the Labour Governments, 1964-1970’, in The Journal of the Operational Research 
Society, Vol 50, 10 (1999), pp.985-993. 
77 
 




The pattern of implementation would depend not only on the scale of investment in mechanisation, but on 
a broader range of policy decisions about future investment in buildings and the extent to which the plan 
for code-sorting should be allowed to dictate pricing, service and structural reforms. Pilling and his 
engineering colleagues understood that the fortunes of mechanisation were tied up with the politics of 
institutional reform, a thorny subject in a historically conservative, monolithic bureaucracy. In this respect 
their timing was perfect, as the Post Office was about to enter a period of unprecedented political and 
organisational upheaval. This stemmed in part from a shift in the British political climate which itself had 
connections with a growing faith in new technology. 
 
The question of industrial productivity became an enduring and prominent discourse in post-war 
Britain in which the PO played its part. When, after the war, the Anglo-American Council on Productivity 
offered free consultancy as part of the Marshall Plan, thousands of British industrialists, including PO 
delegations, travelled to America to see first-hand the fruits of scientific management and mechanised 
production.
4
 In 1949 the PO created its own Joint Productivity Council on which the official and staff 
sides debated the implications for the postal service.
5
 However, it has been argued that, in many respects, 
many British industries failed to fully embrace modernisation.
6
 This changed in the 1960s as more sectors 
of the economy began to feel the effects of technological change. This, in turn, fuelled the public 
discussion of automation, which turned with ever greater insight to the human problems it posed. Sir 
Leon Bagrit became a familiar voice on the radio through his BBC Reith Lectures, The Age of 
Automation. His six-part series was published as a book, reviewed favourably in Technology & Culture as 
‘a group of perceptive, imaginative, and humanitarian essays’.7 He defined automation as an extension of 
human thought, action and control. It promised to liberate workers from tedious jobs by taking control of 
the underlying processes integral to a system, leaving human operators as the overseers and decision-
makers.
8
 Bagrit was the chairman of Elliot Automation, the largest computing manufacturer outside 
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America and one of the main firms used by the PO for manufacturing its sorting machines. (Elliot 
engineers maintained a close collaboration with the PO over the design of machines such as the SPLSM 
and the sub-systems it used for presenting letters to operators.)
9
 Bagrit warned that nations that failed to 
adapt to automation were dinosaurs doomed to extinction. An editorial in The Times was full of praise: 
‘His emphasis on the dangers of falling behind in the race for modernization was timely’, it said. ‘The 
process of automation is evolutionary, not something that occurs overnight. It is happening now. Where 
Britain goes wrong is in not appreciating its potential and making provision for it’. It went on to criticise 
all politicians for ‘failing to grasp the nettle of technology’ believing industry, stimulated by government 
initiative, must thrust forward into the new age.
10
 
Charles Smith, General Secretary of the Post Office Engineering Union, spoke too of an “Age of 
Automation”. His speech to the 1964 POEU Annual Conference surveyed the upsurge of the new 
technologies: ‘They will affect British Industry as a whole and they will have profound social 
repercussions’, he predicted. ‘Indeed, it is disturbing that so little has yet been done to forecast the social 
effects which these technical changes may have. Certainly many occupations and jobs will dwindle in the 
form in which we know them at present’.11 The following year the British Productivity Council also took 
up the theme, sponsoring the Industry ’65 Exhibition Conference “Productivity, Technology, Change”. 
B.C. Roberts, Professor in Industrial Relations at the London School of Economics and founder of the 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, gave a paper signalling both the necessity and dangers of 
automation. ‘But we have to change; no society can remain static. If it remains static, in fact, it dies. This 
is a truism of social organisation just as it is a truism of biological forms of life. Therefore we have no 
choice in the matter. We have to change’.12 He continued by arguing that extraordinary technological 
changes demanded a fundamental re-evaluation of traditional conceptions of industrial relations. 
The old view of the worker is outdated having been based on a notion that man is inherently lazy, that he 
does not want to work and so on. We have devised a stick and carrot method of persuading him to make the 
effort that is required. I believe we must abandon this view of man in relation to work. We have to look at 
man as an individual who is prepared to co-operate, be part of a team, who is a social being, who is 
basically motivated by a need for self-fulfilment and who appreciates and responds to recognition and to 
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status as well as he responds to money or the threat of the sack. This is the fundamental social revolution 
that we have to bring to British industry if in fact we are going to cope with technological change because 
we cannot meet the problems of technological change simply by bribery. It cannot be done simply by 




From the floor, Mr D.A. Barron of the PO Engineering Department disagreed. 
Perhaps I am old fashioned, but I think no matter whatever changes we get in technology, one thing that 
does not change is human nature. Greed and ambition and selfishness and jealousy: all these things still 
stay with people and they always will. I am inclined to think that human nature does react to stick and 




Mr. N. Stagg, representing the UPW, defended Roberts, stating that the most important thing was to be 
involved in policy formation at the earliest stages. 
I believe... that attitudes to joint consultation have got to change and change dramatically if we are to meet 
the challenge of automation... The common objective with management is to ensure that the industry in 
which my members earn their living is an efficient one. Our attitude to consultation should start from that 
point.
15 
The influence of unionism on the automation discourse of the 1960s is complex, but, in official 
pronouncements, a consistent position in support of technical change, while remaining forthright in 
requesting thorough consultation, was voiced. George Woodcock, TUC General Secretary, frequently 
voiced his view that while the adversarial union-management relationship was a healthy and necessary 
institution, most working people were not opposed to new technology in the workplace, desiring instead 
frank and comprehensive consultation before and during its implementation.
16
 This position stemmed 
from a series of TUC debates in the 1950s which stressed cooperation in principle but the need for early 




The increasing prominence of debates on the politics of automation was one manifestation of a 
wider fixation with the role of technology in the economy, and helps to explain the tone of electioneering 
                                                     
13
 Ibid., p.33. 
14
 Ibid., p.42. 
15
 Ibid., p.47. 
16
 Robert Taylor, ‘“What are we here for?”: George Woodcock and Trade Union Reform’, in McIlroy et al. (eds.), 
British Trade Unions, p.193. 
17
 Bufton, Britain’s Productivity Problem, pp.48-49. 
80 
 
in the early 1960s. Political rhetoric was adapting to the growing appetite for Americanisation, the 
mounting acceptance of the benefits of automation and concerns about how the politics of change should 
be managed. This period is of course remembered for political pronouncements equating technological 
innovation with economic progress, with Harold Wilson the most vocal proponent of modernisation as a 
panacea for the ills of British industry. At Scarborough in 1963 Wilson famously stated that the key to 
economic growth lay in harnessing the white heat of the scientific revolution. It was a theme Labour 
began cultivating in 1960 when Wilson gave a speech outlining ‘our message for the sixties: A socialist-
inspired scientific and technological revolution releasing energy on an enormous scale and deployed not 
for the destruction of mankind but for enriching mankind beyond our wildest dreams’.18 
When Labour came to power in 1964, the need for Post Office reform had long been recognised. 
Wilson made Anthony Wedgewood Benn Postmaster General, his youth and passion for reform making 
him an untypical appointment. On his first day, having lunched in the canteen with the staff, he found that 
his office had no Dictaphone or modern office equipment, prompting him to note in his diary: ‘There is 
no reason why the Post Office should be lumbering on using the techniques and filing systems of the 
twenties. It is a modern communication industry and should reflect this in its practice’.19 Straightaway he 
ordered reviews of all main policy areas including telecoms, posts, broadcasting, banking, administration, 
staff relations, relations with Government and the new economic development plans. The three most 
obvious and important areas for reform in the postal service, Benn believed, were tariffs, services and 
mechanisation.
20
 Charles Morris, Benn’s parliamentary secretary, later recalled that ‘within a few months 
he dominated every aspect of Post Office thinking. He seemed to throw out ideas kaleidoscopically. He 
had the most incisive mind I have ever encountered’.21 Duncan Campbell-Smith has portrayed Benn’s 
tenure as one of tension between an energetic, if at times naive, enthusiast for reform and a resistant 
conservative establishment. 
Benn was predictably driven to distraction by what he saw as the antediluvian practices of the Department. 
He saw indolent routines, class-ridden attitudes and a general aversion to modernity wherever he looked: 
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Benn joked in his diary that driving through change in this environment was like trying to ‘resuscitate the 
dying elephant’.23 
On the one hand Benn recognised the traditional roles fulfilled by postal staff as being diverse 
and in the service of society. ‘[The Postman] is a sorter of letters, involving a high degree of attention and 
care. He is a driver of vehicles. He is a deliverer of letters – and in the last capacity almost a social service 
worker, in country areas at least’.24 On the other, he wanted to remould these traditions around his 
modernist, even futurist, hopes for the organisation. His first Annual Report talked of ‘changing the art 
and shape of communications’ with ‘new inventions and the application of new techniques’. He wanted to 
redefine the PO as ‘a science-based enterprise on the threshold of a new era of expansion and 
improvement’.25 The introduction of computers for managing telephones, accounts, statistics and 
scientific research was reported, as was the founding of a new department coordinating work-study, 
productivity programmes and a speeding up of mechanisation research. During a debate on postal services 
in the House of Commons in March 1965, Benn warmed to his theme. The goal, he announced, was to 
equip Britain with ‘the most modern communications system in the world’ and he made clear the 
connections between postal mechanisation and the economic and social wellbeing of the nation. 
The Post Office today really is a Ministry of Communications. Its role in society can be understood only if 
it is thought of in that way. At this moment, as it changes its character, it is finding itself in the middle of an 
aspect of modern life – communications – which is undergoing a fundamental revolution due to scientific 
and technical changes. The role of the Post Office in modernising the British economy can hardly be 
overestimated... If the British economy is to grow at the necessary rate it will be the task of the Post Office 
in the years ahead to provide the basic communications infrastructure. ...if we are to have modern postal 
services, increased investment in postal mechanisation is absolutely essential, and, frankly, this has been 
slow in coming in the past. This year, our investment in postal mechanisation will be nearly £2 million, 
rising to £4 million in two years and over £6 million two years after that... The postal coding system tested 
in Norwich will be applied all over the country... These codes will speed the mail and people will become 
just as accustomed to them as they have become to the London postal districts or the telephone codes... We 
are anticipating the growth of postal business over the years. It is a great mistake to think of the postal 
services as a contracting business on its way down and out. It is, in fact, an expanding undertaking and it 
must be furnished with the machinery and the techniques required.
26
 
A few months later, he and the Prime Minister opened the Post Office Tower. Wilson made the inaugural 
telephone call to the Lord Mayor of Birmingham, where a similar 500ft high radio mast had been erected. 
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Britain’s tallest building was the centrepiece of an ongoing process of switching to subscriber trunk 
dialling, capable of handling up to 150,000 simultaneous conversations and 40 television channels via a 
microwave radio system.
27
 Benn’s biographer notes that the tower ‘conformed precisely to his ideas for 
the image of the Post Office of the future’, while Dominic Sandbrook has described it as ‘an 
uncompromising statement of technological optimism’.28 The tower was unveiled soon after the world’s 
largest satellite earth station was completed at Goonhilly in 1962 (an 85 foot wide steerable dish 
transmitting signals via the Telstar satellite), 
29
 thus the PO had, by the early 1960s, become synonymous 
with spectacular displays of engineering. This, alongside Benn’s public support of heavy investment in 
technology, encouraged those hoping for an ambitious national mechanisation programme. 
Benn’s influence was augmented by another new source of influential support for mechanisation 
in the arrival of McKinsey & Co, the American management consultants. This was part of a wider influx 
of American management consultants into both the public and private sectors.
30
 Like British Rail and the 
BBC, the Post Office was one of a number of public institutions to be opened up to such sustained outside 
scrutiny. Duncan Campbell-Smith has cited this as the key factor that, in his view, made Benn’s impact 
on the PO greater than that of any other Postmaster General.
31
 When, in 1966, he left the Post Office to 
become head of the Ministry of Technology, he had helped set in motion far-reaching organisational 
changes which formed the background to the drawing up of the Letter Post Plan. From the beginning, 
Benn was convinced that mechanisation, coupled with operational and pricing reforms, was necessary for 
the postal service. For the GPO as a whole, he argued that a break with the civil service environment 
would enable the different businesses to be managed with greater autonomy and efficiency. On both 
questions he worked to persuade his political and Post Office colleagues, and, on both counts, he found 
his strongest ally and source of evidence in McKinsey’s, known as the ‘efficiency experts’ for their role in 
restructuring the largest American corporations.
32
 Benn soon found that their views were in close 
alignment, as Campbell-Smith has observed. ‘In McKinsey he had [an] authoritative outsider, voicing 
precisely his own criticisms of the Post Office – and backing them up with hard evidence that Benn could 
employ to sweep aside sentimental and ill-considered opposition’.33 
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McKinsey were appointed in 1965 by the Sir Ronald German, the Director-General of the Post 
Office, and Benn defended the decision in parliament against strong criticism.
34
 The firm’s list of major 
British clients grew in the 1960s to include British Rail, the BBC and the Bank of England. They also had 
a hand in advising on large scale technical change and its employment implications, most notably for the 
British Transport Docks Board, producing a report in 1967 grappling with the radical employment and 
operational changes associated with containerised cargo systems.
35
 At the PO, McKinsey’s were tasked 
with finding ways to increase productivity and profits by ‘challenging the basic logic of a major practice 
rather than its minor details’.36 They interviewed managers, sat in on board meetings at every level and 
initiated hundreds of investigations into collection, sorting and delivery at local and network levels. From 
the outset they argued that technology should be the central feature of long-term planning. All the major 
issues facing the industry, such as improving efficiency, reducing wages and maintaining levels of 
service, depended, they said, on ‘successfully planning and implementing a major mechanisation 
programme’.37 Understanding the economics of mechanisation was vital and Roger Morrison, leading the 
McKinsey studies, emphasised the need to think carefully about the outlook over both the short-term (to 
c. 1975) and the long-term (to c. 2000), remembering that the plan would be affected by changes in 
British transport, demography and technology: 
The ‘plan is not “frozen” but must be constantly revised and updated: technology will be changing. Public 
attitudes and environment may change. Decisions should be taken in light of the latest information 
available... Obviously [there are a] large number of issues facing [the] postal side but only a few are 
critical: Economics of mechanization and its implication on concentration and circulation; Operational 
improvement programme; Evaluation of possible tariff or service revisions; Labour relations strategy; 
Organizational structure and personnel practices.
38
 
Morrison’s staff continued by posing a series of questions related to the effects of concentrating mail into 
larger offices and the relationship with levels of service. They then asked subsidiary questions such as: Is 
the proposed alpha-numeric code the best solution? How significant would a lower level of public 
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response than expected be to the mechanisation programme? How would concentration affect staff? 
Would mechanisation enable higher employment of part time female staff?
39
 
Much of this fell in line with existing PO thinking, prompting some resentment, and was later 
described by one senior official as ‘a long and pretentious foray’.40 However the priority McKinsey’s 
gave to mechanisation undoubtedly had an impact, especially in placing it in the context of a wider course 
of efficiency reforms which generated a large body of data on which planners could draw. This 
strengthened the hand of those pursuing a more rapid pace of change by linking these programmes with 
the need to take bold decisions over the major policy areas of tariffs, levels of service, logistics and 
technology. As Campbell-Smith has put it... 
…the intensity of McKinsey’s work had unmistakably launched the Post Office on a course that seemed, by 
the middle of 1966, capable over time of transforming the nature of the postal service. The cost reduction 
projects instigated the previous summer had triggered a frenzy of data collection, analysis and discussion 
without precedent in the twentieth century.
41 
Such studies were not of course unknown previously,
42
 but the scale of the effort and its focus on working 
methods in sorting offices was new. McKinsey’s recommended commissioning ‘small, specially selected 
teams’ to conduct 4-5 month examinations of 68 of the largest sorting offices.43 An initial study at 
London’s North West District Office in 1966 encompassed 70% of operating costs and led McKinsey’s to 
see potential savings both nationally and locally. ‘The local savings’, they reported, ‘arise mainly from 
reducing excessive grace and casual reliefs’.44 They offered the Postal Services’ Work Study Department 
three pointers for making further savings: 
First it will be necessary to adopt staffing control systems, based on staffing standards and industrial work 
measurement, that are more effective than those used at present in evaluating performance and in providing 
the basis for sound working discipline… Second, there must be a systematic, objective and critical 
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examination of all the factors governing operational efficiency in order to effect improvement. Third, there 




Discussions at Board level dwelt on how, given that mechanisation could only lead to reducing the 
workforce, work studies and mechanisation would need to go on hand in hand to ensure the best use of 
manpower. They looked at other labour-intensive industries and saw a clear trend for hiring more work-
study specialists. They concluded that a further 200 specialists should be brought in and that managers 
and staff should undergo ‘appreciation courses’ to encourage cooperation.46 
The teams undertaking regional “Work & Staff Measurement” projects were often presented with 
new challenges when testing their theoretical knowledge against the complex practical and political 
problems of a sorting office. Mike Berry, a Liverpudlian who during a career in senior management was 
postal controller of Mount Pleasant and managed efficiency appraisals at several other offices, remembers 
rearranging sorting work to productive ends, presenting his analyses to his superiors and then (‘quite a 
frightening experience’) implementing his alternative methods in a particular office. He and colleagues, 
such as Eric Norman, learned to balance ‘going by the book’ with the cultivation of an ‘instinct’ for postal 
operations.
47
 This type of work built upon a number of meticulous studies of large offices, such as that at 
Leeds, in which every aspect of work – from the time taken to unload palettes from vans to the political 
dynamics of motivation and loyalty – was put under the microscope.48 The resulting “Ripple Programme” 
of detailed investigations and alterations to postal work was opposed by the largest offices in London and 
Birmingham. There, staff wished to protect their traditional methods and targets and objected to handing 
these over to be measured and changed. The scientific study of postal work was agreed to bring benefits 
but remained politically fraught, especially with radical elements among city postmen such as the UPW’s 
infamously militant and influential “LDC3” Committee in London who through the late 1960s 
coordinated numerous obstructions and walk-outs.
49
 Work study was publicly accepted and supported by 
the TUC Executive but shop floor opposition was widespread.
50
 In the postal service, “Work and Staff 
Measurement” was intended to apply traffic measurement, the calculation of workloads, the measure of 
time spent on different duties and comparisons of output. Various WSM schemes were negotiated during 
                                                     
45
 POST 69/80... POB (67) 6, Postal Productivity and Work Study, p.1; POST 92/16, PO Report and Accounts, 
1967-8, p.17. 
46
 POST 69/80... POB (67) 6, Postal Productivity and Work Study, p.2. 
47
 BL, NSA, An Oral History of the Post Office, Interview with Mike Berry, C1007/75/01-12, Tape 3 (F12529), 
Side B; Tape 4 (F12530) Side A. 
48
 POST 17/299, Report on postal reorganisation pilot studies at Leeds Letter Sorting Office, January 1970. 
49
 Campbell-Smith, Masters of the Post, pp.498-9; Corby, The Postal Business, pp.50, 116; POST 17/254, 
Operations Efficiency Seminar, 1979; POST 69/238, Managing Director's Committee: Posts: Committee Papers, 
1973, MDPC (73) 6: Service, Cost and Emergencies.
 
50
 Bufton, Britain’s Productivity Problem, p.67. 
86 
 
the 1970s, but repeatedly rejected at UPW conferences. After a provisional agreement in 1968, support 
was withdrawn in 1970 and revised proposals were rejected in a close vote in 1971. During four years of 
negotiations WSM was stripped back to focus mainly on traffic measurement, but this was 
overwhelmingly rejected in 1975. The UPW issued a statement in 1976 explaining that they would not 
put even the latest and much weakened package to conference as it stood no chance of approval and 




Table 2.1: The increasing employment of work study specialists in public enterprise
52
 
Organisation Number of work study staff 
British Rail 1800 
Imperial Chemical Industries 2000 
National Coal Board 800 
USA postal system 160 
Canadian postal system 80 
 
The Board responded to McKinsey’s advice to prioritise their short, medium and long term aims 
in 1968. The resulting document, Aims & Objectives of the Postal Business, summarised its four key 
points under the heading “System Planning and Engineering”: 
(i) To reshape the national letter circulation system by 1979 to gain the maximum economic return from 
mechanised letter sorting and handling, and make the best use of available transport. 
(ii) To complete the postcoding of the 70 largest towns by 1970 and then to extend as necessary to meet 
system requirements. 
(iii) To design, install and commission mechanised letter offices to meet the requirements of the new letter 
plan. 
(iv) In particular to develop the coding desks, translator and automatic sorting machine systems required to 
meet the national needs and bring them to the stage of operational acceptability by 1971.
53
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The process of turning this rudimentary list of expectations into a coherent national plan was already 
underway. Thinking about the shape of the future system was first addressed in detail during a review in 
1966 which targeted completion by 1976.
54
 Here, the stated aim was to combine all technical, operational 
and economic considerations into a single guiding policy document by the end of 1969. 
 
The Letter Post Plan and the Corporation Act, 1969 
 
Amidst the influx of modernisation ideas, momentum on the technical and operational level built up 
steadily in the mid-1960s. In April 1966 the Engineering Department consolidated all engineering work 
for the mail services into the Postal Mechanisation Branch (PMB). Throughout the year they collaborated 
with the Postal Services Department over postcodes, worked on new linking systems between machines 
and produced a new phosphor code-mark printer. Eighteen SEG/ALF suites were ordered, as well as two 
translators, 24 coding desks and six ASMs for a trial at London’s East Central District Office.55 In 1967 
the pace of this piecemeal approach increased further as Brighton, Dundee, Redhill and Swansea were 
added to the list. SEGs and ALFs were earmarked for all large offices promising a minimum 20% return 
on expenditure, the only delays being due to the manufacturers or a lack of space.
56
 Meanwhile, the 
anatomisation of Britain had begun, as that year fourteen large towns were allocated postcodes.
57
 This 
was by itself an outstanding planning achievement. In each case, local and Headquarters teams 
collaborated, under the guidance of PMB. The geographical area to be coded was determined by research 
into local mail-flow, postmen’s walks, street directories, maps and electoral roles. Streets were then 
divided into ‘links’, with known characteristics such as the number of delivery points or the number of 
heavy deliveries. These were combined into ‘units’, which were carefully shaped around demographic 
and commercial forecasts for the rural and urban areas concerned. Units were drawn together to form 
‘machine towns’ which were then divided into sub-divisions. Codes could only be allocated once future 
mail circulation and concentration levels had been predicted which took into account the local 
peculiarities of geography, transport, staffing and buildings.
58
 Throughout, planners were tasked with 
building in flexibility so that any future alterations could be accommodated: ‘In practice therefore each 
coding scheme must be devised individually and with great care, employing expert knowledge of postal 
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coding techniques, postal circulation and of the technical capabilities and design of coding/sorting 
machines and translators’.59 
Thus, before 1969, policies were, being enacted in support of a national mechanisation 
programme. As Martin Daunton has remarked, ‘mechanisation, codes, a two-tier service and the 
introduction of new services, formed a package of reforms in the late 1960s.’60 The most visible of these, 
and the most operationally significant, was the launch of the Two-Tier post in 1968, enabling the public 
to choose between first and second class payment. It was a risky change to the tariff structure which 
Campbell-Smith has concluded was managed exceptionally from a planning perspective but poorly in 
terms of marketing.
61
 One of the main reasons for its introduction was that it helped to smooth out the 
morning and evening peaks of letter traffic: necessary if machinery was to be economically employed 




Table 2.2: The allocation of postcodes in Britain, 1968-72
63
 
Year Number of addresses coded 
(millions) 
% of UK addresses 
1968 6.5 33 
1969 10 50 
1970 13 66 
1971 15 75 
1972 19 95 
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Table 2.3: Installations of letter sorting machinery in 1967
64
 
Place Segregator Automatic 
Letter Facing 
Machine 






Crewe - - 3 - 
Glasgow 1 3 - - 
Liverpool 1 3 - - 
London SEDO 1 2 - - 
London WDO 1 3 - - 
Norwich 1 1 - 6 
Preston - - 3 - 
Southampton 1 1 - - 
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In November 1968, members of PMB presented a draft of the LPP to the Regional Director’s 
Conference, with much of the research having been done over a 2-3 year period by Iain Vallance (later 
Lord Vallance, BT Chairman) alongside other Headquarters planners such as Ron Clatworthy, who went 
on to coordinate the first wave of implementation in various regions.
65
 The formal plan went to the Board 
in 1969 and was delivered by Geoffrey Vieler, a City tax accountant who the following year was made 
Managing Director, Posts.
66
 He drew upon a wealth of ongoing research by Assistant Postal Controllers, 
such as Bill Cockburn, who liaised with others in the regions to begin enforcing the changes.
67
 Vieler 
made the case for a network of 120 Mechanised Letter Offices (MLOs) to replace traditional 
arrangements in which manual sorting was dispersed over several hundred offices. The labour-saving 
logic of coding mail as it entered the system was explained by pointing out that a third of all mail was 
handled at intermediary offices with an estimated average of 3.2 frame-sorts per item. Many letters were 
handled 5 or 6 times during their journey. The paper set targets. Within a decade, the national circulation 
of mail was to be wholly concentrated into MLOs, leading to staff savings and increasing the efficiency of 
unwieldy circulation arrangements. Implementation would be staggered over six phases, beginning with 
equipping the largest offices and ending in full inward and outward concentration. The new network was 
to be superimposed on the manual system which could then fall away. Similarly, Travelling Post Offices 
were to be phased out and replaced by greater use of motorways and lorries, meaning that the historic 
interdependence of rail and postal networks was to be altered.
68
 Once completed, the national backbone of 
MLOs would distribute the mail among themselves, using local satellite offices for distribution and 
collection. The same concept was to be applied in London, often referred to as a state within a state,
69
 
where mechanised district offices would connect with a network of smaller urban offices. The long-term 
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The financial attraction of the plan centred on cuts in staff costs and increased circulation 
efficiency.
71
 The case rested on financial forecasting using discount cash flow analysis (DCF), in line with 
financial methods outlined by the Treasury and with wider trends. DCF became well established in the 
1960s, with the Ministry of Technology reporting in 1970 that 70% of British companies used systematic 
financial techniques for investment forecasting.
72
 The application of performance targets based on five-
year minimum returns on investment for the nationalised industries went back to a 1961 White Paper and 
was intended to encourage profits to be ploughed back in investment for each industry.
73
 Returns and 
expenditure were spread over 25 years and were made for machines and buildings as well as R&D, 
installation, maintenance, planning, publicity, and training.
74
 In doing this, a number of assumptions were 
made, relating to: the future stability of growth of mail volumes; the rate at which postcodes would be 
embraced; the productivity of coding staff; the success of industrial relations – all had potential to be 
hugely disruptive. One of the main criticisms of the LPP made from 1975 onwards was that some of these 
assumptions were overly optimistic. The Mail Users Association stated in 1976 that... 
...the assumptions on which DCF analyses are carried out are more important than the method itself. 
Therefore, the results of the exercises should not be thought of in absolute terms. All they show is that for a 
given set of assumptions certain results follow.
75 
Investment in mechanisation and the pattern of new offices was connected closely with the PO’s 
buildings programme. ‘Two things in the main determine the pattern of future postal investment’ 
explained a paper prepared for the board on capital investment in 1969. ‘One is the need to mechanise the 
letter and parcel services, and the other the need to replace the many very old and entirely inadequate 
large buildings. The main objective is to co-ordinate the achievement of these two requirements’.76 This 
was a facet of the PO’s wider financial dynamics, increasingly being understood by using econometric 
modelling around an ‘operational systems concept’.77 
                                                     
71
 Staff costs were by this point 73% of total expenditure, 35% of this relating to sorting. Report by POUNC on the 
PO’s proposed increased postal tariffs in POST 53/51, Papers regarding the proposed increase in postage rates and 
preparation for decimalisation, 1970. 
72
 It has been argued that the spread of DCF trivialised labour-relations as just another depersonalised factor in a 
financial equation. Batstone, Working Order, pp.70-73. 
73
The Times 08/07/69, ‘Rewriting the Targets for State Industries’, p.27. 
74
 POST 17/283, Letter Post Plan: Questions and Answers.  
75
 POST 69/84, PO Board Papers Part II, Minutes of thirteenth meeting, 21/04/69; Appendix to the Carter Report, 
p.351. 
76
 POST 69/83, PO Board Papers Part I, 1969: Board Paper 98, Appraisement and Control of Capital Investment 
Projects in the Postal Business, May 1969. 
77
 Ibid., Board Paper 21: Long Run Marginal Costs, January 1969. 
92 
 
These complexities meant that predicting overall savings likely to arise from the LPP was 
problematic.
78
 References were made to an initial outlay of £20m, total expenditure of £100m and 
eventual annual savings of £7m-£10m,
79
 but there was recognition that the financial monitoring of 
mechanisation would go on and that formidable complexities were inevitable. Costing in network 
industries was unique because individual capital projects could not be evaluated straightforwardly. 
Forecasters illustrated the problem by using the example of telecoms expenditure, which was split 
between exchange equipment, line plant and subscribers’ apparatus.  
Exchange equipment is useless without line plant and vice versa; and neither is of any value without 
apparatus at each end of the line. It is only when all three elements are complete that the Post Office earns 
revenue … [any such] investment represents links in the network.80 
Similarly, the financial value of the LPP would not be fully known until long after the MLOs were 
operational, when ‘system savings’ kicked in. One of the risks was that concentrating mail into MLOs 
increased long-term fixed costs, effectively putting more eggs into fewer baskets. The danger was that if 
the longstanding growth in mail volumes were to falter (a trend that was known to be linked with national 
economic health) there was potential for acute financial and operational difficulties. Given that the figures 
had been steadily rising for over a century, there were good reasons to predict stability, a point that later 
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Equally, there was the question of how the staff and unions might react to the changes, and it was 
known that this would come at a negotiated price. Based on previous experience with trials, there were 
good reasons to expect cooperation and the formal position was that this was expected to be forthcoming. 
There was a longstanding view among staff that investment in the postal side was overdue. Ron Smith, 
General Secretary of the UPW, explained to Benn in 1964 that staff morale was low, particularly at the 
older offices such as Mount Pleasant. ‘All the capital investment had gone into telecommunications and 
the postal services were the Cinderella left to rot’.83 The support of the Executive Committees of the 
affected unions was assured in the 1968 Annual Report which went as far as to criticise the Board for not 
moving quickly enough, though this statement also carried a suggestion of mounting anxiety about the 
postal service’s future prospects. 
The postal services mechanisation programme is running behind schedule and we think this is bad for the 
morale of the workers involved. Their confidence has been sought and built up to a high degree of 
expectation and they are now faced with the frustrations of carrying on with the old methods… And we 
cannot expect those we represent to continue to be enthusiastic about technical progress and innovation 
with its consequential potential for greater productivity unless such programmes are planned for 
implementation as well as for experimentation.
84
 
Most of the savings were to come through natural wastage equivalent to 17,000 rank and file jobs, but this 
would be undermined by delays in implementation.
85
 As the PO had been reminded at the Industry 
Exhibition ’65 by Professor Roberts, one of the keys to success in managing technological change lay in 
the avoidance of strikes and industrial action. 
The cost of strikes is going to increase quite dramatically and the measure of the cost of the strikes is not to 
be found in counting the number of man-days lost... Industrial conflict cost can be measured only in the 
effect it has on the rate of technological change and the ability of the social institutions, the firm, the 
enterprise, the industrial society as a whole, to accommodate, to regulate, the consequences of the 
technological change itself.
86 
The PO was aware that, although they enjoyed the support of union executive committees, a significant 
element of the workforce might resist. Benn sensed potential problems after his first visit to Norwich in 
1964. ‘I met the staff and found them unenthusiastic about mechanisation. They said it destroyed their 
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skill and craft as manual workers’.87 Since then much had been done to inform and encourage staff,88 but 
a confidential memo in 1967 observed that the prospect of concentration schemes and the disruption they 
promised were ‘extremely contentious subjects vis à vis the Staff Side’. The policy until then had tended 
to be to keep discussion on short-term changes, their local effects, and to defer debate over long-term 
restructuring.
89
 In the summer of 1969, after some hesitancy for fear of a leak, 80 copies of the slides of 
the LPP lecture were confidentially circulated to UPW executives before official approval was given. 
This evidently provoked alarm at the absence of Staff Side consideration in an economics- heavy 
presentation, as an anonymous hand written note suggests. ‘Bill, broad basis OK – accent on economics – 
what about the staff problems in smaller concentrated offices? … What’s in it for the staff?’90 
In his critique of the 1970s postal service, Michael Corby argued that mechanisation was a poorly 
managed project that should not have been undertaken. ‘Long before corporation status Posts was 
psychologically committed to mechanising sorting work, and thus assumptions were usually 
favourable’.91 Certainly great hopes were placed in automation and there was a sense that the PO had little 
to lose, as this passage from the 1966 Annual Report on the financial incentives and constraints of full 
mechanisation suggests: 
The rising cost of anything in the nature of a personal service is an accepted fact in developed and 
sophisticated societies. Moreover, the characteristics of the basic material handled – letters and parcels of 
all shapes and sizes – severely limit the scope for mechanisation within the sorting office. Even when full 
mechanisation is achieved in the mid-1970s on the basis of public codes and automatic sorting, the 
expected economies … will be less than 3% of expenditure. Postal business expands only slowly, in line 
with and somewhat below the level of the increase in general economic activity. All these factors make it 
impossible for the postal service to absorb increased costs in the same way as a technologically-based 
industry such as telecommunications, and pose the question of the future pattern of the service.
92
 
This 3% figure was based on the more cautious estimates made before the arrival of McKinsey and before 
the more detailed calculations of the full 120 MLO plan of 1969, but it shows that even on the most 
pessimistic assumptions there was a strong case for code-sorting. Industrial Inquiries, outside consultants, 
regional postal directors and experienced unionists were all in broad agreement that any reforms that 
addressed the fundamental problem of high labour intensity and rising wages ought to be embraced. The 
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problem had grown in the post-war period. In 1961 Brigadier Holmes, Director of Postal Services, 
highlighted the fact that 40% of mail costs were attributable to sorting offices. ‘It is here’, he knew, ‘that 
mechanization is most needed’.93  
 





Edward Short, the Postmaster General in 1967, believed that £45m expenditure over ten years 
would yield a 25% return. But, as he explained to the House of Commons on 15 March, the problem of 
wage inflation would remain because much of the work of the service offered little further scope for 
automation. ‘We just cannot mechanise the postman who walks up the garden path every morning’, said 
Short.  
Our attack on this problem is two-fold: to mechanise wherever we can with profit and elsewhere to make 
an intensive drive to improve management and operating methods so that each man employed can make a 
maximum contribution to output. Mechanisation of postal processes has proved difficult. But we have set 
on foot an ambitious programme, which makes us a world leader in this field. We have not sought to 
                                                     
93
 Discounting conveyance, this broke down as: 10% collection, 40% delivery, 40% sorting office costs, 10% 
miscellaneous. POST 122/1565... Holmes, ‘Mechanization of the Postal Services’. 
94







Staff Costs (£238.1m) 
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mechanise indiscriminately, but only where it will show profit... The most dramatic changes in mail 
handling are, however, just starting with the new coding desks and automatic letter sorting machines...
95 
But it had long been clear that this was a ‘world problem’ and many administrations, including the 
French, Germans, Americans, Canadians, Russians and Japanese (who regarded the British as pioneers), 
believed that maximising the automation of their respective networks to be self-evidently worthwhile.
96
 
Since 1958, twenty or so countries were in active discussions about mechanisation. Many foreign officials 
visited British sites to observe machines and operations, while the UK, USA and Canada circulated R&D 
information between them. The PO-sponsored Mechanisation Consultancy Service was established in 
1965 to provide expert advice for which there was significant demand, particularly in South America and 
the middle-east. The largest and richest nations all had postal services afflicted with the same problem of 
labour intensity and wage inflation. By the mid-60s, the American Postmaster General, for example, 
viewed labour-saving technology and administrative reform as the key solutions to what he described as a 
‘race with catastrophe’.97 There, a commission of inquiry, on discovering monolithic bureaucracy, 
inefficient management, dilapidated buildings and a serious lack of investment, recommended the 
transition to Corporation status with a new commercial ethos. In America, as in Britain, emphasis seemed 
to be moving from service towards financial self-sufficiency.
98
 The Presidential Commission pinpointed 
the introduction of a more ‘businesslike’ management orientation and the automation of mail processing 
as two of the most necessary undertakings that a change of status might facilitate.
99
 The sociologist Vern 
Baxter, who later studied the connection between postal mechanisation and the Corporation switch in the 
US Postal Service, concluded: ‘Two important purposes of the public corporation that was created in 
1971 to replace Congress as the primary operating authority for the post office were to facilitate the 
mechanization and automation of mail processing and to replace political patronage with a more 
businesslike approach to postal operations’.100 
In Britain, the PO followed a parallel path in changing its status from a government department to 
an ostensibly profit-seeking Corporation, first, in appropriating organisational, managerial and financial 
techniques from the private sector, and, second, in carrying through operational restructuring premised on 
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automation, referred to by The Times as a ‘vast modernisation programme’.101 The Post Office Act 1969 – 
the culmination of successive post-war reforms increasing the functional separation of the different PO 
businesses and their financial autonomy from government – was intended to ‘change the whole 
atmosphere of the Post Office from that of a Department of State to that of a vigorous business’.102 Staff 
were removed from the civil service framework and organised under a new grading structure; there was 
an influx into senior management of businessmen from private industry; and more rigorous financial 
targets were set both for posts and telecoms. In 1966-67 a House of Commons Select Committee 
investigated the Post Office and recommended the change of status. Baroness Phillips explained in the 
House of Lords the three main reasons for this: 
First, the activities of the Post Office are far more akin to those of a nationalised industry than of a normal 
Government Department; second, the Board will have more continuity of direction and control and have 
less reason to centralise and so to slow up decision-making; and third, the Civil Service structure and 
organisation is designed mainly as a regulator and cannot be ideal for a basically commercial task.
103 
The Annual Report, 1969, defined these changes as ‘the most significant in the history of the Post Office 
since the Rowland Hill reforms of 1840’and subsequent commentators have hailed the Act as symbolic of 
a new commercial paradigm.
104
 
The LPP was an integral piece of this larger picture. A statement in Parliament portrayed the 
Corporation Act as a response to the increased scale and scope of PO activity, to new social and 
commercial needs and as a means to increase efficiency: 
In recent years the Post Office has developed into a complex of vast business enterprises. It now faces 
considerable problems of expansion, modernisation and re-organisation if it is to meet the growing 
demands of the economy … The Government believe that this decision to modernise the status and 
management of the Post Office will make a considerable contribution to its efficiency, and the efficiency of 
Britain, in the years ahead.
105
 
A talk in 1968 at the Management Training Centre made the link between technological change, 
organisational restructuring and the change to Corporation Status more explicit: 
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Technologically and in its services the Post Office has always been changing but never more so than at 
present... In the scale of its operations, in capital investment and in rate of technical changes the pace of 
change will be far greater in the next 7 years than the previous 20... The changes needed for shaking off the 
Civil Service methods and procedures and the need for reorganisation which could have come anyway have 
now interwoven. The coming of Corporation status has given an impetus to the other reforms... Many of the 
practical changes needed to replace Civil Service procedures require the reappraisal of whole systems of 
working and this gives the chance to modernise them.
106
 
Thus the change of status of the whole PO in 1969, and the advancing plans for mechanisation 
specifically in the postal service formalised that year, shared the same commercial and political rationale, 
grounded in the pursuit of efficiency and increased productivity. Michael Corby argued that, in 
empowering the Board with greater financial autonomy, this legislation helped alleviate delays in the 
spread of mechanisation caused by the Treasury’s overly cautious approach to capital expenditure.107 
Section 9 of the Act, sub-section 2 explained there were three things the PO needed to do to meet the 
needs of society, industry and commerce: invest in ‘improving and developing its operating systems’; 
contribute to advances in societal communications; and commit to ongoing ‘efficiency and economy’.108 
When in November 1970 MP David Weitzman asked the Minister for Posts and Telecommunications, 
Christopher Chataway, whether the Government might offer guidance to the PO in improving sorting 
office methods he was directed to this passage. The government believed that mechanisation fell within 






The transition from planning to implementing mechanisation was fluid and spread over several years 
without a clear line of demarcation. The LPP was not formally approved until 1970, when some MLOs 
were already operational while others were being redeveloped to accommodate coding desks and sorting 
machines. Through trials, staff in Norwich, Southampton, Luton, Croydon and at various places in 
London, had already gained experience with code-sorting before 1969, while the Head Post Offices of 
Glasgow and Liverpool each had a permanent installation of the preparatory machines (SEGs and ALFs) 
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by 1967. Likewise, the postcoding of Britain spanned the years 1967-72
110
 and other supporting measures, 
such as the launch of the two-tier post, had separate but overlapping justifications to do with tariffs and 
service levels. However, in drawing together so many financial, operational and technological 
calculations into a single package of targets, the creation of the formal plan, or at least the moment its 
contents became more widely publicised in 1970, marked the moment at which the Board committed to 
pursuing a specific radically different future system dependent on automated sorting. It was also the 
culmination of over twenty years of planning, built upon the vision outlined by Gemmel and Carter in 
1946, the great achievement of which was to create a scheme that simultaneously met the needs of 
workers’ wellbeing and system efficiency through the design of the public postcode and of operator-paced 
machines. 
 The LPP did contain flaws which contributed to the delays and disputes of the 1970s. However, 
as R.J.S. Baker later reflected, although some assumptions later proved to be miscalculated, the main 
causes of subsequent political deadlock were external: 
My own impression in the late 1960s and just after was that much more effort should then have gone into 
the personnel management aspects of mechanisation and more specific reassurances should have been 
given earlier against unjustified, but nevertheless understandable, grass roots fears of redundancy or 
insecurity. Otherwise I would not presume to apportion blame for the deterioration of Post Office industrial 
relations since the 1950s (when they were a model for most other industries).
111
 
Moreover, reasonable comparisons with other outside projects casts the work done at the PO in the 1960s 
in a more favourable light. The Warwick IR Research Unit discovered in 1978 that many large and 
medium sized firms, predominately in the private sector, did not pay very much attention to IR when 
making organisational decisions. ‘Labour relations factors did not impinge to any significant degree upon 
management decisions on capital investment and major changes in production methods’.112 Meanwhile, 
though planning was a long-term affair, piecemeal implementation began as soon as was practicably 
possible. Political deadlocks were no less common in the printing industry where the major Newspaper 
Groups abandoned technological change or recast their plans after immense delays.
113
 In the public sector, 
investment projects such as the planning and construction of the Victoria Line during 1948-1969, were by 
comparison far less decisive. ‘The story of the development of the Victoria Line’, state the transport 
historians T.C. Barker and Michael Robbins, ‘shows characteristic features of public handling of 
investment projects in mid-twentieth century Britain: general acceptance of the intention as desirable; 
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delay for argument on constantly changing bases; final approval under temporary pressures which were 
largely irrelevant to the arguments’.114 This meant that years of urban planning often resulted in no 
decisions of substance. The fact that it took about fifteen years to begin construction supports this and 
implies that Benn and the modernisers speeded up the process of change at the PO.  
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This chapter focuses on the aftermath of the UPW strike in 1971, taking in the ways this period disrupted 
mechanisation planning and implementation. Between the summers of 1971 and 1972 management and 
unions adjusted to a post-strike climate characterised by a predictable continuation of hostility and 
suspicion. Some senior managers stiffened their resolve to institute a hard-headed approach to industrial 
relations, while the UPW turned their attentions to the question of whether they would cooperate with the 
Letter Post Plan. Their obstructions, combined with a host of financial and operational difficulties 
accompanying the industry’s financial downturn, led first to a series of anxious reappraisals of the 
wisdom of the mechanisation programme, then became more serious following a stormy conference in 
1972 where the UPW voted for an embargo on cooperating with all new installations of code-sort 
machinery. In return for a resumption of cooperation, the UPW argued that staff should receive an up-
front special payment and be provided with a revised, detailed and substantial plan for mechanisation. 
This chapter seeks to explain some of the immediate and contextual reasons for this embargo. What were 
the reasons for opposition, and was the UPW united in this? Did the Board’s responses to the strike 
worsen the situation, and how did they manage the prospect of further confrontations? Moreover, why did 
the LPP’s fortunes deteriorate so rapidly? Some answers are offered here by documenting the views of 
key figures on both sides of the dispute, and by placing these stances in political and economic context. 
First, the 1971 strike and subsequent parliamentary inquiry are outlined. The management reaction to the 
strike as it applied to mechanisation is then surveyed, with reference to growing tensions between a 
strident commercial management ethos and structural changes to PO industrial relations aimed at 
fostering more inclusive and effective forums for consultation. The UPW’s movement towards 
obstruction is considered by focussing on the content of negotiations over mechanisation including a 
series of criticisms and protests. This goes some way to documenting the reasons for the dispute as well 
as displaying several contextual forces helping to shape the strategies pursued by different groups, and 
again demonstrates the complex interrelation of technological and political issues. 
 Little has been written on the causes of the embargo. Duncan Campbell-Smith has implied that 
the embargo may have been close to inevitable given the bitter resentment felt by staff at the time. 
102 
 
After the strike of 1971, slipping the production models of the first-generation coding desks into place 
without a showdown would have required a miracle, and the UPW did not do miracles. In the event, the 
1972 Conference voted to boycott “piecemeal mechanisation proposals” and to withdraw all cooperation 
until management could offer a perfect solution, covering every aspect of the topic.
1
  
Campbell-Smith followed Michael Corby in perceiving union obstinacy as the root of the problem. Staff, 
states Corby, ‘rejected the system until bribed into acquiescence’.2 While Corby suggested this was a 
reaction to management incompetence, Campbell-Smith has dwelt on the rising influence of militant 
Marxists in London and Manchester. Both make some valid points but underplay the significance of the 
strike and how it ultimately stemmed from government incomes policy in an inflationary economy. In 
1972, Tom Jackson, UPW General Secretary, argued that the historic pay dispute of the previous year had 
cast a long shadow when he remarked during mechanisation negotiations that ‘the strike in 1971 had 
changed the attitude of the membership, who now were reluctant to participate in any scheme without 
payment.’3 The embargo was what has been categorised as a “non-strike sanction”. The industrial 
sociologist P.K. Edwards charted its use in the 1970s British economy. ‘Non-strike sanctions’, he stated, 
‘are a popular form of pressure, for their deployment can be varied to meet tactical needs and can put 
pressure on management while involving few costs for workers’.4 Data for the period shows that this form 
of obstruction was more common in labour-intensive industries where union density was high, and could 
range from refusals to work overtime to wider boycotts of new working methods. ‘The use of non-strike 
sanctions in national disputes, particularly those in the public sector, is still a significant development’, he 
wrote in 1983.
5
 This chapter argues that these interpretations offer a starting point for understanding the 
embargo, but ignore important contextual factors and a number of reasons not related to pay grievances. 
 
The 1971 strike and the Hardman Inquiry 
 
A period of institutional upheaval was to be expected after the PO was reformed in 1969, as the different 
parts of the organisation adjusted to new structures and initiatives. The industrial relations implications 
were debated and discussed across the PO, which, in leaving the civil service, had its wage bargaining 
traditions opened to reinterpretation. In the light of both Labour and Conservative governments seeking to 
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apply various incomes policies that would cap wage increases in the nationalised industries, the annual 
wage round on the postal side became elaborately contested. Concerns centred on how the tradition of 
“fair comparison” would apply to different grades who lobbied with competing, comparative cases. A 
rising incidence of unofficial strikes and the growth of radicalism in some UPW councils may have led 
some to expect a period of unsettled politics, but the magnitude of the dispute which followed was not 
anticipated. This included the industry’s first national strike which brought the mail system to a halt for 
over six weeks. The central issue was postmen’s pay. Alongside the TUC, the UPW staunchly opposed 
the incoming Conservative incomes policy in which pay in the public sector was capped to counter rises 
in inflation. The combination of rising prices and government restrictions rapidly spun the PO into a 
financial crisis, and when the UPW pursued a wage claim designed to match inflation and recover lost 
ground with outside comparable wages, the Board, with government backing, refused, instead offering a 
far lower settlement. The ensuing dispute resulted in a strike lasting from 20 January to 4 March 1971. 
This event and the wider financial and political crises it symbolised had major, lasting implications for the 
industry as a whole and for the mechanisation programme in particular. 
 The strike has been addressed in some detail in Alan Clinton’s 1984 book on PO unionism, Post 
Office Workers. Clinton interpreted its causes and how events unfolded and concluded that its legacy 
weighed heavily on the shape of the postal service’s subsequent industrial relations. He saw the most 
significant damage as the loss of solidarity and group morale felt by many to be a strong, historic 
characteristic of PO employment. In total, 6-8m days of work were lost as around 190,000 workers joined 
the strike, which included the vast majority of the closed-shop postman grade. It was the longest 
continuous strike since the General Strike in 1926, the third largest strike of the 1970s and the fifth largest 
in post-war British history.
6
 
Whatever its precise extent, no other national strike can have had so direct and continuous effect on so 
many people. It was one of the epic battles in the history of the British working-class movement, 
disciplined and tumultuous. It was also a significant episode in the relations between the social classes in 
Britain. Those who participated will always remember it as a great experience in hundreds of thousands of 
lives. There can be no doubt that it will be seen for generations to come as a watershed in the history of the 
Union and in the efforts to settle wages and conditions in the Post Office. It was the culmination of a 
significant phase in the life of the UPW and is generally remembered a decade later as a defeat for the 
Union, although a temporary one. It is therefore seen by those with various points of view as an indication 
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Clinton believed that by mid-February the struggle had ‘reached epic proportions, both in terms of its size 
and scope and the intensity of feeling that was being displayed’.8 Indeed the UPW’s leader, Tom Jackson, 
made some noteworthy addresses during rallies. ‘This is not a strike about pay any longer’, Jackson 
declared in February. ‘It is a strike about self-respect and dignity. They cannot starve us out, for we will 
win’. Later, in Glasgow, he described it as ‘a revolution, an explosion of layer upon layer of discontent 
piling upon the Post Office year after year’.9 Clearly an event of this magnitude made a sizeable impact 
on the subsequent state of industrial relations and, for a time, its effects threatened to derail the LPP 
entirely. 
On 6-8 April 1971, one month after the strike ended, a Committee of Enquiry, chaired by Sir 
Henry Hardman, retired Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, convened at Church House in 
Westminster to direct the pay settlement and make a range of recommendations for a postal service 
widely regarded as being in a state of political and financial crisis.
10
 Tom Jackson, UPW General 
Secretary, argued that postal staff had fallen behind other public sector workers in pay and their case was 
based on ‘fair comparison’ with outside industry. William Ryland, the newly appointed PO Chairman, led 
the management presentation, assisted by Dorothy Fothergill, Director Postal Personnel, who succeeded 
in persuading the committee of the dangerous consequences for national inflation of higher pay. The 
Committee agreed that a 9% award and a ‘performance linked pay system’ were in the national interest 
and might serve to revive the fall in postal productivity for which blame was distributed between the PO 
and UPW. Jackson, whose passionate advocacy was likened by supporters to that of a trial lawyer, 
afterwards told the press that the Government had leaned on the Committee and that postmen were being 
made scapegoats for broader economic and industrial relations problems.
11
 A contentious pay settlement 
in favour of management resulted, disputed in a minority report by Professor John Hughes. However, 
recommendations aimed at increasing postal productivity were backed unanimously by the Committee. 
The Postal Board was instructed to reduce overtime, increase part-time and female employment in areas 
with low recruitment, pursue changes in delivery and collection patterns, introduce a work measurement 
programme and accelerate the use of mechanisation. Much of this was unlikely to be popular with the 
majority of postal staff, the UPW being opposed to work measurement and the employment of part-time 
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 Given the bitterness of the confrontation and the punitive settlement, repairing the 
damage and working towards healthier industrial relations was a formidable challenge, recognised by the 
committee, who recommended wide-ranging reforms in consultative machinery.
13
 
 Having worked long hours on an emergency executive during the strike, the mood in the 
boardroom was severe during 1971. The weight was hardly lifted when they came to face the strike’s 
repercussions. The pressure was felt especially by those responsible for postal performance, including the 
Managing Director, Posts, Geoffrey Vieler, who, just eighteen months previously, had presented the LPP 
to the Board. Duncan Campbell-Smith has written that this period ‘reduced Vieler to a sorry figure, sitting 
slumped at the table through many meetings with his head in his hands’.14 Likewise, Dick Hayward, a 
UPW veteran who had been appointed Director, Personnel, is reported to have had a nervous 
breakdown.
15
 Others in senior positions used these circumstances to assert themselves, none more so than 
William Ryland who was appointed Chairman in April on the basis of his long experience, forthright 
character and a deep working knowledge of the service.
16
 Ryland was reputed to be a workaholic, known 
for his assertiveness and, according to Campbell-Smith, a ‘fearsome taskmaster’ who demanded an 
unrelenting pace of work from his ‘lieutenants’ such as Bill Cockburn.17 Ryland ‘shunted aside’ Vieler, 
selecting his ally and confidante Ken Holmes as Managing Director, Posts.
18
 (Holmes retired in June 1972 
when he was replaced by Alex Currall from the Treasury).
19
 
In the 1971-2 Annual Report, Ryland offered a response to the Hardman criticisms, citing 
mitigating circumstances and arguing that the strike should be viewed in the context of Britain’s ongoing 
political and economic upheavals. He pointed in particular to inflation as the root cause of both the crisis 
in postal finances and the strike, and reminded Parliament that industrial relations was a ‘national 
problem’ as reflected in the furore then surrounding the Industrial Relations Bill.20 
We seem to be at the beginning of a period of deep social change in industry. Managerial attitudes which 
were acceptable in the 1950s and even in the early 1960s are no longer appropriate. Stimulated by 
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improved education, the communications media and easier travel facilities, people’s horizons are constantly 
expanding. Leisure and job satisfaction are increasingly important considerations to the new generation of 
men and women coming into industry.
21
 
He warned that meeting these expectations on the postal side required financial stability. To this end he 
urged the curtailment of some services, raising tariffs and more rapid implementation of programmes to 
improve productivity, through mechanisation, work study and work measurement schemes.
22
 
Management’s philosophy, he argued, should embrace ‘a more commercial approach’ already evidenced 
by: a new central finance organisation; recruitment of more graduates and experienced businessmen from 
the private sector; more external training courses; and closer links with business experts from academia. It 
was hoped a fresh wave of external audits would help cement this new commercial approach.
23
 Ryland 
had been consistent in arguing for this approach even during the strike. He elaborated proposals for a 
corporate-planning system in a lecture at the Institute of Electrical Engineers in March 1971, the day the 
strike ended, claiming his ideas would deliver a more commercially robust industry.
24
 As will be shown, 
this shift in management philosophy had a significant impact on the politics of mechanisation. However, 
other, countervailing changes to the structure and tone of industrial relations were also underway which 
militated against a full-blooded adoption of Ryland’s bullish ethos. 
 
Tensions between industrial relations reform and commercial management 
 
The Hardman recommendations, while emphasising the desirability of commercial management, also 
dwelt on the breakdown of trust between staff and management, arguing that experienced personnel and 
IR experts should have greater influence at Board level. This judgement contributed to the formation of a 
Joint Working Group on Industrial Relations,
25
 but the JWGIR was also the product of an ongoing period 
of reform to IR at the PO, flowing naturally from the PO Act 1969. Having exited the civil service, 
negotiations over wages and conditions were no longer conducted through the Whitley Council system 
and, while Whitley norms were carried over for a while, a new framework adapted to the specific needs of 
the PO was slowly designed. In this respect, PO developments were in line with changes occurring 
throughout the British economy, stemming from the findings of the 1968 Donovan Commission into 
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British industrial relations. These changes saw large increases in the number of personnel specialists 
across industry and the formalisation of the rules and procedures of IR in large companies. Tensions 
therefore developed between two countervailing trends at work in the political economy of the PO: the 
first towards implementing a commercial ethos which sought to increase management autonomy and 
minimise protracted negotiations; the second towards the proliferation and formalisation of forums for 
negotiation and consultation. Both trends gathered momentum by 1971 and help explain some of the 
contradictions in the political backdrop to negotiations over mechanisation policies, addressed later in this 
chapter. 
 A series of historic changes to the structure of PO unionism took place in preparation for, and as a 
consequence of, the PO Act 1969.
26
 The major unions formed an umbrella organisation called the Council 
of Post Office Unions in 1968 while the Whitley machinery was being dismantled in anticipation of the 
switch to Corporation status. COPOU comprised five unions, dominated by the UPW and the POEU,
27
 
and while joint consultation continued on an ad hoc basis in the Whitley tradition, a new framework 
emerged.
28
 COPOU were unhappy with the old informal arrangements for dispute-resolution and wanted 
formal rules to take disputes higher than Regional Directors and involve more independent parties.
29
 
When the Whitley system formally ceased on 30 September 1969, an interim committee for national joint 
consultation (NJC) was formed, with a broad remit of utilising the ideas, experience and resources of 
staff, and establishing national agreements relating to training and working conditions. It was stipulated 
that the committee should have a maximum of sixteen members, eleven COPOU and five management.
30
 
In 1970, Tony Carter was appointed General Secretary of COPOU following the death of Syd Seaton, a 
respected, lifelong PO unionist. Carter’s career had taken him from Executive Officer in the Civil Service 
to serving on the PO Engineering, Factories and Supplies Departmental Whitley Council. He had been 
Deputy GS of the Society of Technical Civil Servants since 1960 and was working under George 
Woodcock on the Commission for Industrial Relations when he came to COPOU.
31
 In his first two years 
he was impressed by the scale of union efforts at all levels in creating new consultation opportunities, 
which he felt had improved communications over operational problems. COPOU’s 1972 Annual Report 
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stated that joint consultation committees had been set up with the following titles: Buildings and 
Mechanisation; Marketing; Office Machinery; Training; Operations; and Improvement and Efficiency. 
Each precipitated a steady flow of correspondence between members on all sides. COPOU publically 
welcomed these developments in their 1973 Annual Report: ‘The area of collective bargaining in the Post 
Office has been increased progressively in the last two years and by the end of 1973 there was not much 
activity undertaken by the Post Office which was not scrutinised and discussed by the unions at all 
levels’.32 ‘The result’, Carter believed, ‘was greater efficiency which was of direct benefit to the Post 
Office’.33 By the time he retired, much more had been achieved. By 1977, the PO’s joint consultation 
machinery had developed considerably, integrating COPOU into a four-tier consultative and negotiating 
structure, operating in tandem with informal arrangements with the separate unions.
34
 
During 1971, the first of many steps in synchronising new IR machinery with other organisational 
changes at the PO was underway. The enormous complexity of the unions, especially the UPW, meant 
this was a gradual process. There were wide regional differences. Some Head Postmasters’ areas had up 
to fourteen union branches, almost a branch per place of work, while others had just one branch for 
twenty places of work and a variety of area committees overseeing different problems. Branch secretaries 
often had different functions. Some dealt with many senior figures for a region, others represented 
workers in a single sorting office and liaised predominantly with local management. The formalisation of 
these forums began with the creation of UPW District Councils. The forming of COPOU and the new 
joint consultation machinery required the unions to co-ordinate their own internal organisation with wider 
changes, and new positions and duties were created at all levels. Union representatives undertook a wider 
variety of work representing local workplaces, acting as branch secretaries and sitting on local and 
regional COPOU committees.
35
 Regional consultation was ‘a completely new idea’ according to Mr R. C. 
Wall, the General Secretary of the Association of Head Postmasters. In 1970 he made his apprehension 
known to the Personnel Division, though acknowledging its useful potential.
36
 
The Personnel Division was at the heart of IR formalisation and expanded in this period as a 
consequence. Miss P. Bridger coordinated much of the work needed for formal disputes procedures and 
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looked to the electricity and gas industries for potential models.
37
 In the wider economy, particularly in 
large organisations, the personnel function had grown rapidly during the 1960s, partly thanks to a large 
increase in mergers, which had increased the division of labour at management level, and partly aided by 
government support. During the 1970s the profession matured such that by the end of the decade there 
were about 20,000 practicing specialists, a four-fold increase over twenty years.
38
 Academic 
commentators in the 1980s noticed that the field of personnel management had come to wrestle with two 
conflicting drives: the pursuit of staff welfare and the pursuit of organisational efficiency. In the postal 
service, incoming personnel specialists had to manage this middle-man role. On which side their 
allegiances lay is hard to judge and will have differed, though there is a view that the trend in the 
profession as a whole was more towards management goals of efficiency.
39
 One way to resolve the 
tension was to view the improvement of staff welfare as a means to operational efficiency over the long 
term, a longstanding philosophy in the postal service, though one that in practice presented great 
difficulties in 1971. When responding to an enquiry from an anxious colleague, E. Fennessey, a senior 
official who represented management on the JWGIR, tried to offer encouragement but acknowledged the 
difficulties involved in building a disputes framework in the post-strike climate. 
 Frankly there are no easy answers to your questions and anything said in the immediate aftermath of the 
UPW strike might have been premature. With the Hardman Report and ensuing pay negotiations with the 




To complement the work of the JWGIR, and as a step towards changing practices in the light of the strike, 
the Personnel Division sought in 1971 to improve communications between and among PO employees, 
establishing a working group in January 1972 at which the problem was defined as improving ‘internal 
“Public Relations”’.41 This involved consultations across the PO and led to the creation of new policies 
for in-house publications, day to day communication on IR matters and the promotion of union journals 
and conferences. In 1972 the focus shifted to improving communications between management and the 
mass of rank and file staff. Studies were begun to better understand the behaviour and attitudes of line 
managers, while Regional Directors were asked to promote local newspapers and magazines written by 
and for staff in an effort to stimulate interest in work matters.
42
 The Board asked that these changes apply 
                                                     
37
 POST 151/uncatalogued, former ref: CH/BO/0002. 
38
 Batstone, Working Order, p.38. 
39
 Ibid., pp.61-6. 
40
 POST 151/uncatalogued, former ref: CH/BP/0008, E. Fennessey to Greenlaw, draft letter, undated (c. 1972). 
41
 POST 151/uncatalogued, former ref: CH/BT/0006, Internal communications: Internal Communications Study 
Group, First Report, Consultation with Management, p.1. 
42
 Ibid, File 2: R. Corp’s comments on the report ‘Organisation of PR in the Post Office’. 
110 
 
as widely as possible. The working group’s first report dwelt in particular on issues of trust, noting that a 
new wave of communications might raise suspicions amongst staff that management were competing 




This sphere of activity – aimed at repairing the political damage of the strike and strengthening 
the staff-side stake in the industry – did not sit easily with the promotion of the commercial approach 
associated with Ryland and Hardman. On 16 February, during the strike, Ryland met Regional Postal 
Directors in London where they discussed the need for ‘a new overall philosophy’, believing that recent 
crises had presented them with a window in which radical reappraisals could be seriously considered.
44
 
They expanded on this in their report’s opening statement: 
Financial criteria clearly indicate that a fresh and total evaluation of the current strategies, risks and 
opportunities of the business are now called for and the recent strike has provided an unequal opportunity 
for breaking away from traditional service patterns should investigation show this to be desirable. In 
current conditions economic considerations must take precedence in any review, providing the social 




Four Directors – Mr G.H. Coates (Northern Ireland), Mr T.C. Carpenter (Scotland), Mr D. Henry 
(Midlands) and Mr D. Wesil (London) – agreed to prepare a report detailing their views on how to 
improve overall financial performance with recommendations covering management strategies, pricing 
policies, staff relations, productivity and mechanisation. The Directors’ immediate concern was to reverse 
a sudden arrest in the historic growth of mail volumes. They judged traffic growth to be singularly 
important to long term productivity, knowing that future revenues and a full utilisation mechanisation 
depended on it.
46
 Various solutions were suggested. They pointed hopefully to the USA, where marketing 
drives and mail-advertising were helping to raise the figures. More radically, they believed the time had 
come to give greater priority to the wishes of big business (who contributed the largest share of revenue), 
and were prepared to contemplate overhauling the historic principal of universal pricing in favour of 
market-led a market-led tariff structure: ‘…we are recommending a move away from standardised 
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services and tariffs towards more discretion at the local level to order things in accordance with local 
demands rather than by reference to universal or arbitrary standards’.47 
The vision of the future postal service outlined in the 1971 Directors’ Report was one focussed on 
making profits through efficiency and productivity. They claimed that both staff and supervisors 
harboured suspicions over the complexity of the Headquarters ‘superstructure’ in London. The regions 
wanted greater powers devolved to Head Postmasters to turn each office into a ‘profit centre’ covering its 
own costs and making ‘a maximum contribution towards the cost of the infra-structure’.48 Looking to the 
future, measures would be needed to improve rank-and-file job satisfaction, but here shrewdness was 
counselled. They observed that a large share of the staff devoted most of their working lives to the PO, 
many in spite of relatively poor pay and conditions. They did not believe there was value in becoming 
‘market leaders’ in personnel management, rather the aim should be to generate ‘the maximum degree of 
job satisfaction’ while remaining ‘cost-benefit conscious’.49 In the interim a tougher line was called for 
with the UPW Branches, even if this came at the cost of further industrial unrest. They believed that only 
by emphasising profit could any shift take place from a service to a commercial mindset. 
In the past the Post Office has placed very great stress on management proceeding by agreement with the 
staff even at some cost to efficiency. In future we think that this emphasis should be changed, and for our 
part we are determined that managers should far more often be ready to proceed when they are satisfied 
that this is justified even though staff agreement is not forthcoming. But it must be accepted that the results 
of this will not invariably be beneficial to productivity and will often be at the expense of disruption of 
service to the customer. Some customers might even believe, if they knew all the facts, that the extra 10% 
or so of productivity that management might achieve in this way was not worth the consequences for them 
and claim that they would prefer to pay a higher price and do without the productivity improvement efforts. 
These are risks that must be taken, for in the long-run we believe that if we do not proceed with the firmer 
management style to which we have referred, the situation will not simply remain as it has been but that 
productivity will decline still further.
50
 
Their attitude towards mechanisation, which they believed to be well-costed, remained fully supportive.
51
 
They were keen to see the first generation of machines and concentration schemes implemented quickly, 
leading to an extended period of ‘stability in design and system’ so that all concerned could become 
comfortable with the new methods.
52
 There was, in their view, no hurry for a second generation of 
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machines or supplementary innovations. Rather R&D should reduce expenditure, focus on figuring out 
likely long term societal demand for postal communications and consider making more use of the high 
quality designs now becoming available overseas.
53
 
Some elements of this philosophy were formalised in the publication of various national strategy 
documents, united by their common pursuit of higher productivity. Foremost were preparations for 
Ryland’s Corporate Plan. His proposals in 1970 for a detailed, systematic, long-term plan to be redrawn 
each year for parliamentary scrutiny – a model analogous to that used in Telecommunications and then 
under consideration in the other nationalised industries
54
 – was taken forward with a period of research 
delegated to the Postal Management Board and its Director, Ken Holmes. Holmes was also Director of 
Finance with a long history in technology and operations having chaired the Mechanical Aids Committee 
in the 1950s and served as Director of Postal Services in the 1960s. The first plan was published in 1972 
and its vigorous tone and commercial content made it a key document in the PO’s wider rebranding 
exercise, most publically visible in the creation of new corporate logos, typefaces and signs for the 
different PO services (just as in America where rebranding around a positive corporate image was under 
way following the Reorganization Act).
55
 The central message was that each business within the 
organisation needed to adapt to changes in the commercial environment. The primacy of business over 
public needs, and a stronger focus on profit, was stressed from the preparation stage.
56
 When a draft was 
completed in December 1971 it ran to 58 pages and laid out a number of salient facts affecting the 
industry as a whole and its subsidiary functions of inland letters, overseas letters, parcels, counters, 
personnel and finance.  
For inland letter mail, a number of threats were recognised which would have knock-on effects 
for mechanisation policy. Traffic growth for inland letters had been slowing in line with GDP growth, but 
the events of 1971 had exposed for the first time how vulnerable traffic growth could be. Some believed 
the rupture with past trends was more than an anomaly, claiming that ‘the long established relationship of 
letter traffic to economic growth may have altered to the Business’ disadvantage’.57 The national figures 
dropped by 8-10% in the first six months after the strike, far more than predicted, and were expected to 
take at least four years to recover (telephone traffic rose by 12% locally and 13% nationally over this 
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 They speculated that this was indicative of future trends and the role of postal communications 
would shrink as the use of telephone, fax and telex services spread. Falling traffic levels were known to 
have contributed to the real decline in productivity criticised in the Hardman Report, but understanding 
the problem beyond this was difficult. Forecasting future trends in the communications market needed to 
take into account the fact that letter writing was a more considered form of communication than 
telephone, offering a range of unique benefits. It was thought that young people used telephones in many 
cases where the older generation chose to write, but this was a hunch and so fresh research was 
requested.
59
 A second phenomenon thought to be critical was labour intensity, which was higher than ever 
at 72% of expenditure and being exacerbated by the increasingly inflationary economic climate, making 
the need to reduce manpower more urgent than ever.
60
 These were judged to be the most damaging trends 
affecting financial performance, for which the plan outlined counter-strategies. One was to continue to 
push for extremely high tariff increases and to strike the right balance between first and second class mail 
to come closer to meeting the industry target of 2% return on expenditure. However, this could only be 
viewed as a longer term goal as the Government and the CBI – both having major interests in maintaining 
existing service levels at low prices – placed limits on PO freedom of action. 
Through these struggles, much was learned about the complexities and constraints of tariff 
alterations, in particular their interrelatedness with operational matters. The aforementioned clamour for 
sharp increases was offset over the longer term by an awareness of the risks involved in sudden change 
and a view developed that experimentation with gradual, conservative alterations was more politically and 
operationally prudent. In 1976, the Carter Committee heard of how a balanced ‘Letter Tariff Philosophy’ 
had been forged, aiming not only for higher revenues, but greater control over issues such as mail 
circulation, attendance patterns and shift-work.
61
 Moreover, there was a growing knowledge among postal 
engineers that the relationship between tariffs and operations raised questions in the R&D of sorting 
machines. Cliff Wicken, a Senior Executive Engineer, raised this point in at the 1970 Postal Engineering 
Conference: 
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I would stress the importance of not only designing the machine to handle the letters but also of making the 
letters suitable for handling by the machine. It is important because it is with both these sides of the 
problem with which the engineer must struggle and this is very much bound up with the tariff structure. 
Tariffs at the moment are based on weight. Some of our machines weigh 5 tons and mail weight is 
negligible. What is important to the engineer is the length of the letter, the height of the letter and the 
thickness of the letter. Ideally tariffs should be structured to encourage the use of machineable mail.
62
 
The other longstanding economising measure, subject to similar constraints, was to make cuts to 
the range and frequency of deliveries and collections. In consequence, the frequency and intensity of the 
debates surrounding both tariff increases and service cuts increased during the 1970s. There was little 
room for manoeuvre with tariffs increases. ‘The overall picture is not hopeful’, explained Holmes in 
November 1971. ‘The CBI restrictions on price increases have led to the Post Office putting forward 
proposals for tariff increases and service cuts which are grossly inadequate as a means of enabling it to 
meet its financial target’.63 Negotiations between Board, Government and POUNC took about nine 
months, and Government retained veto power anyway: anything above a 1p increase on first and second 
class stamps, the equivalent of about £85m extra revenue, was simply ‘regarded as unacceptable’.64 
Nevertheless, following debates about the relative political merits of smaller, more regular vs. larger less 
frequent tariff increases, the strategy favoured in the Corporate Plan was to streamline the negotiation 
process with Government while pushing for as much as 5½p (1
st





this, the strategies outlined by the Regional Directors of more vigorous marketing and higher value 
concessions to bulk business users were included.
66
 Finally, there was the longer term pursuit of 
productivity covered by the Letter Post Plan and the latest proposals for a contentious work study 
‘information and control system’ pencilled in for the largest 92 sorting offices.67 These were termed 
‘remedial measures’ and required formal agreement with the UPW, the securing of which had become 
more problematic. 
In summary, a bullish attitude was encouraged among senior management by the events of 1971. 
It was embodied in a corporate planning system which portrayed mechanisation as a central plank in a raft 
of controversial, profit-oriented reforms, which were viewed with suspicion by many rank and file staff. 
Moreover, the thrust of the commercial approach appeared to stand in contradiction to the comprehensive 
restructuring of industrial relations and the improvement of internal communications gathering 
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momentum since the formation of COPOU in 1968. In attempting to please the government and other 
external interests by couching mechanisation in a commercially-minded reform package, Ryland and 
Holmes inadvertently encouraged a view among many rank and file staff that there was something 
insidious to the Letter Post Plan, seeds that landed in fertile soil in the post-strike political climate. The 
first Corporate Plan forecast the completion of letter mechanisation by 1980 and outlined a schedule 
which referred to the original 1969 LPP proposals – complete with the eventual target of the equivalent of 
16,000 jobs cut. Michael Corby later wrote that corporate planning was insufficiently cross-examined by 
the government ‘The indications are that the sponsoring department had neither the will nor the expertise 
to challenge Posts’.68 He also argued, with the benefit of hindsight, that the first Plan was naive in its 
predictions, especially regarding the public uptake of postcodes and the extent to which traffic levels 
could be increased by marketing, both appearing when he wrote in 1979 as over-optimistic. However, 
both initiatives fared far better in the 1980s and, moreover, the 1972 plan did in fact make it clear that 
‘considerable doubts’ existed over mechanisation and that, in light of the strike and difficult financial 




                                                     
68
 Corby, The Postal Business, p.146; pp.152-4. 
69
 POST 69/237... Corporate Plan, p.16. 
116 
 








                                                     
70
 POST 69/237... Corporate Plan. 
71
 Of the four design consultancy firms commissioned c.1972, Banks and Miles’ submissions were judged best to 
‘express the personality and character’ of each part of the new PO. This was one aspect of an increased focus on 
marketing and a public expression of the new commercialism. POST 69/240... MDPC (74) 40: Design identification 





Staff Numers without remedial 
measures (000's) 




The effects of the crisis on mechanisation policy 
 
As was later acknowledged, the doubts about mechanisation outlined in the Corporate Plan stemmed 
largely from the 1971 crisis and a worsening commercial climate characterised by rising inflation and 
industrial tensions.
72
 This led to what was described as an ‘initial’ and ‘inconclusive’ phase of 
revalidation which was one part of a wider-ranging reduction in capital expenditure imposed while the 
Board tried to understand the post-strike financial situation more accurately.
73
 ‘Postal finances are in the 
present state for three main reasons’ wrote Nick de Jong, Director of Postal Mechanisation, in an 
investment review co-authored with the Finance Department. ‘Firstly, because of underpricing, 
compounded of chronic political tinkering with the business, in the past; secondly, because of the 
vulnerability of the postal services to wage inflation; thirdly, because demand for postal services is more 
or less static’. Nick de Jong was then nearing the end of his career having become a figurehead for British 
postal engineering and a leader known for his ambitious and conceptual views on the place of mechanised 
sorting in the wider political economy of the organisation. His complaints about economic and political 
constraints were made following discussions with the Government in which the PO was instructed to 
make immediate and substantial reductions in capital expenditure with larger cuts to follow, raising ‘a 
fundamental question about the future of the postal capital programme, if not the future of the postal 
services’.74 This feeling was compounded by fears expressed by experienced officials that the fall in mail 
volume represented more than just a momentary dent in an upward trajectory. Some saw it as a measure 
of the damage done to national confidence in the postal service; as doing harm to immediate revenue and 
possibly signalling the beginning of decline.
75
 
The following year, in a financial memo to the Managing Director, Mr C. L. Crump reflected on 
how although management and the Government ‘won’ the strike, its potential for financial damage had 
been underestimated. ‘No-one forecast a 6 ½ week strike, and the cost of the strike, with the 
consequences of the catastrophic fall in traffic, is probably more than the cost of settlement would have 
been’.76 Information was urgently sought on the likely effects. With around 25 new buildings scheduled 
for construction each year, and buildings costs rising by 10% in 1970 and 16% in 1971, it was important 
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to understand the likely impact of changing traffic levels on space requirements.
77
 For example, assuming 
a permanent 10% loss of traffic, Heads of Division in the London Postal Region were asked to quickly 
calculate the operational implications and report back on traffic levels, revenue, staff numbers, personnel 
and promotion policies, buildings programme and effects on Mechanised Letter Office (MLO) schemes. 
The Inner London area was expected to lose 8.4m items of mail per week with a further 3.8m in the Outer 
London Area, which translated into a reduction of capital expenditure from £33.3m to £29.7m. Some 
proposed MLOs were quickly earmarked for amalgamation into single, larger offices, such as joining 
Sutton with Croydon. Other local amalgamation studies were abandoned, yielding to the need for quick 
decisions. Combining Dartford and Bromley, for instance, offered good prospects but building work for 
separate MLOs had already ‘reached the point of no return’. A general memo on capital requirements for 
mechanised offices in London stated that loss of traffic had redirected planners to earlier ideas involving 
six fewer MLOs calling for more detailed thought about the difficulties inherent in controlling larger 
bodies of staff on a single site.
78
 Meanwhile, as similar reports were received from the Regions, planning 
staff at Headquarters were reassessing the broader shape of capital spending in anticipation of sweeping 
government-imposed cuts on the £35m annual budget allocated to Posts, £18m of which was set aside for 
MLOs and mechanised parcel offices. Some sites were shelved despite continuing to suggest long term 
savings,
79




Delays to the LPP which began during the pay crisis were therefore extended while a review of 
buildings policy took place in the summer of 1971. All Head Postmasters were given ten days notice of 
local revalidation studies and were asked to inform staff. ‘You will, I am sure, recognise how important 
[this] is ... at a time when the finances of the Postal business are in a critical state’ wrote Regional 
Director A. H. Woodland in a circular to South Western Postmasters. ‘Many investment decisions closely 
affecting building and mechanisation schemes in this Region will have to be held in abeyance until these 
studies have been completed’. Woodland asked that Postmasters feeling this might spell trouble for their 
local code-sort hopes refer to paragraph 10.3 of the Hardman Report which warned that ‘the scope for 
accelerating the programme’ might need ‘re-examining’.81 Nationally, the largest share of mechanisation-
related expenditure (60%) was for new buildings and renovations, for which ‘commercial criteria’ were 
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applied in all practicable cases. New building proposals were expected to factor in post-strike traffic 
levels, whilst project justification had to display realistic prospects for a minimum 10% return on the 
initial investment using discounted cash flow techniques.
82
 In practice this meant further, delays to the ten 
year backlog on bringing dilapidated buildings in line with contemporary standards. As Tom Jackson had 
pointed out to the Hardman Committee, some buildings had been in use since the nineteenth century, 
complete with loading bays designed for horse and cart.
83
 Much of the least satisfactory accommodation 
was originally built to accommodate the Victorian explosion in mail volumes. R.J.S. Baker, head of 
buildings investment in the 1950s and of the postal staffing division in the 1960s, later reflected on the 
three most important considerations in regenerating postal buildings: the need for adequate capital, 
sufficient planning by engineers and securing the good will of staff. 
The first and second suffered from the general under-investment malaise of our generation and from the 
priority given to telephones when the two services were under one management. (You can sort letters 
somehow in a crowded building but you cannot connect a new telephone without space for a new bit of 
equipment.) We were giving a high priority to big postal buildings in the 1950s but there was a great time-
lag in getting them planned and built. There were vicious circles.
84
  
Adequate capital was not made available until 1960s but in the early 1970s the backlog persisted. Such 
underinvestment, coupled with long-term traffic growth, created poor working conditions in a number of 
large offices. Wary of the longstanding campaigns of unions who expected conditions to compare well 
with outside industry, it was recognised that some new buildings, even without meeting the 10% DCF 
criteria, were so urgent as to be unavoidable.  
A second effect of the financial crisis coinciding with the first revalidation of buildings and 
mechanisation was a cut in the postal R&D budget. de Jong scaled down his department’s annual request 
for funding by 9% to £1.36m, distributing funds in such a way as to retain all 38 major staff but to curtail 
the overall research programme, confining R&D to those projects offering the best prospects for 
immediate return on expenditure. Blue skies (or ‘free rein’) work was now largely shelved. He outlined 
the situation more fully in a statement to the Board: 
The first objective of R&D in the current financial climate is to provide the technical support, improved 
equipment and methods (capable of the earliest exploitation) which are required to implement the 
mechanisation programme with increasing financial and operational efficiency. The broad aims are to 
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maintain, review and implement an R&D programme within an annual budget, covering basic system 
studies, the design of new and improved machinery and the development of code sorting equipment and 
associated electronic systems so as to meet the long-term future needs of the business and its possible new 
services, with a view to productivity improvement, reduction in manpower dependence and increased cost 
effectiveness; to attempt the early invention of the first prototype automatic address/postcode reading 
machine, and to recommend on the standardisation of mail required for a viable system. Additionally, there 
is a need to foster in-house competence and thereby assist the penetration of technology wherever it will 
benefit the business; the professional R&D staff have a vital part to play in the resulting radical changes. 
The level of competence must also be such as to ensure that the PO remains authoritative in postal 
mechanisation theory and practice.
85
 
He went on to remind the Board of the central role of mechanisation to the future of the industry: 
‘Mechanisation, substantially based on R&D work in the PO, is the key factor in the rationalisation of the 
Letter Post. It is capable of providing a highly desirable reduction in sorting office manpower which... 
over a 20 year period ranges from 15-30% [return on expenditure]’.86 The pre-eminence of British postal 
engineering had bestowed de Jong with an influential voice on the Board, and he naturally offered a 
robust defence when faced with the threat of cuts to the design budget. Britain’s reputation as a pioneer in 
postal mechanisation derived mostly from being the first nation, alongside America, to attempt total 
network restructuring based on a coherent, national code-sort system. The PO’s first generation of 
machines was highly regarded by foreign postal administrations and well received among professional 
electro-mechanical engineers globally. As an export, the machines were proving successful and, within 
Britain, their operational use had spread during an initial wave of implementation (though, as we shall 
see, with many teething problems). By mid 1971, 33 offices were operating a total of 44 segregators and 
80 automatic letter facers (ALF). A further thirteen offices operated a total of 248 coding desks and 107 
automatic sorting machines (ASM). On this basis Alex Currall, Managing Director, Posts, presented 
Government with a case for British pre-eminence,
87
 meanwhile the Board observed that elements of the 
British plan were being imitated in the USA, Canada, France, West Germany and Japan in what was 
termed a ‘strong move towards a rational systems approach’.88 
In restating the department’s short, medium and long term plans, de Jong’s emphasis was first 
focussed on the live performance of first-generation machines and improving their efficiency and cost in 
the light of operational experience. Although ‘design stability’ had been reached there remained much 
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scope for technical fine-tuning in the face of problems arising from particular schemes for mail 
concentration, transport alterations and staff reactions to the new working methods. Second, looking 
ahead, work was underway on a “second generation” of machines, designed to reduce production costs 
and improve ergonomic performance, as well as the creation of machines and systems for training coding 
staff. Finally, long term investigations were ongoing into the possibility of remote coding using CCTV 
and the ever elusive application of optical character recognition (OCR) and artificial intelligence.
89
 These 
R&D questions are addressed further in later chapters. For now, it is worth noting that although the 
general direction of R&D was left largely unaltered by factors such as marginal changes in mail volume, 
its scale was limited at times of financial crisis. The budget for R&D, like the capital available for new 
buildings, tended to rise and fall in line with the national economy. 
A third and more enduring consequence of 1971 was the rise of staff hostility to management 
initiatives. For many postal staff, mechanisation came to be viewed with suspicion and became strongly 
aligned with an attack on their rights, wages and the traditional values of the service. This was also linked 
to class struggle and the national dispute occurring between the unions and government, as the new 
commercialism on display at the PO had become associated with the Conservative Government’s 
unpopular industrial policies. For example, COPOU stated in 1973 that the ‘difficult negotiating 
environment’, was, at root, a product of the government’s incomes policy.90 And at UPW debates and in 
its newspaper, strenuous opposition was voiced to the government’s interference in the postal service and 
its attempts to control the legal status of PO unions and the wages of its staff. The question of 
mechanisation therefore came to be affiliated with the suspicion that the rights and incomes of UPW 
members were being threatened by a government determined to foist a profit-oriented, commercial 
mentality onto the management of a public service institution. The Hardman Report had implored both 
sides of the industry to work together towards raising productivity, but the post-strike political climate 
made this impractical. The first notable dispute came in November when the Minister for Posts and 
Telecommunications, Christopher Chataway, announced proposals to save money such as abolishing 
second deliveries, raising certain tariffs and targeting staff cuts of 25,000 before 1979. In The Times, Tom 
Jackson, UPW GS, characterised Chataway’s position as ‘paying more for less’ suggesting that staff cuts 
would actually be closer to be 7,000, and that service cuts, from which business users were exempt, 
would anger the public and be rejected by the Post Office Users National Council (POUNC).
91
 Chataway 
told the Commerce and Industry Group of the Law Society that postal services were worse than they used 
to be, that deliveries and collections needed trimming and that telecoms would monopolise rapid 
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communications in the future.
92
 Jackson again responded that these were knee-jerk, long-term reactions to 
a short-term economic depression, and, in private, told Holmes that staff were aggrieved by ‘such a 
fundamental change that ... could affect the whole nature of the postman’s job’.93 
At a Special Conference in December the UPW membership voted down a number of the 
Hardman proposals, including extending the employment of women and part-timer workers and 
management’s proposed work-measurement system. Speaking for a motion dubbed the ‘Manchester 
Alternative’, Jean Jacque made a scathing attack on the UPW GC for being timid, on POUNC for 
favouring the interests of the Confederation of British Industry and on low pay, equivalent, he said, to 
‘starvation wages’. He had to wait for the applause to subside before turning to mechanisation. ‘Two-
hundred million pounds have been wasted on the monstrosities in our offices’ he claimed, adding that 
staff wastage would not cover the redundancies recently outlined in parliament. Others who spoke 
accepted the inevitability and even desirability of mechanisation, and suggested the UPW should 
scrutinise the plans to ensure they improved services and as well as profits, ‘but before the little offices 
were swallowed up’ commented an editorial in The Post, ‘they wanted a decent productivity deal out of it. 
They wanted improvements in the service, and they knew that they must accept change’.94 
Meanwhile, union and management leaders entered more regular and progressive discussions in 
the Joint Working Group on Industrial Relations, at which mechanisation featured prominently. At 
management briefings from late 1971 (held privately in the mornings before the JWGIR sat) efforts were 
made to come to terms with the UPW challenge during discussions covering a range of new ideas and 
research about industrial relations. IR on the postal side was understood to be unusually tense, meaning 
that ‘any decision mishandled could blow up into more of a crisis than if the climate were less volatile 
and staff morale higher’.95 Mr Gowen, Director South Western Postal Region, traced this back to the 
introduction in 1968 of the two-tier post ‘when the service fell so low in public esteem that staff morale 
became badly affected. The blame for the present PO troubles was’, he believed, ‘placed by the staff on 
the men at the top, rather than on local management’.96 All accepted that the industry’s politics had been 
heavily strained by numerous factors, including the introduction of two-tier, organisational restructuring, 
regrading, the strike and uncertain traffic levels. However they were divided over how to fix things and, 
again, showed signs of the tension between pursuing commercial goals while also attempting to include 
the unions in decision-making. The dominant line of thought was for fostering mutual understanding 
                                                     
92
 The Times, 03/11/71, p.4. 
93
 MRC: MSS.148/UCW/5/6/27... Postal Services, 03/11/71; Special Report on Postal Restructuring, 04/11/71 
94
 POST 115/514, The Post, 1972: Special Conference December 1971 Report, January Issue, pp.22-29 
95
 POST 65/134, Joint Working Group on Industrial Relations Minutes, 1971-1975: Minutes of Official Members 





between staff and management through more open and regular communication, including the concept of 
‘imaginative consultation’, meaning to go further than required by the “rule book” in entering into 
thorough and early communication with unions during policy planning. Nevertheless there remained 
those who, on certain issues – such as the extent to which the Board should encourage the UPW to 
streamline its overabundance of representatives and unwieldy branch structure – continued to argue for a 
‘divide-and-rule’ approach.97. Such tactics were said to be widespread among Head Postmasters and 
evidently had apologists at the highest levels, but Mr W. Pounder, Director of Industrial Relations and 




By the time of these discussions a number of offices were operating code-sort machinery. In each 
case, a process of local consultation was followed and, though informal, the PO seems to have offered 
flexibility and timeliness in handling different human dilemmas as they arose. For example, those 
working in areas likely to be affected were assured in advance that any relocation of jobs to different 
offices was subject to two-way discussion. The postal official R.J.S. Baker wrote in Journal of 
Management Studies in 1971 that... 
...when a man’s job disappears owing to area reorganization, he may be considered for transfer to the office 
to which the work has been transferred provided he is considered suitable and local circumstances allow. 
Alternately he may be transferred to some other comparable type of work elsewhere if he himself wishes 
and at the discretion of management - and certain other alternatives may be open.
99
 
However, wider implementation of the LPP required formal agreement with the UPW. Given the 
uncertain financial and political situation, management wished to avoid, for a period, committing to any 
detailed, long term deal with the workforce. Conversely, UPW negotiators needed a convincing case to 
take to the membership that the plan was financially and operationally viable, and that the workforce 
would share in the savings. Much of the discussion of mechanisation on the JWGIR during 1972 dwelt on 
these matters. 
Management’s post-strike reappraisal had culminated in a computerised costing forecast based on 
data from local studies which produced a promising five year forecast again confirming that code-sorting 
was sound in principal. But doubts had surfaced over its underlying assumptions, raising questions over 
the scale of implementation.
100
 The Board had confidence in the overall plan, but had come to favour a 
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step-by-step timetable for implementation, committing only to commissioning a handful of 
unquestionably profitable MLOs per year. David Stewart (management) later told Carter (COPOU) that 
higher costs and less availability of new buildings contributed to a policy of equipping ‘the key ones in 
the system’ first.101 Senior Management was reluctant to share their findings with staff during the initial 
revalidation studies. Following requests from COPOU for more information, Stewart wrote to 
Headquarters colleagues, ‘I see no real difficulty in excluding staff participation in these studies as we 
have done in the past. They will, I am sure, be more concerned with the results than the preparatory 
work’.102 Realising that UPW Branches would likely become suspicious at staff and resources being 
diverted to a secret revalidation, regional planners warned Stewart that the UPW would have to be 
informed. The following Monday, he wrote again to Carter with notification that studies into current and 
projected traffic, buildings expenditure and staffing levels would commence immediately. Reluctance to 
share costing information with staff remained strong until at least March 1972.
103
 COPOU made their 
dissatisfaction plain during a meeting in January 1972 where Mr Failes (UPW) voiced his ‘disgust’ with 
the delays. He told them that the late submission of piecemeal proposals was unlikely to satisfy the UPW 
membership and ‘did not constitute a proper plan’. He and his negotiating colleague Bill Wolfenden 
called instead for a formal plan detailing financial viability, environmental conditions, a timetable for 
installation and immediate special staff payments. They reminded Steward that there was an element of 
the rank and file who wanted to abandon mechanisation entirely. The mood worsened after an episode of 
Tomorrow’s World aired on the BBC before Christmas which, based on information from Telecoms 
engineers, speculated that OCR might soon make the Postman obsolete
104
 In response, Stewart carried on 
negotiations in a step-wise fashion, following a strategy prepared immediately after the strike when the 
Board made staff-side acceptance in the abstract (or the ‘operational concept’) the first goal, followed 
later by practical negotiations such as special payments, working conditions and matters arising from 
implementation and timing.
105
. As one senior engineer wrote to a colleague in February 1972, ‘...the 
[official] view seems to be, “let’s get an agreement in broad terms and then negotiate the details 




 Review: PHBS/BG/0048, Buildings and Mechanisation Committee of the Postal Business 
Joint Council (COPOU), 1972-1981: Minutes of the 2
nd
 Meeting of the Buildings and Mechanisation Committee, 
01/08/72, p.5 
102
Emphasis in original. POST 122/12528... Confidential note to SDPS by D. Stewart, 22/06/71. See Stewart to F. E. 
Jones (SDP), ‘Letter and Parcel Post Plans’, 20/07/71 
103
 POST 122/12529, Letter Post Plan: Staff Side Consideration, 1970 -1972: Stewart to Carter, 26/07/71; and F. E. 
Jones (SDPS) to DPMB, 06/03/72 
104
 POST 122/12529... 6th Meeting of the Joint Group on Postal Coding and Automatic Letter Sorting 
(Administration/COPOU), 03/01/72, paragraphs 84-98 
105




afterwards!”’. In particular, there were concerns about striking a deal with the UPW that did not tie 
special pay for coding to productivity from the outset.
106
 
In the aftermath of the strike, the strategy of nudging the UPW towards official cooperation 
started to look shaky in April 1972, one month before the mechanisation debate scheduled for the Union’s 
Summer Conference. Wolfenden and Failes composed twelve probing questions about the mechanisation 
programme and sent them to Alex Currall, who had by then succeeded Holmes as Managing Director, 
Posts. They wanted to know: why a step-wise implementation policy was now being pursued in favour of 
the systemic 120-MLO plan originally proposed? Which offices could expect what types of new 
equipment? Was there a timetable for installations and mail concentration and how was this expected to 
affect staff? What was the basis of decisions in selecting offices? How should local consultation proceed? 
What were the long term prospects for OCR? And how did British automation compare internationally?
107
 
The initial answers provided partial explanations but left Currall dissatisfied. ‘I’m afraid some of these 
answers just won’t do’ he wrote to those drafting the official response. Some questions had been 
misunderstood and certain answers were cursory, misleading or vague. In relation to a question about the 
minimum traffic needed to justify code-sort installations, he advised thinking again about their response: 
If the answer as drafted were trotted out from the platform at the UPW Conference, I suspect the immediate 
riposte from the floor would be “It is all very well talking about an office which handles about 2 million 
items per week posted and delivered. But what type of office is this? What class? And can you give half-a-
dozen examples of the kind of office by name?”108 
Currall demanded ‘more clarity of thinking’ in explaining the improvements to machine design expected 
in the future.
109
 This had some effect, as at the end of the month, a new joint committee was established 
devoted wholly to buildings and mechanisation, where more detailed questions could be addressed and 
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The UPW Embargo 
 
The PO submitted a report before the May 1972 UPW conference. It documented the different machines 
including segregators, ALFs, coding desks and automatic sorting machines, and described how they were 
joined into a system which integrated into the workings of a sorting office. The logic of the code-sort 
concept was placed in the context of the national plan of postcodes, mail concentration and MLOs, 
including diagrams and a timetable for regional implementation. It also outlined how future savings 
would be shared with the staff, and made assurances about new working conditions and security of 
employment. Finally, the Board’s report underlined the operational and financial benefits of the LPP and 
went on to acknowledge the challenge posed to all affected by the changes. 
[The PO] believes that mechanisation opens up the prospect of building a modern technologically-based, 
efficient postal system... Mechanisation also means less drudgery and more interesting jobs. What it does 
not mean is people being thrown out of work… But mechanisation does mean change – and facing up to 
the problems of change.
111
 
After debating a new postal grading agreement, the future of the telegraph and giro services and 
establishing some new directions for wage negotiations, all 1,450 delegates filled the Empress Ballroom 
in Blackpool for what The Post labelled ‘the big one’: whether or not to accept the EC’s recommendation 
to extend formal cooperation with the LPP. It was known beforehand that a motion would be put forward 
for an embargo on the introduction of new technology which had first been proposed by union members 
at London’s Eastern District Office, where there had been industrial action over newly installed conveyor 
systems. After the strike, the situation escalated and a number of London branches offered their 
support.
112
 During the debate, they combined in opposition, arguing that their dissent was ‘no flat 
rejection of mechanisation’ but was designed to enable further scrutiny of plans for substantial 
redeployment and loss of staff, new working methods and changes to the working environment. 
Moreover, promises of higher pay from future savings was not a fair deal. Staff, they said, wanted to 
establish a payment scheme in advance of cooperation. Indeed, Jackson and the EC – having made their 
agreement with the Board’s report clear – were questioned as to whether their faith in the advantages of 
the incoming technology was naive; that they had a... 
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...child-like faith... that we should all emerge into an age graced by a mechanised postal service, producing 
a high level of profitability capable of sustaining good conditions and paying good wages – in fact, a 
mechanical golden goose laying golden eggs.
113
 
Some delegates worried that accepting the plan on the back of the Hardman recommendations would be 
‘playing into the hands’ of a Tory government, and likened their problems to those of mineworkers and 
railway workers. Others denounced the financial prospects of mechanisation, refusing ‘to pay the price of 
the shovels with which we are expected to dig our own graves’. Delegates who had experienced the new 
mechanised conditions and had spent time operating code-sort machinery added their testimonies. Freddie 
Page of London’s West Central District Office: 
The sorting office you know is certainly not the office we work in... We are like Charlie Chaplin in 
“Modern Times” – caught up in the machinery. Like a sausage factory, the work comes in at one end and 
goes out the other. You get no natural light or ventilation. You are working in excessive noise and dust… 
We must see that our destiny is determined by us, and not by the machines!
114
 
Another delegate, from Norwich, asked whether the technologists who had designed the machines also 
sufficiently understood sorting office life: 
We need control not the machines, but the so-called experts in the POMB [Post Office Mechanisation & 
Buildings Department] who, in our experience, plan installations and yet have no knowledge of sorting 
office procedures, for the simple reason that they’re rarely inside one, and have never worked one! … The 
POMB can no longer be allowed to charge around like a bull in a china shop, putting bits of equipment 
here, there and everywhere. There must be a re-validation of the mechanisation exercise, and that is why 
we support the amendment.115 
Others worried that the introduction of code-sort posed a threat to small offices and to the respectability 
of postal services: 
If we don’t have this review and revalidation of mechanisation, with what will the small branches be left? 




A thread running through the debate was that even the most outspoken pessimists were keen to 
distance themselves from perceived Luddism, stating caveats about their support for the principle of 
technological progress. However there remained overwhelming hostility. Jackson later said that the 
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debate was framed by a ‘fear of the new’, and at its end there was a note of resignation in his plea to not 
turn away from modernisation. He warned that to do so would ultimately lead to ruin because the only 
hope for the service was to become more productive and for this to happen, the sorting process needed to 
be modernised. His colleague, John Taylor, admitted that he had ‘faith’ in mechanisation, ‘because on 
that single word, I believe, hangs the future of the members we represent’.117 
In the event, the conference voted against the EC and instructions were passed to all members to 
work only existing equipment, not new installations. Jackson returned to PO Headquarters with a list of 
conditions for renegotiation. These included the union’s full involvement in an extensive revalidation 
exercise and drawing up a new five-year plan; an assurance based on new costings of financial viability; 
and, above all, a substantial ‘lead-in’ payment to compensate staff for the upheavals of reallocation and 
changes to their work.
118
 When he met the Board privately, Jackson stressed that a failure to engage with 
these requests could result in a complete rejection of mechanisation. Currall told the Board that: ‘The Post 
Office would be forced to abandon mechanisation, at least for a period, and would face considerable 
public odium, particularly over postcodes’.119 Implementing the LPP by executive action was not an 
option owing to the scale and longevity of the proposals and the ruinous effect a strike over 
mechanisation would have on the credibility of the Post Office. 
Comparable embargos over technological change occurred in other highly unionised industries in 
this period, in which similar arguments were heard. In particular, Fleet Street experienced halting 
attempts to introduce web-offset printing of national newspapers such as The Times and The Mirror. Joe 
Wade, General Secretary of the National Graphical Association, used familiar, combative imagery in the 
union journal Print in April 1976: ‘What frightens me is the way in which some national newspapers are 
rushing into new technology with all the verve and suicidal tendencies of a kamikaze pilot’, he said. ‘If 
unions and their members are to accept changes in technology – and I agree they have no alternative – the 
employers must equally accept the social costs involved’. Those who thought the ‘revolutionary scheme’ 
at the Financial Times would ‘cure all past evils’ were, he warned, ‘living in cloud-cuckoo land’.120 Like 
the UPW, the NGA was the largest rank and file union, though in a privatised, and more hostile 
bargaining environment where cautious acceptance of the need for change was distinguished by greater 
cynicism. Their official position was summarised as follows: ‘We go along with the introduction of new 
technology if only because the alternative is worse. But we demand that the threat to our members’ 




 POST 69/92, PO Board Papers: (296) Letter Mechanisation: Offer to UPW, November 1972. 
119
 Ibid., Offer to UPW, November 1972. 
120
 Martin, Fleet Street, p.234. 
129 
 
employment that this necessarily entails is dealt with in just and humane social terms’.121 They too sought 
a package deal, with terms which included a reduction in the working week alongside improved pensions 
and sick terms. As with the UPW, Wade tried to persuade the more sceptical members of the necessity of 
new technology, arguing for a joint approach between workers and management. This advice was 
likewise comprehensively rejected by the membership.
122
 
For the duration of the embargo at the PO, the UPW prohibited all members – effectively all staff 
in the grades Postman and Postman Higher Grade (PHG) – from operating any new code-sort 
installations. However this injunction was in practice open to interpretation, revealing further the 
connections mechanisation had with wider industrial and political resistance. After the conference the 
reaction of staff varied, with stronger support for the embargo at some offices and in certain regions. In 
general, UPW representatives stayed united over the issue. UPW House issued a special circular on 16 
June 1972, also published in The Post, with instructions not to work any new installations of machinery or 
cooperate with new concentration schemes. Staff were to continue operating equipment already in use and 
to cooperate where concentration schemes were already underway.
123
 However the wording “in use” left 
room for local interpretation and led to some disputes. At Birmingham where staff had just moved into a 
new building still being mechanised, Mr Hood, the local UPW Branch Assistant Secretary, told Mr 
Proctor, the Head Postmaster, that although he personally regretted the embargo, having opposed it at 
Conference, their branch intended to uphold union solidarity by taking the toughest possible position on 
borderline cases, such as packet machines being trialled and on the brink of formal operation, and by 
interpreting all local concentration schemes as part of the LPP. Much time and money had been invested 
in bringing Birmingham up to full MLO status and every week with code-sort machines not in use cost 
the office money. Anticipating severe disruption during the Christmas rush, Proctor proposed a number of 
local circulation changes and the suspension of the Saturday afternoon collection, but these were 
immediately opposed by the staff who valued the overtime that would disappear. Proctor acquiesced, 
worried about ‘a confrontation on the sorting office floor’, and sent a memo to Headquarters warning that 
other branches would likely be obstructive.
124
 Similar scenes occurred across the country, with special 
problems in London. At West Central District Office, where packet-sorting machinery lay idle, staff went 
as far as to distinguish between peg-coded trays and ordinary trays on a conveyor belt, refusing to use the 
latter. Dorothy Fothergill highlighted this as a particularly troubling case when she warned the Director of 
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Pay and Grading to expect this behaviour elsewhere.
125
 Concern about such ‘blacking’ of lifts and 
conveyors was heightened at PO Headquarters. Mr V. A. Huckerby wrote in with news of resistance in 
the London Inland Section, advising that, under the circumstances, further confrontation was to be 
avoided: 
The severity of the effects of a UPW embargo would vary with the degree of non-cooperation; delaying or 
obstructive tactics by staff … could quickly bring offices to a standstill... The general attitude of non-
cooperation which would prevail would almost certainly create problems not at present foreseen with 
adverse effect on costs, service and productivity. Notwithstanding any reluctance to yield to staff pressure, 
the consequences of failure to reach agreement could well be out of proportion to the money at stake.
126
 
The question of what was and was not defined as part of the mechanisation programme became 
subject to local and national negotiation. In the months following the conference, a wide range of policies 
and initiatives were drawn in. At a meeting with Tom Jackson in September, Ryland challenged the UPW 
interpretation that the long term withdrawal of Travelling Post Offices should be formally recognised as 
part of the LPP. He pointed out that £1.5m of equipment had been ordered, with a further £2m on hold, 
and, with no resolution to the embargo in sight, placing further orders was risky. However, prolonged 
delay was a major problem because it would take the PO out of the market for machine manufacturing. 
Ryland knew that by putting off orders indefinitely, they risked allowing a fragile, specialist 
manufacturing sector upon which the PO depended to fall away.
127
 Jackson agreed and reassured the 
Board that he and the EC supported mechanisation, but it was, he said, no good ignoring the groundswell 
of opposition. Many staff were, he said, ‘seriously perturbed about the inadequacy of the information the 
Business was able to give them about its mechanisation programme and would need something firm on 
this before they were prepared to ask their Conference to reverse its decision’.128 He argued that the main 
reason for the embargo was that staff simply judged the ‘human implications’ of mechanisation to be ill-
considered, and wished to reduce the risk of mechanisation leading to deteriorations in the working 
environment and loss of pay. 
The other side of the embargo dispute revolved around pay. Much was said about the human 
implications of mechanisation, and this formed the thrust of the UPW case, but, equally, cooperation had 
its price. Both sides understood that staff were entitled to some share of the long term savings expected of 
mechanisation, firstly as incentive to cooperate as stakeholders in the industry’s future and secondly as 
compensation for the disruptions caused. Union negotiators therefore wished to secure the best possible 
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deal for their members, particularly in light of hardships suffered during and since the strike. Jackson told 
the Board he viewed the twin driving forces behind the embargo – human implications and pay – as two 
sides of the same coin: 
UPW members [can] only be persuaded to accept letter mechanisation if the Post Office [can] demonstrate 
that it [is] profitable and that a share of the profits [will] go to them. Without a thorough, detailed plan for 
mechanisation and comprehensive local studies at more than a handful of offices, it [is] possible that 
Conference would refuse to work all existing mechanised equipment.
129
 
Wolfenden was slightly more accommodating but also advised that advanced “lead-in” payment would be 
necessary and that there was no chance of a reversal without credible assurances on environmental 
conditions, redundancies, loss of promotion and loss of pay. Although rank and file attitudes varied – 
ranging across unawareness, ambivalence, enthusiasm, and outright hostility – and a significant minority 
of Union Branches were ill at ease with the embargo decision, the UPW at large gave support to Jackson 
and Wolfenden as they made their two part request. First, for more involvement in the shaping of long 
term decisions about the pattern and content of their members’ work. Second, for a quantifiable and 
immediate share of the financial benefits of mechanisation. 
The management reaction was at first similar to that following the strike. An urgent request was 
made to all Regional Directors to send reports on the expected financial consequences, with special 
reference to likely loss of savings and the abandonment of machinery and concentration schemes.
130
 The 
annual cost in working hours for each region was then estimated. By far the highest figures were for 
regions with most industrial unrest. These were Wales, the Midlands and London (Table 3.1).
131
 This 
again suggests that opposition to mechanisation was linked to wider occupational grievances. Mr Colgan, 
Director North Western Region, offered views in support of the impression given by the national figures: 
…the main losses derive from the often lengthy negotiations which are necessary before cost savings 
schemes are implemented. The delay ...is mainly a function of the degree of militancy displayed by 
particular staff sides and usually the larger the unit, the greater the militancy. Hence, offices with the 
greatest potential for cost savings have the biggest problem in achieving them and, while targets are 
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As these definitional boundaries began to settle, the Management Board thought through their strategy for 
obtaining staff cooperation. On the one hand they believed some of the UPW plans to be unrealistic. ‘It is 
no use the Union expect[ing] to be given firm costing figures for a programme which spends capital now 
and recovers the savings to pay for it over a long period’, read a brief prepared for Ryland before a 
meeting with Jackson. ‘It is immensely difficult to forecast all the circumstances which could obtain years 
ahead.’ However, there was growing acceptance that there were legitimate concerns over advance staff 
payments, working conditions and redundancy and a real need existed for fresh discussions: 
There could never be certainty about building and equipment costs; staff costs; traffic forecasts; or future 
service patterns. Changes in any of these substantially affect outturn... The policy of non-co-operation in 
mechanisation and concentration is costing the Postal Service money it can ill afford and is doing nothing 
for UPW members; a way should be found to end it as soon as possible.
133
  
It was felt a more relaxed posture in their dialogue with UPW and COPOU leaders might be more 
productive in reaching disaffected staff, or as one official put it: ‘...it is not the Union Executive we aim to 
convince but through them the UPW Membership’.134 
 
Table 3.1: Estimated loss of savings from Embargo
135
 




South Eastern 22,464 
Wales 62,138 
London 219,144 
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The developments leading up to the embargo were among the reasons for the inauguration in 
April of the Buildings and Mechanisation Committee to provide a forum for discussions between 
Management and Unions. The BMC was at first chaired by the Director of Buildings and Mechanisation 
N.C.C de Jong and from November by his successor, R.O. Bonnett. Together with operational, finance 
and personnel directors they outlined to COPOU the problems of creating reliable costings under 
prevailing economic conditions and the limited use of detailed timetables while capital expenditure was 
being curbed.
136
 As mentioned, their temporary policy for mechanising offices had fallen back to 
equipping ‘the key ones in the system’ but this was not a stance likely to gain any sympathy with the 
staff.
137
 PO Executive T. Scott elaborated on his position in a letter to Jackson in November, adding that 
the question of a lead-in payment was also complicated by government incomes policy: 
…we just do not know at this point in time how the economics of code/sorting might work out – for the 
very simple reason that we lack sufficient experience and practical information for a sound assessment of 
its actual or potential viability… Hence the need for the further intensive study period to make sure we get 
things right, not only for code/sorting, while we are about it, for mechanisation as a whole… The timing of 
the pay element of the suggested basis for a resumption of full co-operation is naturally subject to 
Government policy for controlling inflation.
138
 
Unable to commit to a definite long-term plan, Bonnett agreed to commission a nine month revalidation 
which he defined as ‘a critical appraisal of the information gained from past experience... required to 
ensure that future action [is] in the right direction’. Running in parallel with this, he said, planning for 
future implementation would continue and engineers would bring a second generation of machines to 
higher standards of cost and ergonomics.
139
 The revalidation was to begin in the New Year headed by Mr 
M. J. Reed
140
 with Union scrutiny led by UPW Assistant Secretaries Bill Wolfenden and Maurice Styles, 
and EC member Bill Tracey. Jackson told The Post this would involve ‘the complete opening of all books 
and access to every statistic upon which decisions would be taken, plus a share in the decision-making 
process’.141 We turn to this project in the following chapter. 
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In reviewing the impact of the strike on the fortunes of mechanisation it is apparent that, considering the 
acrimonious outcome of the Hardman Committee, the resulting hostility and loss of trust significantly 
contributed to perpetuating antagonistic attitudes and heated denunciations, culminating in the 1972 
embargo. This stand-off, which would last for three years, in some respects represented the continuation 
of the strike’s confrontation over pay by other means. However it also provided an opportunity for 
reflection and the rehabilitation of consultation, as the long process of resolving the dispute got underway, 
and any attempt to explain the UPW embargo should accommodate these two motivating factors: the 
desire for higher pay and the desire for a say in the changes underway. Certainly, the pursuit of higher pay 
favoured an obstructive stance. It was in the union’s interest to emphasise the inadequacy of management 
plans because, the more persuasive they could make this point, the more credible their arguments for a 
higher share of financial compensation. It should also be noted that from 1973, under stages II and III of 
the government’s incomes policy, limits were established applying to postal wage settlements. Bargaining 
groups were free to distribute settlements as they saw fit, but the UPW was unified in equal distribution of 
pay awards across the membership. These conditions made the pursuit of a lead-in payment all the more 
attractive.
142
 However the evidence suggests there was more to the embargo than merely playing a long 
game to increase the price of cooperation. Concerns about lack of information and the need for 
management to substantiate its future plans were consistently and widely voiced, and sincerely felt by 
many. This was particularly evident in the pertinence of detailed questions about the human repercussions 
of technological change posed by the UPW, and the Board’s inability to give adequate answers, even if 
their hands were tied by the unprecedented financial crisis into which the industry had been plunged. 
Overall, it should be recognised that the internal politics of postal services was shaped by outside 
forces and in discourses gripped by a fear that, as with the struggles over technological change in 
newspaper printing, the industry was battling decline. The course of the mechanisation debate in the 
postal service during 1972 was complicated by its entanglement with the broader political and financial 
contradictions of the early corporation period which sprang from its incongruous status as an ostensibly 
profit-seeking, nationalised utility. On this view, industrial unrest in the postal service after 1971 – 
including the mechanisation embargo – was as an outgrowth of contradictions inherent in the hybridised 
corporation emerging after 1969.
143
 This found expression in the ambiguous understanding of what 
mechanisation was intended to do. Its purpose was reinterpreted variously as a question of who would 
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control the labour process, as a new vehicle for wage bargaining, or as an effort to be jointly embraced for 
its future operational prospects. Thus the wider tensions between commercialism and IR reform found in 
the embargo a paradoxical combination of conflict and political reconstruction. It is the efforts to foster 










This chapter asks how the mechanisation programme changed during the 1972-1975 embargo. During this 
time a major joint review of the Letter Post Plan took place – known as the “revalidation” or “the review” 
– with contributions from management, unions and engineers. This entailed a wide-ranging investigation 
into all aspects of mechanisation, covering finances, working conditions, the reactions of the staff and the 
public, and the state of the British programme in global context. The revalidation report responded to 
union requests for a revised plan in which substantial changes to the original LPP were made. Part of the 
revalidation involved improved consultations with staff over issues of pay, conditions, productivity, 
staffing and hours. This formed the basis of a string of negotiations to resolve the impasse over 
mechanisation, leading to an agreement in 1975 which linked together three issues – the length of the 
working week, the employment of women and part time staff, and a special payment to staff for their 
cooperation with mechanisation – into a package deal which ended the embargo in the summer of 1975. 
This chapter therefore considers a period in which mechanisation was reassessed, leading to changes in its 
character and scope, and involving the main stakeholders in a common task of remodelling the 
programme. I will explain the key areas of inquiry and the outcomes of the revalidation, with particular 
reference to financial and political aspects. I will demonstrate that this had wider value than resolving the 
deadlock over the LPP in that it contributed to the ongoing innovation of systems modelling in the postal 
service. However I will show that the principal accomplishment of the revalidation was delivering a 
credible, revised programme which was combined with a substantial up-front payment in which the 
savings expected of mechanisation were shared with postal staff. I will show how the interests of the 
different stakeholders were promoted and will document the course of negotiations behind the 1975 
agreement, leading to the conclusion that, on balance, the revalidation and subsequent package deal 
represented a successful, if drawn-out, measure for restarting the LPP on a realistic foundation.  
Michael Corby has argued in strong terms that the revalidation presented the PO with an 
opportunity to abandon mechanisation altogether and that its continuation resulted from a fear of ridicule 
and a stubborn refusal to accept that the enormous investment in code-sorting had been an error. He 
concluded that ‘...too much ego was at stake’ and ‘there was a willingness to mechanize at almost any 
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price’.1 Duncan Campbell-Smith has offered a brief and less acerbic summary, to which I return in the 
conclusion, but agrees that there was ‘some justice’ in Corby’s conclusion and that this was ‘tacitly 
acknowledged’ in the ‘monumental’ scale of the revalidation.2 I argue that this is an unduly negative 
reading of both the reasons for the revalidation and of its findings. This chapter therefore begins with a 
summary of the nature and scope of the project. An alternative interpretation of the revalidation as a joint 
exercise in model-building is then presented, which focuses on the role of engineers as problem-solvers in 
operational, financial and political matters. The point here is to demonstrate that the revalidation was 
considered by senior officials to be part of a wider, ongoing commitment to devise a dynamic model of all 
postal operations. One aspect of the revalidation was a reassessment of the machines used for code-
sorting and the R&D philosophy guiding their design, which is treated in more depth in the following 
chapter. Here, the wider influence of engineering on the PO’s reappraisal philosophy is considered as it 
related to operational management and commercial strategy. In the second half of the chapter attention is 
turned to the effects of this on industrial relations and the ways in which ending the embargo involved 
political considerations beyond the immediate concerns of new technology. The context and course of 
negotiations to end the embargo is discussed alongside an account of how this fitted with the wider 
rehabilitation of formal consultation. The chapter concludes by returning to question the criticisms made 
of the 1975 settlement. 
 
The revalidation in outline 
 
Despite the uncertainty created by the problems of 1971, the Board remained committed to pushing ahead 
with machine installations and concentration schemes on a piecemeal basis, hoping the storm might be 
weathered and the 120 MLO plan revisited. However the UPW embargo greatly complicated matters. The 
Board first tried to persuade the UPW executive council to cooperate by showing the results of fresh 
costings which gave a promising five year forecast, but the special payment to staff was considered far 
too low and it was clear that the majority of the membership wanted a full reappraisal.
3
 Ryland and a 
group of senior managers accepted this and began coordinating the broad-ranging review, which began in 
January 1973 and was later scheduled for completion in October to coincide with a special report on the 
postal service requested by the Minister for Posts and Telecommunications, Christopher Chataway.
4
 The 
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revalidation was a joint effort in a number of respects. The unions were invited to contribute their own 
views and to scrutinise the evidence gathered. Many individuals representing many departments made 
contributions, and research was undertaken at dozens of locations across Britain. 
 At the beginning of 1973, a study team was established at the Headquarters department for 
Mechanisation & Buildings (POMB) in London, headed by Martin Reed and including Ron Clatworthy 
and Harold Davis, who coordinated the research being undertaken in the regions. They were instructed to 
keep COPOU informed as the revalidation advanced.
5
 Their central goal was to establish a detailed and 
well-evidenced policy for the future of mechanisation and as basis for negotiations to resolve the impasse 
with the UPW. In particular, their work was to take into account the deterioration in the postal service’s 
economic environment as well as the reservations that existed about the Letter Post Plan formulated in 
1969, meaning that a more cautious approach was advised, especially regarding underlying financial 
assumptions. The core of this review involved three steps. First, regional studies were conducted at 
eighteen of Britain’s major sorting offices in which large quantities of data about traffic levels, mail 
circulation, staffing and duty arrangements and the likely effects introducing code-sorting and 
concentration schemes would have in each case. Second, this data, once collected, was fed into a 
computer costing model built using similar methods to those devised during the original LPP costings in 
the 1960s. The aim was that this would produce a range of scenarios for the future of mechanisation, each 
with their own financial and operational forecasts. Third, the raw data from the regional studies was 
handed to outside consultants who were asked to run similar multiple regression analyses, yielding an 
independently derived set of forecasts for the different scenarios, or “options”, proposed by the PO.6 This 
took around eight months and was completed in September. Much of the hard work involved writing 
programmes for the mainframe to process the data, as this was then pushing the boundaries of computer-
aided modelling. 
 This was a major undertaking involving many people throughout the industry. POMB had a total 
staff of about 430 at this time, about one-eighth of all Headquarters staff. Of these, around 80 were 
dedicated to the administration of the LPP, 20 to overseeing changes in training (Chapter 6), and the rest 
devoted to buildings, drawing office work, vehicles and other forms of mechanisation. In addition, each 
region had 3-4 people permanently engaged on local administration of the LPP.
7
 However, the numbers 
involved in the revalidation in one way or another went well beyond this due to consultations with 
regional directors, leading figures in the different research areas, postmasters and union representatives 
                                                     
5
 Uncatalogued: 2nd Review: PHBS/BG/0048... 4th Meeting of the Buildings and Mechanisation Committee, 
05/02/73. 
6
 POST 17/317, Review of Mechanisation, pp.1-2. 
7
 Appendix to the Carter Report, pp.333-334. 
139 
 
recruited in assembling the data, not to mention the outside consultants and other effected departments 
such as Personnel and Finance. The resulting report ran to several hundred pages and its findings were 
presented to a special UPW conference in 1975 in support of a proposed deal to resume cooperation. It 
comprised sub-reports on several interlocking studies covering financial forecasting, technology, the 
effects of automation on employment, the role of outside industry, and the British scheme in international 
context. Its main conclusion was that the LPP should be reduced in scale from 120 to a total of 81 MLOs. 
A number of these findings are examined in more detail below, particularly those relevant to 
industrial relations. However, the revalidation also came to be viewed by some senior engineers and 
managers as an example of the broader progression of systems-modelling at the PO and so this is briefly 
discussed before returning to the specifics of the report and subsequent negotiations, in order to appreciate 
the revalidation in its full context. This contributes to the argument by demonstrating that the 
revalidation’s concern with financial forecasting was not a knee-jerk reaction to changing conditions but 
was rooted in sophisticated traditions of financial monitoring at the PO and, moreover, was instrumental 
in strengthening a wider sphere of much needed operational know-how in this period. 
 
The revalidation as model-building 
 
The central model of the revalidation was built from the financial forecasting machinery used to cost the 
original LPP in 1969. The financial realm of mechanisation thus became a full-time field of study at the 
PO in the 1960s. By 1972 the problems were obvious and it was clear that Britain’s economic problems 
had undermined some assumptions behind the early figures. Financial questions were central to the 
revalidation, having ties to all other aspects from the number of MLOs, to the types of machines used, to 
the amount staff could expect in special payments. Research therefore focussed on how to improve 
existing knowledge in order to better predict the financial effects of the LPP. An unstable, inflationary 
and strike-prone climate made this all the more difficult, as doubts over traffic growth, the increased cost 
of capital borrowing and industrial unrest all led to costly delays, rendering the already knotty task of 
financial forecasting highly complex. During 1973, several lines of research were pursued, both 
conceptual and empirical, and by 1974 the PO could fairly claim to have undertaken the most 
sophisticated exercise in financial modelling of any capital project in the mail system’s history. This 
resulted in significant revisions to the original plan and a refinement of the LPP’s conceptual framework. 
To explain how this unfolded it is first necessary to say more about how the financial apparatus of 
mechanisation was created in the late 1960s, the key elements of which worked in combination and were 
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used again, in modified form, during 1973. These techniques were discounted cash flow analysis (DCF), 
the use of computers and audits by private consultants. 
The use of DCF at the PO followed a 1961 White Paper outlining its use in the Nationalised 
Industries, recommended by the Treasury for its subtlety in balancing many variables for investments 
where returns were spread unevenly over decades.
8
 DCF was first used in the postal service during five 
years of trials and research on modernising containers, fittings and equipment in sorting offices.
9
 Such 
analyses for mechanisation began in the mid-1960s and were refined by a 1967 White Paper, which 
differentiated between the returns expected of the PO’s different businesses, with 8.5% overall return on 
expenditure targeted for telecoms and a more modest 2% for Posts, reflecting its special problems with 
wages and tariffs.
10
 For capital projects, including the LPP, a minimum 10% yield over a 25 year period 
was the ‘required rate of return’. This meant substantiating estimates for a plan’s long-term savings by 
showing why it was expected to exceed the interest that sum of money would otherwise have accrued by a 
minimum of 10%. This established a benchmark for approving capital investment, although full 
commercial criteria were tempered where social obligations applied. Although the 1967-1969 figures 
appeared to fit easily within Treasury criteria, the unusual scale, complexity and long-term nature of the 
LPP meant that even the most thorough forecasting was open to doubt. The first phase of budgeting for 
the 1969 LPP combined the costs of buildings and machinery as well as R&D, installation, maintenance, 
planning, publicity, and training. Costs were weighed against the expected savings remaining after a 
proportion had been shared in special payments with the staff. The majority of savings were expected 
from a reduction in staff hours to the equivalent of 17,000 staff, and, once the full MLO system was in 
place, through ‘system-savings’ only accruing once sufficient numbers of MLOs came on-stream 
enabling the wider automation of national mail-flow and other expected but difficult-to-quantify 
benefits.
11
 Phased implementation meant that redundancies could be avoided through natural wastage, 
agreed with COPOU from the outset.
12
 Still, the need to anticipate the degree of stability in industrial 
relations remained paramount because the proportion of savings to be shared with staff, and their ongoing 
participation, was vulnerable to negotiation and veto respectively. Moreover, the best use of capital 
                                                     
8
 Corby, The Postal Business, pp.203-207. 
9
 POST 17/143, Working Party on Modernisation of Sorting Office Equipment, First Report, 1966, pp.1-3, 30. 
10
 White Paper, Economic & Financial Objectives for the Nationalised Industries, Cmnd 3437, (London: HMSO, 
1967); David Heald ‘The Economic and Financial Control of UK Nationalised Industries’, in The Economic 
Journal, 90 (1980), pp.243-65; POST 92/16, PO Report and Accounts, 1967-68, p.5; POST 53/51, Papers regarding 
the proposed increase in postage rates and preparation for decimalisation, 1970, POUNC report, p.6. 
11
 POST 17/283, Letter Post Plan, Questions and Answers. 
12
 Ibid.; POST 122/12528... Development of the Letter Post System: Joint Statement by the Post Office and the Staff 
Associations comprising COPOU; POST 115/512, The Post, 1970, 11 April Issue; The Times, ‘Automated sorting 
for Post Offices’, 02/04/70, p.19. 
141 
 
placed a premium on time: the quicker and more comprehensive the implementation, the more the rate of 
return increased. 
Uncertainty about how a DCF model’s variables interacted had long been accepted, and any 
conclusions derived were tempered by judgement born of experience. For example, the strategy of 
aligning investment in buildings with mechanisation – and determining the scale, order and timing of 
implementation – was based on both the prevailing climate of management opinion as well as on the 
outcomes of financial analysis. However the purpose of forecasts was to provide evidence of sound 
planning for parliamentary scrutiny and to create a tool for predicting financial outcomes under different 
potential scenarios and for the ongoing measurement of performance against targets. At its heart, DCF 
made use of detailed assessments and forecasts for staff hours, duty patterns and traffic statistics. 
Informed assumptions were then made about future trends in the key areas of annual mail volume, the 
cost and availability of capital, the public uptake of postcodes and stability of industrial relations. Outside 
trends such as inflation were also beginning to be modelled, working from such observations as the 
apparent link between mail volumes and general economic activity in Britain.
13
 All of this data was fitted 
into a computerised, mathematical simulation which was built up and amended over time and used for 
monitoring progress through to completion; a ‘major task’ utilising ‘fundamental research’ into such 
fields as computer simulation and network theory,
14
 and was similar to methods being used in the ‘parallel 
fields’ of electricity, gas and railway networks.15 An optimistic return for mechanisation of 31.3% had 
been shown to the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries in 1966, but even the most pessimistic 
assumptions returned 17.5% at that stage.
16
 These and subsequent figures were audited by independent 
outside bodies, primarily with the consultants Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., with whom a long-run 
marginal costing model was constructed in 1969 in which the main elements of the postal system were 
studied in situ and from a statistical perspective. On the back of this, ideas for a total model of postal 
finances began to circulate, based on a systems research concept (Figure 4.3). 
Although flexibility was built into the 1960s models – in their emphasis on rolling appraisal and a 
degree of inflation-sensitivity – by the end of 1972 the political and financial context had changed 
considerably. Developments such as the apparent plateau in growth in mail volumes, the pay crisis and 
the UPW embargo exposed the weakness of some assumptions. New data was needed, as were alterations 
in the general planning approach, developing what was best about existing mechanisms and re-evaluating 
others. After the embargo announcement in 1972, the Directorship of the Mechanisation and Buildings 
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Division passed to R.O. Bonnett, formerly Director of R&D, while de Jong became Director of Postal 
Mechanisation. Both would have a significant influence on the revalidation. Bonnett took the lead in the 
revalidation and sought to make the costings programme more cautious, more objective and more open to 
the UPW, discussed below. Meanwhile, although de Jong’s focus returned to R&D, his ideas and 
concepts continued to inform the PO approach to modelling. 
In November 1972 de Jong was asked by the Board to review how financial and systems models 
could be put to use in improving the postal service. Assisted by informal discussions with people inside 
and outside the industry interested in this ‘new thinking’, he wrote a report detailing his thoughts on what 
he called ‘one layman’s view of the science (or art) of modelling’.17 He referred to the forthcoming 
revalidation of mechanisation as one of the most important examples of systems-modelling at the PO. In 
postal R&D, a huge variety of models had been used for different purposes, ranging from manikins 
representing the average size and shape of a postman
18
 (Figure 4.2) to computer programmes designed to 
simulate the internal workings of a sorting machine. Sorting machine models (Figure 4.1) helped identify 
ways to increase the speed, timing and accuracy of letter flow in a machine, and provided data for judging 
staff levels and wider operational problems
19
 Though de Jong conceded that even the best models did not 
perfectly reflect the complexity of the real world, he knew their benefits from postal R&D in refining 
machines and components. At the commercial-strategic level, elaborate abstract models (‘where the mind 
starts to boggle’) provided a framework which minimised errors of judgement. This enabled important 
decisions to better express the ‘corporate view’, while, he believed, tending to favour the interests of 
management. ‘Models’, he concluded, ‘in fact serve as focal points which bring coherence to what would 
otherwise be differing opinions and judgements from various vested interests’.20 
Modelling had a long history in postal decision-making, taken to a new level in the 1970s by 
Walter Simpson who was then experimenting with computerised simulations for pricing, pay, capital 
planning and pensions.
21
 In each case, the value was measured according to its accuracy in predicting 
future events and trends, which, in turn, depended on the quality of the research and the skill of 
professional modellers.
22
 In its simplest terms the postal system could be thought of as a ‘black box’, 
where well understood inputs and outputs were processed by an unexplained inner system (Figure 4.4). In 
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reality, simple reductions were of limited value because inputs and outputs in a postal system are highly 
variable and complex. What de Jong wanted was a ‘total systems model’: a scaled representation of the 
real world system, simulating every letter, postman, and transport link, and all the operational rules 
guiding them. Among the industries judged to be in the ‘system model club’ was Telecoms, where an 
automated, standardised, integrated network combined with far higher levels of capital expenditure in 
justifying the technique. This was a more difficult ideal for a system as variegated as a postal network. 




One of the computers used in the mid-1970s for these purposes was the IBM 370/168, described 
as ‘the largest single timesharing installation in the country’.24 PO scientists saw this as the culmination of 
two lines of development in the post-war period: computing and operational research. The operational use 
of computing begun when a punched card accounting system was introduced in the early 1950s, and was 
followed by computers installed in 1958 for payroll processes which became the largest procedure of its 
type in Britain. ‘Large scale operations... characterised computing in the Post Office ever since’, stated a 
PO document submitted to the Carter Committee in 1976.
25
 This included the launch of Data Processing 
Services in 1970 and, in software development, the writing of thousands of programmes. The design 
practices utilised in this were incorporated into the computer industry’s first Code of Good Practice. The 
other side of the coin, Operational Research, dated back to the entrance of statisticians into the running of 
the mails system after the Second World War.
26
 By the mid-1970s, professionals in statistics, economics, 
forecasting and market research formed two divisions of the PO’s OR Department, where the goal was to 
build ‘Total Postal System Analysis’.27 This was complemented by plans laid in June 1972 for an 
independent “Long Term Planning Unit” to conduct specialist research up to the end of the century, 
tasked with predicting the future ‘socio-economic, commercial and technological environment’ for the 
postal service. The mechanisation programme was an important consideration in their work. The LTPU 
was asked to focus on issues such as the effects of inflation and the likely direction of communication 
technology by working with outside organisations and academics. The aim was to build a better 
framework for medium-term mechanisation and marketing strategies, while assessing prospects for 
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personal computers equipped with electronic mail (referred to as a ‘multi-purpose terminals’) and their 
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Taken together, this activity resulted in several practical applications of computerised modelling 
in the postal service and provided useful precedents upon which both future system simulations and the 
more immediate needs of the LPP’s revalidation could draw. For example, the mails circulation automatic 
data processing system (ADP), designed between 1967 and 1972 was thought of as a potential foundation 
for a future total model. This automated the information used to organise mail circulation and was 
implemented over a phased programme which transferred all timetables of the 700 dispatch offices to a 
unified computer system. It was the first circulation database to not only update day-to-day records but 
also provide a wide range of management information, such as inter-regional mail statistics, again, useful 
in the revalidation (Figure 4.5). Mail routes were planned using information on all haulage and train 
timetables taking into account dispatch and transfer timings. A set of instructions was generated within a 
framework of constraints which included standards of service, the use of intermediate offices, the timing 
of despatches, transport availability, and local circulation arrangements. Transport schedules benefitted 
from a statistical simulation ‘in which all vans, drivers and their work history are represented by 
corresponding model elements’.34 The ton-mileage figures helped settle multi-million pound contracts 
with British Rail.
35
 Likewise, by 1972, the mechanisation programme’s costings had computerised 
discounted cash flow procedures that included 20 year inflation-sensitive forecasts. ‘It also allows for the 
adjustment of significant variables in the installation plan and expresses those costs which are important 
and the degree of their importance’.36 Therefore, by 1973, the Board was able to draw on a well-formed 
body of knowledge derived from the most advanced modelling techniques then available to the network 
industries, valued for their uses in predicting future trends, simulating real-world operations and helping 
to unite differing views in planning change. Certainly, senior engineers such as de Jong recognised and 
supported mathematical and conceptual modelling as effective tools for solving a wide range of problems, 
from financial forecasting to agreeing compromise solutions over contested issues, and viewed the 
revalidation of the LPP as part of broader developments in computer-aided forecasting apparatus. 
 
The revalidation report 
 
The main conclusions of the revalidation report were based on the computer-aided modelling described 
above. However this was combined with discursive reappraisals of the main areas involved and a 
consideration of the different economic context in which the organisation existed in 1973. The overall 
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tone was measured in acknowledging widely held reservations and that conditions had changed, but 
purposeful in providing a thorough defence of the continued importance of the LPP, albeit in revised 
form. Coming to more modest predictions about the financial savings expected of mechanisation was a 
natural reaction to the deteriorating trends in the industry, to outside pressures, and to the pay crisis and 
UPW embargo. Michael Corby later argued that, on DCF grounds alone, mechanisation should have been 
scrapped at this juncture on the basis that had the level of profit sharing with staff been factored in 
correctly, future savings would be wiped out, leaving a loss of £50m. The ‘fundamental weakness of the 
revised plan was that it increased fixed costs at a time when it appeared mail volumes were in terminal 
decline.
37
 As will be shown, these figures are disputable and growth of traffic later recovered, but it is true 
that the threat was a cause for concern in 1973 and it was trends like these that resulted in more cautious 
assumptions being used in the revalidation. 
Committing to substantial, fixed investment in 25 year plant when the future level of business 
was in question carried risks. This, coupled with years of efficiency programmes, increased the likelihood 
of operational imbalances and failures. The phrase “more eggs in one basket” was a term used by the 
Managing Director’s Committee in early 1973.38 This fragility had been exposed during the 1972 
Christmas period, when a flu epidemic caused a spike in staff absence of 26% above the previous year, 
resulting in 9 million letters and cards not being delivered by Christmas. The failure is said to have 
‘deeply scarred’ Ryland and cemented his determination to make changes to postal services thereafter.39 
The prevailing view on the Board was that high inflation was at the root of the problem and, though it 
provided good reasons for added caution, it was not nearly sufficient reason to consider abandoning the 
LPP altogether. This position was supported by the government and the Treasury. However, during 1973, 
a new wave of financial constrictions was placed on the PO and this also helped set the tone of the report. 
Like other nationalised industries, the PO had a direct line to its sponsoring government department and 
to the Treasury, who passed on economic indicators and confidential commentary tailored to PO needs. 
This was supplemented at PO Headquarters by monthly forecasts supplied by in-house economists, by the 
consultants Morrell and Associates Ltd. and by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research. 
In all of this, the most important indicator was inflation because of its wide-ranging effects. In 1973 the 
Treasury instructed the PO to lift its minimum rate of return on large capital projects in the postal service 
from 10% to 16%.
40
 By this time the Board had already accepted that they had been wrong to suppose, in 
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the late 1960s, that inflation could be controlled by the state.
41
 In May 1973 the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced a 4.5% cut in PO expenditure.
42
 While Regional Directors supplied new cost-
cutting lists, the brunt of savings came from deferring new buildings, in keeping with Phase III of the 
Heath Government’s incomes policy, in which the nationalised industries were asked to reduce their 
demands on the construction industry. The PO promised, where possible, to delay new constructions by 
three months and reduced the buildings maintenance budget for the year .
43
 £750,000 was saved by 
delaying the Coventry MLO for a year, and, with the embargo keeping new mechanisation on hold, Alex 
Currall acknowledged the fortunate timing. ‘With reassessment of mechanisation generally’, he told the 
General Purposes Committee in July 1973, ‘the need to delay placing certain orders would not be a 
hardship; it would provide the opportunity for a clearer assessment of requirements. Some £700,000 
might be saved here’.44 The mixed blessing of the delay exemplified how the reappearance of high 
inflation could affect costing policy in contradictory ways. On the one hand, greater pressure on wages 
played ‘an important role in the justification for mechanisation’ with its labour-saving promise.45 On the 
other, doubts over future trends in mail volumes and the effects of pricing caps made for an uncertain 
future which favoured downscaling the number of MLOs. The prudent response to this and to outside 
pressures can be seen in the more demanding standards set for DCF forecasting and its core assumptions. 
Indeed, no growth in mail volume was assumed in the revalidation. 
In considering the revalidation report itself, a more measured strategy than that found in the 
original LPP costings is evident. A set of four options for the future programme was laid out along a 
continuum, ranging from the complete cessation of the programme, through intermediate levels of 
implementation: 
- Option 1: ‘Baseline’ in which the existing system would continue with minimal changes 
- Option 2: 81 MLOs with full concentration and no change to service standards 
- Option 3: 31 MLOs for second class traffic only with Day D delivery  
- Option 4: 50 MLOs for most second and some first class traffic with present service standards 
Options 2-4 were tested against each other and against the baseline manual option for a 25 year period to 
see which gave the best results. The data came from a number of sources, including eighteen regional 
studies which assessed mail-flow and staffing trends. In each case the likely effects of the different 
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implementation options was projected. Each regional study related to a major sorting office already or 
soon-to-be mechanised. The projections related to the varying demands made upon staffing, transport and 
administration for different proposed ‘concentration areas’ (i.e. the varying extents to which mail might 
converge on a given office) and ‘catchment areas’ (i.e. the geographical coverage of collections and 
deliveries). The mail-flow research was used to simulate the inward and outward sorting processes of all 
affected offices, amounting to a major sampling exercise in which 2 million letters were examined and 
their data analysed by computer to construct ‘a matrix showing the potential flows of traffic between 
mechanised offices’.46 Some of this analysis was based upon data about the overall mails system. 
However this was combined with findings on the ground in the eighteen regional studies at major sorting 
centres. The report explained: ‘The work involved the examination and recasting as necessary of all duties 
involving sorting work in all offices in the potential concentration area of each MLO, as well as at the 
main office’. The traffic matrix study was used to assume a national pattern of year-on-year concentration 
as a rough guide to the hypothetical staffing and duty arrangements at a given office over the long term. 
As with the national study, a 25 year forecast for each option was compared against the baseline option 
using DCF.
47
 The outcome in each case was a report containing the cash flow statements, a narrative 
description of the study, machine employment charts, traffic-flow maps, demographic information and 
changes proposed for staffing and duties. The financial results were mixed, with larger offices tending to 
show more promising figures than the smaller offices, although these were expected to make system 
savings by reducing reliance on GFOs, DOs, and TPOs.
48
 
Once the data was assembled in London, the final stage was its incorporation into a new 
computerised DCF model, developed from the central costing model used on the original LPP. This 
comprised a synthetic, multi-module computer programme with five sub-modules, each linked by the 
transfer of data. Its purpose was to express the relationship between the different factors involved with 
predictive reliability and provide final forecasts for the four revalidation options. (The Board regarded it 
as a significant achievement, noting that the French postal administration had attempted something 
similar, occupying a small team of programmers for eighteen months and costing 2m Francs before being 
abandoned due to difficulties in handling their own varying, complex, local factors). Sub-model 1 handled 
data for traffic and hours for all offices; Sub-model 2 calculated machine requirements derived from the 
traffic data; Sub-model 3 calculated staff hours saved due to outward concentration, taking into account 
handling times, reject rates, unmachinable traffic etc; Sub-model 4 used 80 algorithms to do the same for 
inward concentration. Traffic flow sampling and predicted postcode uptake was here used to arrive at 
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likely proportions of code-marked mail; and, finally, Sub-model 5 amalgamated the findings of 1-4 and 
converted them it into cash sums for buildings, changes to circulation, equipment, commissioning, and 
maintenance. The computer took about twelve hours to run the tests.  
To ensure the results’ credibility, the same raw data from the regional studies, along with the 
wider systems data, were supplied to P.A. Management Consultants Ltd. They performed their own DCF 
forecasts using multiple regression techniques.
49
 Both sets arrived at similar figures, although the 
consultants’ forecasts were slightly lower. The PO returns were 31.2% for Option 2, 31.7% for Option 3 
and 32.9% for Option 4. The consultants’ figures were 29%, 22.5% and 26.3% respectively (Table 4.1). 
Both groups recommended scaling down the original plan for 120 MLOs, favouring Option 2 as showing 
the best financial outcome with a still substantial 81 MLOs and adjusted schedule of concentration 
schemes. This was eventually the option taken forward, constituting a significant revision of the original 
plan in the capital required, in network restructuring and in staff savings, which were now limited to the 
equivalent of 6,000 full time staff.
50
 The model itself, built using the PROSPER financial analysis 
computer package, with elements written in BASIC, was then built upon to monitor the ongoing 
performance. This enabled the generation of rolling regional performance targets which, it was hoped, 




Table 4.1: Forecasts for returns on expenditure for different revalidation options
52
 
 Capital Costs (at 1973 prices) DCF Return 




Option 2 £10.4m £25.9m 31.2% 29.0% 
Option 3 £0.4m £10.2m 31.7% 22.5% 
Option 4 £1.8m £16.2m 32.9% 26.3% 
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In the revalidation report the PO claimed Options 3 and 4 seemed attractive at the outset but that 
evidence gained from the regional studies proved that a higher number of wide concentration areas 
brought the largest returns over the long term, with the fullest savings only arriving once the final offices 
came on stream and a complete system was in motion. Option 2 promised a high return on capital and 
offered best long term prospects in numerous respects. It was firstly amenable to two long phases of 
implementation, mechanising first outward and then inward sorting. It promised to handle more of both 
first and second class mail, and eliminated the need for Travelling Post Offices. Just as phasing out TPOs 
coincided with the Board’s conveyance policy of increasing motorway haulage, it also showed a better fit 
with the postal building programme and the rationalisation of administration costs. Another attraction was 
its greater palatability to the UPW whose Executive expected the 81 MLO arrangement to bring a 
reduction in late duties, unpopular with the membership.
54
 Finally, as the ‘more fundamental change’ 
being tabled, Option 2 was the closest to a ‘total system’ option in providing a sound technical basis for 
the future integration of OCR technology. Interestingly, the final report went on to state that the Board 
still saw merit in the more limited Option 4, mirroring the views of those who still believed a less 
committal, step-wise implementation was the best immediate strategy. ‘However’, the report concluded, 
‘from a psychological standpoint, and also a practical one in negotiations with unions, a clear decision in 
favour of option 2 would carry more conviction with both postal and engineering staff and give 
management more confidence in taking long term decisions’.55 
The overall conclusion was therefore that the new assumptions were well reasoned and, even 
though real risks existed, even the most pessimistic costing made the enacting of Option 2 well 
worthwhile.
56
 The most important assumption was that the financial savings remained on a sure footing – 
the retrospective view from the mid-1980s simply posited ‘economic reasons’ to explain the 81 MLO 
decision.
57
 A number of characteristics of the costing process described – greater attempts at caution and 
objectivity, the flexible and sophisticated use made of financial modelling and the foundations laid years 
previously – are at odds with the critical judgements of rash naivety made by the PO’s critics. However it 
is also clear that another of its functions was to appease the rank and file membership of the UPW and the 
Post Office Engineering Union (POEU), who made plain their desire to see a thoroughgoing plan for 
mechanisation. In this sense, the costings had clear significance for the ongoing fortunes of industrial 
relations, a point that was raised repeatedly at the time. The revalidation’s findings were made available 
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for union scrutiny and actively involved union input and cooperation. The ways in which the staff and 
their unions were involved, and the extent to which this marked a break with their past involvement in 
network planning, is described in more detail below. Here it is worth re-emphasising that the role of 
engineers in mechanisation went far beyond that typically associated with the institutional technologist. 
An important feature of the revalidation was that its assumptions and conclusions existed within a 
functional systems framework inspired by engineers. Theirs was the favoured conception of the postal 
system: an organic entity in its need to adapt to a shifting economy and society, but in practice a giant 
machine whose components should work in harmony towards the ultimate purpose of turning inputs into 
outputs with the maximum efficiency.
58
 Their views as experts were sought on how to construct models 
of the postal system to simulate its major elements (traffic flow, scheduling, tariffs, costing, industrial 
relations etc.) and how to use this to predict future trends and make informed decisions – an approach 




A distinguishing feature of the revalidation was a more pronounced and open involvement of rank-and-
file staff through their unions, principally the UPW and the POEU, building on the traditions of union 
consultation over mechanised sorting which stretched back to the inter-war period. Nevertheless, the shift 
towards more openness had to overcome a countervailing element of management hostility to union 
involvement, which had roots deeper than the reactionary views fostered by the strike.
59
 Traces of an 
exclusionary approach to planning were present at Board level in the 1960s. For example, the question of 
staff-side cooperation over the long-term was not included in the main part of the formal presentation 
outlining the LPP to the Board in 1969, but discussed only in the question- and-answer session. The notes 
for this session reveal that consultation was then limited regarding the overall plan. ‘We are ... under 
considerable pressure from Staff Associations to disclose our plans to the staff and on a number of 
occasions recently we have been embarrassed by our inability to reveal our future intentions for a 
particular office’.60 A similar impression is made by certain passages in the PO’s correspondence with 
McKinsey’s in 1965, who encouraged their client to debar the unions from participating in both short-
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term productivity and long-term planning studies. ‘It was also agreed that they would not be told that the 
objectives of these projects were to identify how cost savings of 25 per cent could be made’ noted A.K. 
Stewart of McKinsey’s. Staff side cooperation would ease the process of change but, he warned his PO 
contact W.A. Wolverson, this risked compromising decision-making.
61
 The PO’s civil service culture had, 
in McKinsey’s view, led to ‘an atmosphere (encouraged by parliamentary control) that accentuates the 
tendency of management to debate both sides of the question and thus postpone decisions, and to observe 
the rule book at the expense of initiative’.62 Though in outline the LPP was widely known by 1969, and 
although supportive individuals on the UPW EC, such as Tom Jackson, had been well appraised, it is 
equally clear that designing the LPP had been a one-sided affair to that point. How did this change during 
the revalidation? 
From the outset, R.O. Bonnett signalled the Board’s intentions to make the revalidation a 
corporate project. In January 1973, Bonnett publicly invited the UPW to come on board this ‘far reaching 
enquiry’.63 The Post reported the programme of research, listing its distinct investigations, outlining plans 
for the eighteen regional studies, the costing exercise, a reappraisal of code/sort working, and of R&D and 
outside industry. It was explained that a study into the experiences of other countries was underway, as 
was research on environmental conditions in mechanised offices. The twin aims of the revalidation – to 
establish the relative merits of the different implementation options and to regain the full cooperation of 
the staff – were also made clear. 
The information gathered during the regional studies had dual significance in forming the basis of 
financial reappraisal as well as facilitating the close involvement of local staff and union branches, 
helping all parties to better appreciate the complex realities of staff attitudes to mechanisation. Except for 
Northern Ireland, two offices were chosen for each region, following discussions with the affected 
managements and staff associations. All regarded this as an adequate sample from which to draw useful 
conclusions, comprising existing MLOs, General Forwarding Offices (GFOs) and District Offices (DOs), 
which represented the full spectrum of office size and local operational arrangements then existing in 
Britain, serving different types of rural and urban areas. The offices selected were Aberdeen, Brighton, 
Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Chelmsford, Chester, Glasgow, Guildford, Leeds, Liverpool, London South 
Western District Office, Nottingham, Preston, Sheffield, Southampton, Watford and Wolverhampton.
64
 
Lengthy instructions were given to each office and these were made available to the staff through copies 
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sent to the COPOU, who had the opportunity to comment. In each case, planning staff from London made 
frequent visits with advice on how to compile the local costings for the four revalidation options. 
Instructions from Headquarters were flexible in offering general guidelines over the numbers of machines 
required, their expected levels of performance, maintenance costs, and staffing requirements, but the 
details of implementation were left to local discretion.
65
 
In matters of immediate concern to staff such as changes in duty patterns and overtime levels, the 
local variation in both existing and projected arrangements was such that useful trends were difficult to 
discern: 
Regions were instructed that proposed changes [‘vast numbers of duties’] should produce new duty patterns 
which were realistic and of a type which would be likely to be acceptable to local staff… Naturally the 
pattern of changes varies greatly from office to office, just as does the pattern of duties at present. No 
overall summarisation of the information provided by the studies would be very meaningful. For example, 
some MLOs have wide concentration areas covering many tiny offices, others cover a few larger ones, and 
some have no concentration at all; some schemes involve considerable changes to forward sorting or to 
transport organisation, and some no changes in these respects. Information was collected during the studies 
on matters like the balance between ordinary time and over-time, numbers of early, late and night duties 
and other similar points.
66
 
In spite of this, some provisional conclusions were possible. More Postman Higher Grade (PHG) working 
was inevitable as the UPW expected to succeed in keeping code work for this grade only. More coding 
for first class mail would take place in the afternoons and evenings, while second class mail would be 
focussed more on mornings, with an overall reduction in night duties. Staffing levels would on average 
fall at non-MLO offices although some of the larger offices were expected to lose the greatest numbers, 
easing recruitment problems in certain cities, although this was dependent on different levels of regional 
concentration and other factors, making this conclusion more tentative. In general, the magnitude of the 




 Beyond the gains in operational knowledge, the regional studies provided an opportunity for a 
much closer, sustained and more personal interaction between Headquarters departments and regional 
offices than regular, everyday operations would ordinarily permit. Though this entailed some tensions and 
disputes it is clear that a more nuanced mutual understanding of the different parties’ attitudes and 
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interests was gained. In the final report, management wanted to display empathy with staff about the 
changes affecting them. It was admitted that some of the disruptions would be painful and that an 
increased awareness of the value of good working conditions had been encouraged by mechanisation. 
However it was the variability in staff attitudes from region to region and across the grades that was 
chosen for special emphasis. ‘They range from welcome, through wariness, to hostility’, the report 
concluded, listing widespread sentiments they had observed: 
 Suspicion of change in general 
 The idea of using mechanisation to gain more money 
 Mutual suspicions between postal and engineering staff 
 Some fear of redundancy 
 Concern over changes in duty patterns and types of work 
 Concern over possible loss of work and reduction in take home pay especially in offices from which 
work will be withdrawn 
 Growing awareness of environmental issues 
 Enthusiasm about operating new equipment 
 Realisation that machines reduce hard or boring work 
It was hoped that in providing COPOU with access to all information in the final report, and 
because of their involvement in its compilation, many of these problems might be alleviated.
68
 Part of the 
purpose of bringing together so much information into a coherent picture of past, present and future 
mechanisation was to convince those outside Headquarters that the programme for which their 
cooperation was sought was worthwhile and well thought through. As the final report put it, ‘a firm 
declaration of Post Office commitment to mechanisation’ was needed to generate the required staff-side 
support.
69
 The staff embargo was seen as a ‘symptom of the general issue’ of management not adequately 
appreciating the subtleties of staff interests and attitudes. ‘The present stalemate will be hard to resolve 
partly because the real fears and requirements of the union membership are so ill defined’.70 To reach a 
resolution, the revalidation needed to be seen in the context of the wider effort to improve industrial 
relations, and this would include a demonstration of good will over the crucial question of special 
payments. 
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The package deal: pay, productivity and the employment of women 
 
There is a good case to be made for the importance of the revalidation to the staff, primarily via the 
involvement of COPOU in contributing towards a number of its different studies and in scrutinising the 
whole. The entire project served the purposes outlined in de Jong’s writings about modelling, going some 
way to rehabilitating the corporate spirit between the management and staff sides: a by-product of the 
joint planning and data-gathering, the greater degree of staff-side participation and the fact that 
conciliatory rhetoric from officials in London could now point to something of substance in its support. 
Re-modelling the LPP, therefore, acted as a statement of intent by providing credibility to financial and 
operational forecasts and, in so doing, softened the ground for the resumption of staff-side negotiations by 
weakening the line of criticism that mechanisation was an ill-conceived, authoritarian imposition. The 
widespread concerns about how code-sorting worsened the working environment – by atomising and 
deskilling the worker and bringing more noise, heat and dust – were also addressed in the revalidation. In 
the next chapter we see how this was achieved by co-opting a separate but parallel programme of machine 
and building redesign into its remit. But these advances could only go so far in resolving the embargo 
which was, after all, very much about pay: both in the straightforward sense that the UPW were seeking 
the maximum share of savings from mechanisation before cooperating, and as a form of industrial action 
which extended the strike and its grievances; waters were muddied by a host of issues beyond that of pay. 
This final section therefore traces the history of negotiations which led to an agreement in 1975 and 
begins by summarising some of the contextual issues that had a bearing on questions of pay, and, over 
mechanisation, the development of a “package deal”, touching on the length of the working week, the 
employment of women, the Conservative’s incomes policy and the change of government in 1974. 
 Firstly, the deal that was arrived at in 1975 needs to be understood in the context of a general 
improvement in the sphere of union-management negotiations and with the limitations imposed by the 
government’s incomes policy in mind. Although serious tensions clearly continued over this period, 
industrial relations did improve in certain respects after 1972, as a result both of the revalidation and the 
more general repair work required after the strike. When members of COPOU’s EC met with the PO in 
April 1973 they pressed for further steps to improve mechanised working conditions but also 
acknowledged that good progress was being made in addressing their wider mechanisation concerns.
71
 
Ryland told the General Purposes Committee of his belief that IR had improved greatly during the 
preceding year,
72
 while Will Paynter, an outside observer with a reputation for impartiality and who had 
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monitored the JWGIR since 1972, withdrew his membership in June on the grounds there was little more 
for him to contribute. The PO, in his generous view, now had ‘no major industrial relations problems’.73 
Moreover, COPOU and the Board found that there could be common causes resulting from severe 
economic conditions, namely their joint opposition to the government’s pricing caps, spending cuts and 
incomes policy.
74
 Amidst a terrible financial outlook, the second half of 1973 saw both the Board and the 
Unions begin preparations for Stage III of the Government’s Incomes Policy, due in October, the terms of 
which, Ryland believed to be of the greatest significance and that this was a common interest for all PO 
stakeholders.
75
 Notwithstanding a still considerable dissenting element of the UPW, its executive council 
and members of the Board both appear to have leavened their protests to Government with recognition of 
the national significance of counter-inflation measures. 
 On 3 October 1973 Tom Jackson joined with COPOU colleagues in meeting Prime Minister 
Edward Heath, alongside Ministers for Employment and Posts and Telecommunications, to remonstrate 
about the fall in pay, requesting special treatment under Stage III of the government’s incomes policy. In 
person, Heath’s response was muted: ‘No promises’.76 The following week, he wrote to advise he was 
rejecting their case: a ‘bitter disappointment’.77 Other COPOU Unions reacted with selective strike action 
without consulting the UPW. Jackson had outlined his pragmatic philosophy on incomes policies in an 
address to the Financial Times Conference the previous summer. Incomes policies, he argued, were 
doomed to failure because sectional self interest was a 'rocklike fact' of modern society. Whether it was 
wages or profit, everyone first pursued their share. This took primacy over all proposed 'abstract' ideals of 
the greater national good. Wage claims were shaped, he said, by two factors: 
 Firstly, evidence and, secondly, expectation. The most important of these is expectation. A General 
Secretary worth his salt will have a very good idea of what expectations his members will have at any 
particular time. Expectation is composed of many factors. The nightly bombardment of television 
commercials, keeping up with the Jones’. A continuing demand for an increase in real wages, what the firm 
or the industry can bear, cover for increased living costs and perhaps - most important of all, the general 
level of settlements being made elsewhere and particularly the better of these settlements.
78
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These were among the pressures felt by Jackson during the annual wage round, applying equally to the 
special payment for mechanisation which, as the situation then stood, was expected to be restricted under 
the terms of Stage III. This changed in January 1974 when the Board, anxious to end the embargo, made 
representations to the Government and succeeded in securing an exception to Stage III for the special 
mechanisation payment, which was by then referred to as the ‘lead-in payment’. £10m above the Stage III 
pay code was granted.
79
 
 Jackson and the UPW Executive strongly supported the revalidation and continued to argue for its 
merits with the membership’s dissenting element, while recognising that the best chances of ending the 
embargo lay in securing a high lead-in payment. Following the government’s rejection of special 
treatment in the annual pay round, it was realised that the lead-in payment was the best medium-term 
lever in pay negotiations.
80
 Events at the UPW Annual Conference in 1973 gave a good indication of how 
far they still had to go. There, a number of questions were posed about the amount of lead-in pay the EC 
were seeking in their negotiations. The ensuing debate revolved around two issues. First, there was 
disquiet over the code-sort grading policy, whereby both Postmen and the senior PHG grade operated the 
coding desks, with the former receiving increased pay whilst on coding duties. This was thought to 
undermine the PHG grade where postmen could end up earning more than their senior colleagues.
81
 A 
grading agreement was settled a year earlier and, because since then no further offices had been 
mechanised, it was agreed to let the issue wait for the final negotiations. Either way, this was bound to be 
a thorny issue. As the COPOU representative, T.C. Carpenter, remarked in a joint meeting in 1970, re-
grading risked unbalancing the complex operations of the sorting office where staff ‘had been conditioned 
by the past twenty years to accept the present Postman/PHG differential as justified’.82 Second, 
discrepancies were apparent in the coding rates achieved at the operational MLOs because of differences 
in equipment, experience and the nature of the mail being processed. It was widely felt that the guideline 
figure of 2,100 items per hour was too high, that some offices reaching this target were abusing shortcuts 
in the system for measuring the work rate and it was agreed that a lower rate should be sought.
83
 The 
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Board opened with 30p per week extra pay in an initial offer before the conference and a motion arguing 
the EC should increase their demand for 50p was at this stage rejected. Speaking for those in its favour, 
John Taylor explained that they did not oppose the new technology. ‘We want the conditions and the 
safeguards for our members before we go into mechanisation. That’s what the issue is all about’. He 
continued, 
On the postal side we are going to face an upheaval that will be far, far greater than anything we have had 
to face in the past. This upheaval will mean drastic cuts in manpower in hundreds of our smaller offices, 
completely new environmental conditions, domestic upsets, possible loss of earnings to thousands of our 
members. This is the cost that this Union’s membership must bear as the price of mechanisation.84  
Tom Jackson replied that the EC was not in fact demanding 50p, it was demanding a ‘detailed 
comprehensive plan and the lead-in payment’.85 
In 1973 the UPW held another special conference on mechanisation. The most significant 
outcome was that the embargo was widened to include the Parcel Post Plan (the parcel service’s 
equivalent of the LPP, only on a much smaller scale and with far less opposition) and the employment of 
female and part-time staff. This was a pre-emptive strategy intended to pave the way towards an 
overarching agreement which might combine all special issues into one package and avoid dealing with 
them piecemeal, thought to be the most direct route to better pay and conditions.
86
 Women and part-time 
staff were paid less than full-time men and comprised a very small proportion of total postal staff. The 
Postman and PHG grades were either entirely or mostly male dominated, depending on the office, and the 
UPW had a vested interest in the status quo, fearing the effects of an influx of cheaper labour on wage 
claims.
87
 This was connected with a complex history of gender relations in the postal service in which 
strong views about the distinctions between men’s work and women’s work persisted. This culture of 
exclusion was typified by the UPW’s 1955 statement: ‘The work of Postmen is proper to a male grade 
and should be performed by Postmen.’ Only when severe staff shortage could be shown, it continued, 
should women or part-time staff be temporarily employed.
88
 In 1965, a ‘thermostat’ agreement for 
London prohibited the recruitment of women or part-time staff unless total vacancies for the city 
exceeded 5%. Following the strike the Hardman Committee advised these restrictions be lifted in areas of 
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acute staff shortage, but the UPW rejected this at their December 1971 Conference. The 1973 decision 
therefore corked an already slim bottleneck in labour supply pending the comprehensive deal, prompting 
the PO in April 1974 to urge reconsideration, reminding the EC of forthcoming equal-pay legislation ‘and 
also the social climate’.89 
Privately, senior management recognised the opportunity code-sorting presented for raising the 
part-time contingent and bringing more women into the rank-and-file grades, though women at this time 
were not eligible for coding work. Because PO policy was to replace temporary with full-time staff 
wherever possible, it was thought ‘pointless to train women at great cost if they are likely to be replaced 
(if only in theory) by new, established, male employees, and at short notice’.90 A study group looking into 
this question noticed several other problems. Although they entertained the idea that ‘tradition and social 
circumstances’ could make women better typists and therefore better coders, the big difficulties would be 
in altering grading and shift structures. Shift work for women would have to be arranged around their 
husband’s working pattern and their domestic responsibilities, while young single women were judged 
less reliable with higher turnover. Pregnant women and mothers were also deemed problem categories, 
but older married women (ideally ex-typists) were thought to be the best segment of the female market. 
The general view was that although mechanisation promised a long-term rise in part-time working, the 
issue could be shelved in the short-term on account of the sparseness of this portion of the labour market 
and the inflexibilities of existing staffing structures.
91
 Nevertheless, beyond code-sort working, the PO 
retained a strong interest in loosening the unions’ grip on employment restrictions as their negotiations 
over the lead-in payment developed. 
 The PO planned to submit the revalidation report in time for the 1974 UPW conference, with the 
hope of having a lead-in offer with a realistic chance of success. The general election and change of 
government complicated proceedings and a postponed special conference was scheduled for the autumn. 
In the event, this too was postponed as negotiations drew on, becoming exceptionally complex. In total 
there were four stages of negotiation between the EC and the PO between November 1974 and May 1975 
when the special conference convened ahead of its annual conference. In its simplest terms, they offered a 
package comprising an offer to end their embargos on mechanisation and the recruitment of women and 
part-time workers in exchange for the abolition of Saturday deliveries, and to a minimum two hour 
reduction in the working week. The shorter working week was preferred to a lead-in payment in this 
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 However as negotiations unfolded, a variety of permutations were aired. The PO heard the 
original package proposal on 19 July 1974 and responded cautiously pointing to a number of ‘formidable’ 
problems, though agreeing to analyse the operational and financial implications. When negotiations 
resumed in November, the PO would not accept the two hour reduction or the five day week. They 
instead raised their lead-in offer from 65p to 80p and offered to increase pay for Saturday work. The EC 
spent a month considering the offer before coming back to the table on 13 December. Tom Jackson told 
Alex Currall that their membership would prefer to trade the lead-in payment for a two hour reduction. 
The summary of this meeting published in The Post has Jackson outlining his reasoning to the Board:  
Whilst UPW agree that mechanisation was in the long term interests of the Postal Business the changes it 
would bring about were massive, involving not only loss of jobs, changes in men’s office of employment 
arising from concentration schemes, a loss of earnings in overtime and Night Duty Allowances, but also 
substantial changes in office environment and working techniques… Working conditions were substantially 
altered in a mechanised situation and the staff was entitled to compensation in return. In the Union’s view, 
reduced hours were a far better compensation than money, since this bought physical relief from the 
increased stress arising from mechanisation.
93
 
The board rejected this proposal, positing unacceptable damage to the level of service at a time of tariff 
increases. In its place they offered a choice between a one hour reduction or £1 lead-in payment. The 
UPW response was to point out that the one hour was worth more than £1 and asked for the lead-in offer 
to be increased accordingly. Further meetings eventually led to agreement on a final set of proposals to be 
taken to conference: an end to the embargos on mechanisation and the recruitment of part-time staff and 
full-time postwomen (henceforth with equal rights and responsibilities as men) in return for a lead-in 
payment of £1.35 per week.
94
 The way this was to be paid was structured over five years according to 
future productivity improvements. Postmen and PHGs would receive a £1.15 first element payment, with 
a second element of 20p added once manpower savings reached a prescribed threshold. In parallel 
negotiations the PO Management Staffs Association (POMSA) secured a £60 per annum first element for 
sorting office managers with a £10 second element.
95
 
The conference began on Friday 16 May. Tom Jackson made an emotive and energetic case for 
accepting the offer. He argued that this was a crucial step in repairing a postal service being fatally 
undermined by the effects of inflation, which threatened to increase the postal deficit and cause a loss of 
traffic which would lead to the loss of jobs and deterioration of the service. ‘I must tell you firmly and 
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flatly that I cannot get more than £1.35. To send me back for more is to reject mechanisation’. He 
continued: ‘Those of our members who are opposed to mechanisation… are saying we cannot afford the 
capital expenditure or increased pay. These are the people who see no further than the end of their nose’.96 
He described attempts to abolish the Saturday delivery as ‘the most strenuous negotiations I have ever 
been involved in’ and on the issue of the recruitment of women, he attacked journalists in The New 
Statesman and The Socialist Worker who depicted the UPW as anti-female and insisted that with 
legislation on the way, it was time to accept the recruitment of fulltime postwomen as a matter of 
urgency. ‘A grave responsibility rests upon delegates to this conference’, he concluded. ‘You can reject 
the advice we have given – what you will be unable to reject is the recriminations of your members. For it 
is their jobs, their livelihood, their earnings and their conditions which are at stake’.97 The EC was 
challenged by ‘Corby’ who argued that the proposals were not in the best interests of the staff or the 
public. He claimed that traditional manual sorting remained preferable to the MLO scheme and the public 
had failed to use postcodes. A number of delegates rallied to support the EC. ‘Who is Corby Kidding?’ 
asked one delegate. ‘Can’t he see that mechanisation is the last chance of saving jobs?’.98 Jackson replied 
along similar lines and added that the reason for a lack of postcode use by the public was that the scheme 
had ground to a halt when the embargo started. Once cooperation resumed, a comprehensive publicity 
campaign could begin. In the event Corby’s amendment was rejected, the offer was accepted and the 
embargo ended.
99
 Resumption was carried by 6863 to 4407 votes.
100
 
Despite the absence of new machine installations, it should be noted that thirteen MLOs were 
operative between 1972-1975. Staff at these offices experienced their own transitions which were 
monitored by Headquarters staff. The revalidated Plan was still a long way from national integration with 
all the “critical mass” financial and operational benefits this promised. A forecast of 81 MLOs meant that 
between six and thirteen installations were scheduled per year up to 1981 (Table 4.2). Though further 
delays meant the full system was not completed until 1985,
101
 this meant in 1975 that the major human 
aspects of implementation were to be tackled on a greater scale than before and this was spelled out in the 
revalidation report.
102
 The history of the preparations made for this is explored in Chapter 6.  
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When the Carter Committee was formed in 1976, the PO was invited to explain the revalidation 
and comment on how it contributed to a resolution, including the lead-in payment affair. Their submission 
is here quoted at length as it provides a good summary of how mechanisation was entangled with the 
wider political upheavals in the industry, and reconfirms its importance in drawing all parties around a 
common goal. It also suggests that a turning point in resolving the embargo was the return to power of the 
Labour government in 1974, who were ready to be more flexible in interpreting how the continuation of 
the national incomes policy should apply to the nationalised industries, particularly with regards to special 
industrial payments. 
The refusal of the UPW to co-operate in mechanisation in 1972 until there was full understanding of future 
intentions was a symptom of the general unease. During the course of the full review of mechanisation 
done in 1973, therefore, meetings were held with the unions affected to tell them about the studies being 
undertaken, to seek their views and to explain the benefits of mechanisation. The unions also had access to 
all the material collected for that review. These meetings helped to secure the agreement of the unions in 
1975 to the resumption of mechanisation... In May 1974 the Government had recognised the justification 
for a “special payment” in respect of postal mechanisation (as well as certain other items affecting Post 
Office staff) out with the then current incomes policy. This concession was related to the general pay 
situation at that time and was not incorporated in the Special Pay Review of July 1974, but left for 
subsequent negotiation. These negotiations were however expanded by the Union to cover a range of 
matters, notably withdrawal of Saturday delivery, shorter working week and employment of women...The 
first element payment has to be seen in the wider context described above rather than as narrowly identified 
with new mechanisation schemes... In addition to the pay settlement there has been considerable effort to 
overcome the industrial relations problems inherent in a major change of the mails systems. Much attention 
has been paid to the design of mechanised offices and equipment, and plans for each office are discussed 




The Carter submission concluded with a reminder that the PO considered these matters in 
international context and the global problem of labour intensity and the near-universal pursuit of 
mechanised sorting. From contrasting the British experience with similar, foreign projects, the conclusion 
of engineers, management and the union ECs was that no better long-term solution than the combination 
of code-sorting with productivity programmes was on the market. The embargo in Britain was 
problematic and linked to the combustive industrial politics of the time, but in international context, 
Britain’s problems had parallels, not least in United States Postal Service where industrial action over 
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machine-paced sorting was the source of severe protests.
105
 The wider picture was that if the PO was to 
take its long-term responsibility to its customers seriously, it needed to reduce its dependency on labour 
and invest in more efficient handling systems. On this view, the speedy pursuit of mechanised sorting was 




In assessing the significance of the revalidation, it is important to remember that it was not solely 
concerned with finding the course of least resistance, or even in proving again the financial viability of 
mechanisation, though this was clearly a primary function. Discounting the details of the revalidation’s 
financial side, the Board knew that the total future investment it proposed, though considerable in its own 
right, was dwarfed by the annual expenditure of the PO as a whole. Great stock was also placed in the 
importance of Britain’s international standing in postal automation and in meeting the expectations of 
public and commerce. ‘It therefore made sense to persevere, even if only to avoid a massively disruptive 
change of plan’, Duncan Campbell-Smith has commented. ‘This way lay the future of the postal service, 
whatever the financial complications of the day’.106 Financial questions were, of course, central and the 
figures for Option 2, with its reformulated plan reducing the proposed number of MLOs from 120 to 81, 
were carefully calculated and subject to external audit and, to an unprecedented extent, staff-side scrutiny. 
Even the DCF results, which used more cautious assumptions, were consistent with the prevailing 
judgement of senior management and engineers that the LPP should continue in revised form. 
Furthermore, the implications of financial forecasting permeated the other areas as a consequence of the 
interrelation of the different aspects of code-sorting. However, as the PO later acknowledged, the 
revalidation’s value was, equally, political. The impetus behind it was the UPW’s embargo decision in 
1972. Between then and the acceptance of the £1.35 package deal in 1975, the revalidation was the single 
most important factor (other than the lead-in payment) in striking a new accord between the two sides of 
industry. This was primarily due to its open, democratic and consultative approach, which more credibly 
involved the staff as stakeholders in re-planning the future shape of the system. Seen in the context of the 
ongoing formalisation of the PO’s joint consultation machinery, it becomes clear that the rising wave of 
consultation and negotiation, inherent respectively in the revalidation and lead-in payment, suggests that 
the concrete issues of mechanisation offered both sides a forum in which post-strike industrial relations 
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could be rehabilitated. Unions became involved in planning for the future in new ways; management 
reacted to new financial constraints with a corporate, rather than a unilateral, approach; and engineers 
brought new ideas to the field of modelling, situating the revalidation within the broader framework of 
building a robust forecasting apparatus for the mails system. 
 That political calculations of bargaining and compromise were central to the revalidation is 
consistent with the findings of industrial sociology in this period. In the wider economy, survey data 
suggests that firms that had recently experienced a strike were statistically more likely to involve IR 
considerations in capital investment decisions. This prompted Eric Batstone, the academic most familiar 
with the PO in this period, to argue that ‘... industrial action is the crucial factor in explaining the 
centrality of personnel and industrial relations considerations in fixed capital investment decisions’.107 
Moreover, the evidence supports the view that the increasing primacy of compromise rather than conflict 
as a management strategy was more than an empty or cynical gesture. In their study of the car industry 
Paul Willman and Graham Winch highlighted similar consultation practices at British Leyland. ‘In 
practice’, they discovered, ‘[union] participation acted as a sounding board for managers' ideas. It allowed 
BL to impress upon union representatives the difficulties and complexities of change and to rehearse 
ideas which subsequently arose in negotiation. The unions, however, did not find it an effective means to 
modify management suggestions or proposals’.108 This stands in contrast to the PO’s revalidation and 
subsequent package deal, where there was more substance to union consultation and where the two 
demands of the embargo were met: first, by involving the unions in a comprehensive review, and, second, 
in sharing the future savings of the LPP with the staff. In the next chapter we see that over the same 
period, this pattern was repeated at the technological level, where, in the design of a second generation of 
machines, staff-side interests played an important role. 
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Chapter 5 Continuity and change in R&D: second generation machines and 
the “Easy View” coding desk 
Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses developments in research engineering between 1972-5 and the extension of 
consultation over R&D and the working environment. This period saw a transition to a second generation 
of machines with particular attention paid to developing a new coding desk, the so-called “Easy-View”, 
which saw a ‘fundamental redesign’ and halved production costs.1 This was significant in that its design 
objectives were better shaped by the psychological and physiological needs of operators. I argue that this 
shaping took place as both a natural outgrowth of past R&D and in response to staff-side criticisms of the 
first generation of machines. Lines of development were also fine-tuned by the effects upon the PO of 
poor economic conditions. The ongoing redesign of machines was incorporated under the revalidation 
umbrella, encouraging engineers to alter their philosophy of development and give greater priority to 
ergonomics. However, as is shown here, this should be balanced against the fact that postal R&D was 
long-established with its own unique culture and history, something that has not been sufficiently 
emphasised by critics who have suggested that PO engineers were uninterested in the human side of 
design.
2
 The issues addressed in this chapter are therefore centred on both the machines and their makers. 
I will explain who was responsible for which aspects of the R&D process and how the second generation 
of machines differed from the first. I argue that alterations to design priorities took place between the late 
1960s and the early 1970s and that this was consistent with the wider extension of staff-side consultation 
and changes in the commercial environment. This included an organised effort to learn from the first 
phase of implementation, a greater focus on computing power in improving machine performance, a 
greater focus on cost-effectiveness in response to cuts in funding and, above all, the wider application of 
so-called “human factors” research to improving the working environment. Overall, there was both 
continuity and change in postal R&D over this period. Continuity in that a rounded design philosophy 
was in place during the 1960s, balancing technical, operational, human and financial needs. Change in 
that, once it was clear that mechanisation was viable in practice, there was a shift towards improving 
existing designs and adapting them, both to lessons learned and to political and economic changes at 
large. 
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 The success of the Easy-View coding desk is evident in that it became the standard model used in 
Britain for the next 25 years. The first batch went live at Redhill, Surrey, in 1975. Thereafter huge 
numbers entered service, the last being decommissioned in 2003.
3
 The Easy-View was the high point of 
PO coding desk design in terms of novelty, durability, effectiveness and ease of use, and the PO put right 
some fundamental problems in its second attempt to master the intricacies of the man-machine interface.
4
 
Later audits of the performance of code-sorting were critical of the context in which the Easy View was 
used, but this was part of a mid-1980s debate about how to move beyond the need for human coding 
within the sorting office environment.
5
 In describing the process by which design specifications were 
selected and prioritised, more evidence is added to the argument that the PO’s record ought to be viewed 
more charitably and that there was a constructive side to this notoriously tumultuous period. Roderick 
Martin has noted that, in 1970s Britain, consultation and union participation was often little more than a 
superficial gesture. It was rare for joint institutions between unions and management to have much 
practical effect on the specifics of technological change, stemming from the incompatibility between joint 
consultation and the adversarial nature of collective bargaining over wages.
6
 This divergence of interests 
tended to preclude union representation, where it existed, from having a voice in the R&D process and 
there are examples of organisations using the introduction of new technology as a means of asserting 
management authority in industries with troubled industrial relations.
7
 The PO was an instance of the 
exception to this, in that technological change and industrial relations were more democratic and 
constructive. This was important in securing an orderly transition to new working methods. Paralleling 
the inclusivity of the revalidation of mechanisation policy, the second period of designing code-sort 
machinery reveals an increase in staff consultation and an explicit emphasis on addressing UPW 
grievances in testing and trials. 
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The settings and structures of R&D and the role of Telecoms 
 
The core of mechanisation R&D had long been centred on Dollis Hill Research Station, the epicentre for 
PO applied science and technical innovation. Opened in 1933, Dollis Hill gained its reputation as a world 
class industrial laboratory thanks to contributions to computing, telephone and satellite systems. During 
the Second World War it was the site for the construction of the code-breaking Colossus. Its post-war 
research programme focussed heavily on the telephone network, such as switching circuit theory and 
thermionic valve research.
10
 Among Dollis Hill’s success stories were the co-axial cable, capable of 
carrying over 2,000 telephone calls at once, the electronic telephone exchange for long distance trunk 
dialling, and the Goonhilly Relay Station in Cornwall which facilitated the first cross-Atlantic signals via 
the Telstar satellite in 1962.
11
 During the early 1960s more staff were added, including mathematicians 
for calculating satellite orbits and programmers for advanced industrial computers such as the National-
Elliott 803. This influx was matched by a widening research agenda and the growth of an in-house 
library, to which some 300 books were added per year and 9,000+ more loaned in. Its published output 
was also considerable.
12
 By 1969 there were over 1,500 staff working at what had by then become an 
overpopulated and ‘exhausted’ site.13 It was this outstanding pool of expertise that encouraged Anthony 
Wedgewood Benn in his vision for the PO as a revolutionary, science-based ‘Ministry of 
Communications’.14 
In their graduate recruitment literature, the Engineering Department invited prospective scientists 
and technicians to spend their careers improving a communications network of global significance. ‘The 
life of the nation depends on the efficiency of the extensive postal and telecommunications system which 
serves us at home and links us with the rest of the world’, explained a 1959 recruitment brochure. ‘It is 
the Post Office engineer who is responsible for the design, provision and maintenance of the equipment 
which comprises this system’. New entrants, usually holding three A-levels and a technology-related 
degree, were generally welcomed with a secondment to a telephone exchange, in private industry or 
placement abroad, before settling down and specialising. ‘At Dollis Hill’ there was promised ‘great 
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opportunities for the man with an enquiring mind; electronics, micro-wave radio, quartz crystal, 
supersonic waves, postal mechanisation – all these and many more equally fascinating subjects are 
studied and developed to keep Britain in the forefront of world communications’.15 The most senior 
engineers often stated that the department’s breadth of research and record of achievement helped foster a 
culture of excellence. Spectacular breakthroughs in satellite and intercontinental telecoms were held up as 
benchmarks of scientific and technical ingenuity, serving to ‘sharpen the technical imagination of staff, as 
well as proclaiming the Department as a science-based forward-looking unit in a progressive Post 
Office’.16 Increasingly in the post-war period, the PO came to rely on its scientific and technical expertise 
which was both of a high calibre and diverse in practice. Even after the capital restrictions which flowed 
from the 1971 crisis, total annual expenditure at Dollis Hill stood at £20.4m, some 3% of total capital 
expenditure. From this, postal R&D received a budget of £1.3m per annum.
17
  
Postal R&D was therefore historically embedded in the larger structures of telecoms R&D.
18
 At 
the broadest level telecoms R&D saw its purpose as integrating basic research with applied science for the 
benefit of the business; a concept that held equally for the postal side, with which it shared both material 
facilities and a cross-flow of expertise. Strictly speaking, the work of R14, the main postal division of 
R&D, was performed by telecoms on an agency basis. However responsibilities for decision-making and 
establishing new directions in design rested in large measure within the postal service, with engineers and 
planning staff often working in tandem in both R14 and the Postal Mechanisation and Buildings Division 
(PMBD). The division objectives for R14 were ‘to study new devices, materials and systems of potential 
engineering value to the Postal Business, and... to develop prototype equipment and carry out field 
trials’.19 With a number of its key development projects in fact based away from Dollis Hill at sites in 
London such as Gresham Street and Calthorpe House, this raised questions about the need for telecoms 
involvement at all. The PO Board authorised the annual budget and postal R&D policy was ultimately 
governed by PBMD where design decisions were approved by an R&D Steering Group, of which R14 
was a prominent member (although this group had in fact appropriated its ‘system of project definition 
and approval’ from telecoms). When the role of telecoms in postal design was posed in the R&D Annual 
Report for 1975, much weight was given to ‘strong links’ between the two concerning common technical 
features such as ‘opto-electronics’, ‘signal processing’, ‘human factors’, as well as mathematical and 
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 As the report elaborated, there were less tangible but equally 
important reasons for a close relationship with telecoms, such as a shared design philosophy... 
“Should postal engineering be carried out in THQ Research Department?” Yes. Being situated within a 
larger organisation enables cross flow of expertise in parallel specialisms, keeps standards high in an 
environment of professional comparison and enables specialists to be easily drawn in for short term 
projects from other fields without limiting their career prospects... R14 remains convinced that the scope of 
automation will increase and the introduction of what is loosely termed “robotics” is not far off. But 
whatever areas the Division moves into it is perhaps even more important that the work is closely allied 
with a systems approach and that a close relationship should be maintained with those in the Postal 
Business who are responsible for developing the operating systems of the future… If research is to be 




Pay and conditions for design engineers also mirrored those in telecoms, from the maintenance 
grades to more executive roles, with ‘recruitment, promotion, and training... organised on a common basis 
at many levels’.22 At Dollis Hill, once the national mechanisation scheme was known to be imminent in 
1966, the number of student apprenticeships, bursary and sandwich courses increased.
23
 The conditions of 
entry for the most senior grades displayed a departmental preference for youth and talent, and a flexible 
attitude towards career development in which postal planning or field management was as likely as 
dedicated R&D work. Potential Executive Engineers under 35 years old were preferred, holding a First or 
Second Class degree in electrical or mechanical engineering, mathematics, physics, chemistry, polymer 
science or computer science. Alternative credentials were accepted, including corporate membership of 
the Institute of Electrical Engineers, or Radio or Production Engineers. A 1980 recruitment brochure 
spoke of promotion opportunities in engineering development, Headquarters departments or national 
planning, generally located in central London. Training lasted for 10-20 weeks including stints at the 
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By the early 1970s a new technical paradigm utilising micro-electronics was anticipated by system 
planners in telecoms as the work in the field expanded in preparation for a new generation of digital 
exchange equipment known as System X. This factored into plans begun in 1968 for a move out of Dollis 
Hill to a new 100 acre site on Martlesham Heath in Suffolk, intended to provide a ‘modern stimulating 
environment’ to help attract and retain high quality staff. Fourteen departments, including R14, were 
gradually transferred to the 32 laboratory buildings which made up the Martlesham facility, officially 
opened by the Queen in 1975.
26
 Over 1,500 staff, including 500 ‘high calibre’ engineers and scientists 
were relocated.
27
 The Engineering and Personnel Departments corresponded over the IR implications and 
together established the ‘Martlesham Move Committee’ to facilitate communication over 
accommodation, productivity and training. Though the move was clearly necessary for the future health 
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of R&D, it created short-term upheaval. The purpose-built accommodation earmarked for R14 was given 
over to priority work on semiconductor processing for six months, leaving the department out-housed, at 
some inconvenience.
28
 Some 800 Dollis Hill staff were moved to temporary accommodation in 
Martlesham, Ipswich and Felixstowe as the transfer took place.
29
 Postal R&D was therefore performed at 
numerous sites while maintaining a presence at Dollis Hill and, later, Martlesham. Its professional culture 
was to some extent shaped by the state of the telecoms field in Britain, bringing with it the longstanding 
benefits of unique, specialised knowledge in overlapping areas of applied science and a larger 
organisational structure for research than would be justified by the economics of mechanisation in 
isolation. Martlesham became the centre of research on OCR and high speed mail handling, and where 
research into the manual dexterity of coding desk operators and Human Factors took place.
30
 On Studd 
Street, London, Telecoms oversaw the development of the inks used for stamp cancelling and fraud-
protection on tax discs and postal orders.
31
 
The PO was the principal agent for most R&D, augmented by contracts with selected firms. R14 
and PMBD together oversaw a number of Design & Development Divisions (DD1, DD2 etc.), comprising 
small working groups of two or three people specialising in aspects of mechanical or electrical design. At 
various points in a project, their drawings were handed to a workshop at London’s Mount Pleasant 
Sorting Office where they helped build prototypes to be ‘de-bugged’. David Evans, who later became 
Royal Mail’s Head of Design, began his postal engineering career in 1971 working on electrical design 
under Cliff Wicken, then Head of DD1, sited at Telecoms Headquarters at Leith House on Gresham 
Street. Wicken was known as a ‘no-nonsense’ boss with a keen sense of humour and a preoccupation with 
spending as little of the PO’s money as possible. Another colleague who joined as a student apprentice at 
the same time was John Backhouse, who was obsessed with Rover cars and player pianos with which he 
sometimes busked outside London’s theatres.32 The testing for the second generation machines took place 
at a new laboratory at Calthorpe House. This was over the road from Mount Pleasant and in 1970-1 took 
over the work formerly undertaken in the workshop in the Mount’s basement. Twice a day, a minibus 
shuttled engineers such as John Harrison, Aubrey Walker and Mike Ferro between the different sites. The 
lead engineer at Calthorpe House was David Gubby, later succeeded by Barney Newton and Dave Evans, 
who directed operations in the machine shop and electronics lab where test rigs were built to test 
prototypes. His staff included Terry Klee, Mike Greenberg, Ray Paris and Ray Northfield and their work 
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covered several key aspects of the new generation of code-sort technology such as the development of 
coding desks, printing systems, microelectronic memory, high speed sorting, segregating and culling units 
and, later, video coding and email.
33
  
Evans remembers ‘a strange, competitive environment’ between the different Development 
Divisions. Extremely tight time limits for testing fostered a ‘gung-ho’ attitude of ‘get-the-project-planned-
up’ with minimal time built in for understanding, correcting and learning from errors (something he 
believes Royal Mail and business in general has never properly addressed).
34
 The outside equipment 
manufacturers, with whom the PO had a close collaborative relationship, entered at the earliest 
opportunity in the pre-production phase. The bulk of postal engineering’s annual £1.4m budget was spent 
on developing letter mechanisation in-house, with two-thirds going to PO staff and the remainder spent 
on contracts with industry, consultants and universities. The specialised and long-term nature of hybrid 
electro-mechanical R&D made this arrangement necessary. The use of live mail, for instance, was 
invaluable for testing machines in real-world conditions at high-technology sites such as Mount Pleasant 
and Croydon Head Post Office, where a ‘constant proliferation of new designs’ underwent testing.35 
Private manufacturers were denied this benefit for security and legal reasons and in keeping with the 
historic principle against interfering with the mail. With no guarantee of a contract, private firms were 
reluctant to commit their finances to specialised projects. Four firms supplied ancillary equipment, such 
as conveyors, elevators and chutes (GEC/Elliot Mechanical Handling, Manufacturers Equipment (MEC), 
Geo. Robson, and Sovex). There were four suppliers of free-standing equipment including Segs, ALFs, 
Coding Desks, and ASMs (GEC/Elliot Automation, Plessey, Masson Scott Thrissell, and Westlands). In 
1965, under Benn’s guidance, these and other interested firms joined together to form the British Postal 
Engineering Equipment Association (BPEEA), with 28 members and orders exceeding £6m by 1970. 
‘Inevitably the association endeavours to pressurise the PO – especially with regard to present and future 
levels of orders’, it was noted in a 1973 report, highlighting growing tensions with outside industry. The 
PO exchanged dialogue with the BPEEA to ‘develop its arguments and explain some of its problems’, but 
conflicts over tenders sometimes compromised the associations’ united front.36 The PO believed there 
was a possible £300m international market of which it believed it could secure £50m. During the 
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embargo, production orders were nearing completion and the manufacturers were running out of work, 
leading to redundancies. Those who had not already abandoned the field were considering doing so. 
There is a real danger that when the Post Office is in a position to re-activate its mechanisation programme, 
the supporting Industry technology and capacity essential to its success will have disappeared unless 
immediate action is taken towards injecting a reasonable workload into the firms primarily concerned… 
The high hopes that British Industry would participate substantially in postal mechanisation overseas are 
not being fulfilled... The virtual cessation of the mechanisation programme is having a detrimental effect on 




Though contractor relations clearly mattered, there was little the PO could do. The issue was raised in 
parliament, but prospects for the government stepping in with funding were poor. The PO argued that 
there was still adequate competition in the field for expertise and resources to be regenerated upon 
resumption of letter mechanisation and that there would be no option but to pay higher prices for this 
when the time came. 
 
Adaptation of the R&D programme to new financial and political conditions 
 
By the time the embargo came into effect in 1972, the financial environment for postal R&D had 
deteriorated compared with the promising conditions of the late 1960s. Introducing the new machinery 
and the postcode system had proved to be difficult. In 1970, the Institute of Mechanical Engineering in 
London hosted the first international postal engineering conference on mechanisation. The larger part of 
papers presented were by British PO engineers describing past and present developments in the design of 
sorting machines, their various components and sub-systems, and related fields such as postcoding. Nick 
de Jong, then Director of PO Planning and Mechanisation, delivered an optimistic and congratulatory 
plenary paper, describing the conference as ‘a very important and proud occasion’ representing a ‘climax’ 
to the careers of those who had been pivotal in the ‘long pioneering effort to establish this new branch of 
engineering’. For de Jong, John Piggott (Director Design Engineering) and other senior figures such as 
Geoff Copping (‘a mastermind in postal automation’),38 the successful trials of the 1960s and their 
culmination in the LPP appeared as a great vindication for the field, and for their own leading roles within 




 David Evans, ‘A Life in Automation’, Lecture given at the British Postal Museum & Archive, 30/10/07. Evans 
credits Copping with a number of important insights in how to turn, convey and manipulate letters within the 
machines. His books on these matters are still spread around the world’s postal administrations. 
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it. de Jong believed a radical reorganisation of mail circulation relying on automatic sorting appeared 
finally to be at hand: 
Technical progress has been such that the Post Office now has at its disposal a range of equipment well 
able to meet its demands in the coming era of intensive mechanization; an era in which postal engineers 
will make ever increasing contributions both economic and social to this vital public service. ...it is possible 
that future postal engineers will look back on this Conference as recording the early days of this difficult 
marriage between mail and machine in which both inventive art and engineering science can be found. 
Throughout the development stages of the more complex machines, an immense amount of courage and 
persistence has been required by engineers, and by management. The reward is the array of equipment that 




Though the field’s sense of achievement was justified, the intervening two years had seen a number of 
changes to business conditions which had consequences for postal engineering in Britain and for R14 in 
particular.  
One effect of the financial crisis was a slight cut in the R&D budget, which was sensitive to 
changes in the national economy. The annual request was reduced by 9% to £1.36m and spread in order to 
retain all 38 major research staff while curtailing the overall programme to priority projects offering the 
best prospects for quick returns. Blue skies, or ‘free rein’, work was mostly shelved. de Jong summarised 
for the Management Board how R&D would adapt over the short, medium and long term: 
The first objective of R&D in the current financial climate is to provide the technical support, improved 
equipment and methods (capable of the earliest exploitation) which are required to implement the 
mechanisation programme with increasing financial and operational efficiency. The broad aims are to 
maintain, review and implement an R&D programme within an annual budget, covering basic system 
studies, the design of new and improved machinery and the development of code sorting equipment and 
associated electronic systems so as to meet the long-term future needs of the business and its possible new 
services, with a view to productivity improvement, reduction in manpower dependence and increased cost 
effectiveness; to attempt the early invention of the first prototype automatic address/postcode reading 
machine, and to recommend on the standardisation of mail required for a viable system. Additionally, there 
is a need to foster in-house competence and thereby assist the penetration of technology wherever it will 
benefit the business; the professional R&D staff have a vital part to play in the resulting radical changes. 
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The level of competence must also be such as to ensure that the PO remains authoritative in postal 
mechanisation theory and practice.
40
 
In outlining the adaptation of R&D to the new conditions, de Jong reminded the Board that in spite of the 
reappraisals underway the major benefits of mechanisation still held. Return on capital still ranged 
between 15-30% over a twenty year period based on realistic predictions about reductions in manual 
sorting. Mechanisation remained the ‘key element’ in the restructuring of the mails.41 The great 
accomplishment of the Engineering Department had been to bring the first generation of machines to 
operational standards. By 1972, twelve MLOs equipped with first generation equipment had been 
successfully commissioned. These were Norwich, Croydon, Southampton, Newport, London’s East 
Central District Office, Stoke, Preston, Aberdeen, Brighton, Cambridge, Huddersfield and Sheffield. 
Three further installations lay idle due to union dissent in Cardiff, York and London’s West Central 
District Office.
42
 In restating the department’s short term plans, emphasis was placed on studying the live 
performance of the first-generation systems and making incremental improvements to efficiency and cost 
in the light of experience. Talk of reaching first-generation ‘design stability’ co-existed with continuous 




Looking to the future, the ultimate goal was unchanged: the full automation of sorting in all of its 
stages between collection and delivery. Longer-term investigations continued into remote coding using 
CCTV and, as ever, the use of Optical Character Recognition (OCR) with artificial intelligence. If 
machines could ‘read’ the postcodes on letters with high reliability, which was still a distant prospect, the 
need for coding desk operators – the last significant ‘manual’ stage in sorting – was removed. R14’s 
continued pursuit of a viable OCR solution against strong budgetary pressures revealed a faith in the 
potential of their technology and gave a sense of mission to all interim designs along this path. Heading 
OCR Research was A.W.M. Coombes who, in May 1970, told The Times that the long term value of their 
contributions to computerised character recognition went beyond solving problems in postal sorting. His 
team took a cybernetic approach in modelling their future machine on three stages of human cognition: 
sight, interpretation and decision-making. Designing a computer which might reliably recognise patterns 
and shapes was a ‘first step’ towards machine intelligence, he believed. 
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Twenty-five years from now we will be in the middle of the next revolution, following the computer 
revolution. Machines will be robots, doing things which are intelligent. They will do things we now say 
need a high degree of mental ability and agility.
44
 
Already, de Jong and Piggott were trialling new computer programmes ‘with machine learning 
capabilities’ for controlling the recognition process. ‘The philosophy guiding this programme’, they wrote 
in late 1971, ‘provides for progress in defined stages with demonstrations of performance at appropriate 
points as a check on progress, feasibility and economic prospects’.45 The final goal was eventually to have 
sorting offices controlled by a single computer overseeing all data-flow and machine operation.
46
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In the meantime, they looked for improved medium-term solutions in code-sorting. As the man-
machine interface, R14 and PMBD viewed the coding desk as the point in the system in greatest need of 
re-design. This was a priority reinforced by staff feedback, with urgency added by the UPW embargo in 
1972 and other protests that were mostly absent when the LPP was first announced.
48
 Criticism from 
outside the PO was also heard between 1972-5. As the embargo wore on, the wisdom of mechanisation 
and its underlying R&D was questioned in the newspapers, in Parliament and eventually in a 
Parliamentary Inquiry. In March 1972 the Labour Whip, John Golding, put it to Christopher Chataway in 
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the House of Commons that ‘the slowness of the introduction of postal mechanisation is proving self-
defeating and that it is thought within the business that much of the equipment being ordered will be 
obsolescent by the time it is used’.49 In January 1973 The Times published details of the unused machines 
in London, Cardiff and York. A PO official denied mechanisation was being delayed but said that it was 
taking a ‘natural break’ while unions were consulted in a review.50 The following year, in the House of 
Lords, William Anstruther-Gray, who had been Assistant Postmaster General in 1945, voiced his low 
opinion of the entire postcode scheme. ‘...these extra letters and numerals seem to have no rhyme or 
reason behind them, and ... it is almost impossible for one to remember them unless one happens to have 
the address in front of one on a desk’.51 This echoed the popular complaint that typists and secretaries 
across Britain, not to mention the public, were wasting their time with codes that were not used by 
postmen.
52
 The CBI, too, highlighted the frustrations of many large companies which had converted their 
address systems based on postcodes, at great cost, only to see no progress by the PO or any sign of a 
rebate for pre-coded mail. They also criticised the UPW for its obstructions which, they argued, 
jeopardised the future of their own industry and ‘damaged the previous high regard in which postmen 
were held in the community’.53 
The Mail Users’ Association offered the most detailed public critique in its 34 page submission to 
the Carter Committee, which upheld staff concerns over the de-skilling and isolating nature of code-
sorting. Though their technical brilliance was admitted, serious questions were raised about the design of 
the machines and of the overall system, with PO engineers accused of a failure to understand what 
changes sorting staff would accept in their working environments. They criticised delays in the 
programme, failure to implement OCR for printed business mail sooner, high administration costs, poor 
promotion of postcodes and increasing fixed costs at a time of uncertainty over future mail trends. They 
concluded that job satisfaction would be damaged as button-pushing obviated the skills of frame sorting, 
and that commissioning larger offices might exacerbate already tense industrial relations. 
The MUA believes inadequate attention was paid to the human relations implications of mechanisation. In 
1970 a conference of British Postal Engineering did not mention the problems. Industrial relations is not 
mentioned at all in the 350 page report. A paper of “Special Environmental Problems Associated with 
Mechanised Sorting Offices” was presented; however, the quality of thinking was of pre-Hawthorne 
standard. It commented, “sorting office fenestration can profitably be restricted to that necessary to avoid 
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any ‘sealed in feeling’ by the staff”. MUA believes the effects on the informal work structure have been 
underestimated. Mechanisation will tend to result in loss of job autonomy and the breaking up of working 
groups. This could result in the anomie that is prevalent in many production line systems becoming a 
feature of postal employment.
54
 
The MUA denied being motivated by ‘schadenfreude’, adding that the PO had ‘generated quite enough 
dogma on the subject of mechanisation’ and that, through higher postage costs, their members would be 
‘compelled... to pick up the bills for any mistakes’.55 They continued by arguing that the costing of the 
revalidation had been inadequately audited by the government and that mechanisation displayed the 
characteristic shortcomings of public sector capital investment. 
The pattern is typically: over optimistic forecasts, work begins, delays occur, work continues sporadically, 
industry becomes “locked into” project, point of irreversibility passed, true costs revealed showing benefits 
illusory. At this latter stage all those with special interests point out that there is no going back and that 
examination of previous errors will accomplish little and may even be harmful.
56
 
The delays and the small proportion of mail then being handled mechanically were, they concluded, 
bringing postcodes into disrepute.
57
 
This critique, though justified in parts and supplemented by a sizeable alternative financial 
analysis, in several places presented a straw man of PO incompetence in using rhetorical language and 
reductionist reasoning. The criticism that PO engineers demonstrated an incurious attitude to human 
factors was a particular caricature. References were made to a comment at the 1970 postal engineering 
conference that the PO was considering building sorting offices with no natural light. D.V. Davey, an 
Assistant Staff Engineer, was quoted as saying: ‘I consider there is a case for a “windowless sorting 
factory”’.58 But, in context, this was speculation during a discussion about how to reduce overly stuffy 
sorting offices. Davey went on to cite Croydon’s west wall which was 85% glass and raised the 
temperature on hot days. Others agreed that the variability of sunlight was not always welcome and that 
refining colour schemes and lighting configurations might be easier on the eyes. The discussion was 
strictly about the investigation into 25% windows in south and west facing walls and improving lighting 
and colour contrasts. They were cognisant, too, of developments elsewhere in industry where ‘total 
energy systems’ were being introduced and affecting the placing of windows in factory designs.59 This 
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misrepresentation of the windows discussion was later repeated by Michael Corby,
60
 and more recently 
echoed by Duncan Campbell-Smith, whose criticism was based on the absence of the term “industrial 
relations” in the index of the proceedings of the 1970 postal engineering conference.61 
Very little in the MUA submission will have surprised POMB who saw it as an elaborate version 
of arguments increasingly heard from within the PO after 1971. Some criticism was felt to be 
constructive, some politically motivated and some ill-informed, but, taken together, these were pressures 
keenly felt. During a dispute in 1971 between R&D and Training Division over the quality of staff 
training experiments, Copping asked Training for a more detailed, thorough approach in procedures at 
Croydon where there were problems with the methods used for acquiring data on, and monitoring the 
performance of, operators. When D.V. Davy, who was by then Head of Training, took the critique as an 
insult (‘If you were not such a nice chap I would be writing you a very rude reply’), Copping reminded 
him of the virtues of a thick skin when trying to implement change. ‘I cannot help wondering how you 
would have reacted to the criticism open and implied that we in DD1 have had to live with over the last 
3/4 years’.62 
In addition to outside complaints, it is evident that the core demands attending the first wave of 
implementation had stretched the resources and abilities of Copping and his colleagues to the limit, as he 
explained in his February 1973 branch report. 
After the birth of the old Planning & Mechanisation Dept. [1968] my branch held its breath for two or three 
years for fear of a fiasco… As it turned out the commissioning and settling down period for a new office 
became a matter of years rather than weeks but happily the rejection of mechanisation on purely technical 
grounds was just avoided. I began to breathe again and development engineers ceased to be frantically 
occupied in patching the ship in mid-ocean just to keep it afloat.
63
 
One response to these pressures was a more visible and prominent commitment to improving the code-
sort system, later promoted as the most important aspect of the revalidation exercise.
64
 This was not mere 
posturing to appease the UPW membership, but rather reflected a genuine shift in design philosophy in 
which worker wellbeing was elevated as a design principle. From 1971, shaped by experience of the first 
wave of installations, a more consistent and focussed concern with ergonomics and human factors was 
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evident in statements concerning new ideas and directions in R&D. Though attempting an evidence-based 
understanding of human psychology and physiology was a longstanding feature of postal engineering, its 
significance increased after 1971. Copping’s defining paper in 1958 on the future of sorting machines 
recognised the need for sound ergonomics as a means of improving operational efficiency. ‘In any 
process which is controlled directly by a human operator’, he noted, ‘the working conditions of that 
operator have a considerable bearing on the overall efficiency of the man/machine combination’. But with 
the priority at that stage still focused on overcoming the still considerable technical difficulties, he treated 
questions of staff, ergonomics and psychology in a cursory discussion under the heading ‘Ancillary 
Problems’.65 In 1971, by contrast, de Jong and Piggott were presenting a case to the Management Board 
for extending human factors research over a wider range of engineering: 
This work [human factors research] is of major significance to the labour intensive Postal Business which 
inevitably involves many important man-machine interfaces. Mechanisation in its earliest phases led to the 
initiation of PO work in this field. Present Human Factors work for the business is concentrated on tasks 
related to the current letter code sorting system (i.e. keyboard designs). A need exists for an expansion of 
this work to embrace parcel sorting and to provide a firm basis for the design of other systems involving 
changes in the man-machine relationship.
66
 
Though surviving the rigors of live operation in a technical and operational sense, the first-generation 
machines were by no means acceptable to many of the staff expected to work them. The technology had 
reached a stage that demanded an ergonomic focus if the next generation in design was to maximise its 
contribution to sorting productivity, and so a shift in outlook was in some ways the logical development. 
As it happened, this coincided with a period in which emphasising the virtues of progressive, human-
centred industrial design became an ever more prudent political gesture. Certainly, as Copping construed 
it retrospectively, it was an obvious area for improvement in code-sorting and ergonomics was the major 
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Design objectives for a second generation of machines 
 
Shifts in R&D policy took place between the strike in 1971 and the beginning of the embargo fifteen 
months later. A reduction in funding prompted a streamlining of the overall research programme. Long 
term projects were confined, firstly, to reducing reliance on coding desks through experiments with a 
CCTV system that would enable some mail to be coded remotely at computer terminals in an office 
environment away from the sorting office floor, and, secondly, to achieving the eventual obsolescence of 
both coding desks and CCTV by continuing research into computerised OCR reading. Over the medium 
term, projects likely to produce quick savings and reduce production costs were favoured. However, in all 
cases, the department’s design philosophy was altered by placing greater weight on human factors 
research and a fresh emphasis on man-machine interfaces. What effects would this have on changing the 
attributes of code-sort machinery? What objectives were established, by whom were they initiated, and 
when? 
The desire for a more parsimonious solution to letter presentation had long been discussed and ideas were 
circulating in the late 1960s about a design in which the movement of letters was unbroken and seamless. 
M.S. Agate, Senior Executive Engineer, raised the issue in a discussion session at the 1970 conference:  
The coding desk is the only letter handling machine in which, of necessity, the letter has to be brought to 
rest several times; it is the basic cause of the complexity of the machine and many elegant solutions have 
been produced to meet these requirements. Present day thinking is towards a simple constant velocity letter 
transporting system with coding and printing operations completed without halting the letter. The current 
philosophy is the reduction of the mechanical content of the machines with electronics as the replacement, 
and where maintenance procedures are built around throw-away capsules.
68
 
Nevertheless, it is Eric Hills who is credited with envisioning a new kind of coding desk and charting its 
design path. Hills was a senior figure in the engineering hierarchy by the 1970s, overseeing the work of 
the Development Divisions, having been instrumental in the design of numerous machines and sub-
systems in the 1960s, including belt systems for stacking and destacking letters, electronic scanning units 
and synchronisation and control systems. (Detailed minutes of meetings in 1962-3 between PO 
Engineering and the contractors Elliot Automation on the design of the “Reader-Feeder” unit for the 
SPLSM provide insight into the intricate problem-solving with which Copping and Hills engaged).
69
 
David Evans, who worked with Hills on the mechanics and control system for the Easy View, remembers 
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Hills sharing his opinion that the workstations he had helped create were constrictive and ill-suited to 
efficient, comfortable reading. 
He thought that the coding desks that were being developed at the time were inherently wrong in their 
design... His view was that the earlier machines that they’d had all presented the mail with the person 
effectively sitting bolt upright in the air looking straight across and keying the image. His view was that it 
would be far easier if the letters were presented in the same way that you would hold a book. So his 
concept was what we call the “The Easy View Coding Desk”.70 
Hills’ ideas received consideration during 1971 as the first-generation C6 Coding Desk was undergoing 
re-engineering prior to expected bulk orders. Urgent time pressures at that stage confined this work to 
improving assembly, reliability and maintenance features, which ‘precluded lengthy deliberation of 
fundamental design questions’. Thereafter, Hills had the opportunity to elaborate his concept and it was 
soon favoured over a competing two-window design similar to the C6, to the extent that top-down coding 
was in time recognised as obsolete.
71
 From the financial and operational perspectives, it had the great 
advantage of mechanical simplicity compared with its predecessors, which gave credible prospects for 
greater reliability in use and a potential 50% reduction in production costs.
72
 
These were among the conclusions of a review into all aspects of the coding desk in which special 
attention was given to ‘operator comfort, mechanical simplicity, reliability, cost and compatibility with 
other machines in the letter-sorting system’.73 These were the main operational requirements established: 
a. Unlike the previous design of coding desks which had a height of approximately 2m, the new coding desk 
had to be designed to a height approximating to that of an office desk. 
b. The coding desk should be ergonomically matched to the operator. 
c. The capital cost should be low. 
d. The floor space taken up by the coding desk and its operator should not exceed that of the earlier types of 
coding desk. 
e. The supply of letters to a suite of coding desks should be replenished automatically from a single letter feed 
point. (This requirement was later dropped in favour of the hand loading of individual coding desks.) 
f. The coding desks should fit together to enable a coding suite to be assembled, and positioned such as to be 
compatible with the office traffic-flow pattern, thus minimising the transportation of mail within an office. 
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g. After coding, letters from all the desks forming a suite should be collected by a single aggregating belt and 
fed automatically to letter sorting equipment. 
h. The intrinsic rate (that is, the rate at which letters can be presented to the coding-desk operator) should be 
fast enough to prevent frustration of the fastest operator.
74 
In addition, four general design constraints were specified: 
a. Simple and reliable mechanics. 
b. Low maintenance cost. 
c. Use of established letter-handling principals. 
d. Minimal effect on the sorting office environment; in particular, a low noise level.75 
 





The most acute need for change was in the ergonomics of how letters were presented to the 
operator and, explained Evans, Hills and Wicken, ‘it was from this aspect that the new design of coding 
desk evolved. One of the prime aims of the coding-desk design was to ensure that it would fit the person 
required to operate it’.77 Three research areas were defined for the tackling problem: letter presentation, 
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physiology (seating posture, leg space, elbow room etc.) and environmental factors (noise, heat and dust). 
These specifications were drawn up during 1972 and were drawn in as a central feature of Engineering’s 
contribution to the revalidation. Moreover, the Easy View was by 1973 formally incorporated into a 
broader project of redesign encompassing the full range of code-sort machinery, dubbed the “second 
generation”, referring to all machines in a code-sort suite. At this level, the goals were to improve 
performance through more accuracy and speed in letter handling, and to integrate the different stages – 
segregation, facing, cancelling, coding and automatic sorting – into an automated whole. This would 
require automatic feeders and replenishers to tie various stages together, such as the high speed pre-sorter 
then being tested which added an extra stage of segregation into four stacks of mail exiting the coding 
desks and entering the Automatic Sorting Machines. The overall vision was for ‘a new low cost integrated 
modular code-sorting system’ to become ‘the national standard for MLOs’.78 
Thus the Easy View was the centrepiece of a raft of improvements to code-sort hardware and the 
timing of the embargo and revalidation presented an opportunity to fashion what might otherwise have 
been ongoing, incremental improvements into a more coherent package. With one eye on the bigger 
picture, redesigning the individual building blocks of the first generation system was clearly anticipated 
from the late 1960s. However a detailed appreciation of exactly which features needed changing and in 
what ways was not entirely possible until there had been time to assess how first generation machines 
performed live and on a wider scale than the early trial offices alone. As de Jong observed in 1971, there 
was a need to react to the initial wave of implementation and the problems this raised if the next phase in 
design was to succeed. ‘The specification and design of these future machines’ he wrote, ‘is made 
possible by the knowledge and unique experience available and through feedback arising from 
maintenance and operational experience’.79 
 
Re-engineering the working environment: noise, heat, dust and isolation 
 
The subject of some stronger complaints made at the UPW conference in 1972 was the increase in heat, 
noise and dust produced by the machines and these grievances became a mainstay of UPW commentary 
on mechanisation through the 1970s. For some, the spread of code-sorting was associated with 
deterioration in the working environment. The 24 coding desks at Brighton were at one stage described as 
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‘the equivalent to 24 two-bar electric fires’ pushing temperatures over 100 °F in summer 80 These were 
longstanding issues in sorting offices studied by postal engineers, dating back in the case of dust to at 
least the 1930s when bag-cleaning machines and mechanical dust extractors were first developed. The 
dusty air created by the erosion of envelopes and wrapping fibres had long been a problem in sorting 
offices which was progressively exacerbated by mechanical handling. After the war, concerns about 
heating and ventilation at London’s Mount Pleasant precipitated a range of humidity, temperature and air 
quality measurements for comparison with outside industries. S. Scott of the Mechanical Aids Committee 
described dust as ‘an inescapable concomitant of work in sorting offices’.81 The problem was still alive a 
decade later, despite improvements to extractor fans and bag cleaning processes. Even so, the strength of 
protest in the early 1970s was not anticipated by the Board before initial implementation. In 1966, after 
three weeks inspecting large sorting offices in America and Canada seeking reassurance that the British 
plan was ‘sufficiently ambitious’, the Board concluded that their own in-house R&D led to more staff-
friendly machines. In contrast to the British PO, the USPS gave private manufacturers such as Philco in 
Washington a ‘free hand’ in designing machinery. ‘The noise level was high and certainly greater than 
would be acceptable in this country’, their visit confirmed. ‘Safety standards were inferior’.82 They felt 
their optimism was justified by the fruits of the PO’s post-war design process in which union input was 
ever-present. Aware of the inevitability of outside scrutiny, one of the founding goals established in 1947 
was to liberate the operator from the rhythm of the machine as a prerequisite for a psychologically 




In discussions at the 1970 postal engineering conference, G.N. Davison, Staff Engineer, attributed 
the decision to untie operators from the rhythm of the machine to a design philosophy which had always 
prioritised human factors, referring especially to the ideas of John Piggott. The allocation of codes to the 
keys of the first 12x12 keyboard was based, he said, on ergonomic principles. 
The operators had to learn and memorize two-letter codes, some logical and others arbitrary. Later the 
operators learned by associating particular finger positions with corresponding destinations, without any 
reference to alphabetical codes.
84
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In a similar spirit, de Jong pointed to the Ergonomics Department at Dollis Hill and the wide range of 
outside experts consulted as an indication that this tradition was still alive and well. He added that 
ergonomics in postal automation was not an exact science owing to the many different psychological 
dispositions found among the mass of staff with which their machines interacted. 
We may be near to inventing an apparently intelligent robot but I think we are a long way from producing 
the standard man which these problems of ergonomics etc. seem to me to require. One man’s meat is 
another man’s poison and what suits one doesn’t suit the other. There are many variants to cope with and a 
compromise solution to meet partially everybody’s individual tastes may be as near to the ideal indicated 
by the science of ergonomic studies as we can go. I have no doubt about the contribution ergonomics can 
make to improving the machines that we do design.
85
 
Part of the purpose of the technical field trials in Bath, Luton and Norwich was to understand how 
staff reacted to different machine set-ups and to gather their views; a dialogue preserved in the 
correspondence that flowed between local staff representatives and the official management/engineering 
side. Though little organised opposition occurred during the post-war trials – on the contrary goodwill 
and support prevailed – many of the grievances that exploded in the 1970s had been voiced for decades 
on a smaller scale, with questions raised over allowances for mechanised working, shift durations and 
health.
86
 Concern was expressed on the Mechanical Aids Committee from the late 1950s onwards that, in 
replacing traditional frame sorting, coding lessened the need for geographical knowledge and might 
deskill sorting – something acknowledged by engineers T. Pilling and P.S. Gerard, who in a 1961 article 
in the PO Electrical Engineering Journal wrote about the Luton trials, commenting that reducing reliance 
on the skill and memory of staff would mean ‘a less skilled sorter can be employed’.87 When the UPW 
accepted the LPP in principle in 1969 they expressed caution on these grounds, warning of reservations 
about the machine’s affects on the working environment following discussions with the Norwich branch. 
‘We have in mind… such important issues as noise levels, space standards and ventilation’. The Board 
responded with pledges to develop special acoustic treatments in trial offices as well as redesigning the 
machines to minimise noise and heat.
88
  
It was discovered after the first wave of implementation that, although there was complaint about 
the greater heat and noise, staff reactions were quite varied from one person to the next and from office to 
office. A complex picture of how staff took to the new working practices emerged in which an 
individual’s perception of mechanisation seemed to be shaped by factors such as length of service, how 
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well moving into the new building had gone or regional variations in attitudes to management policies. 
Some saw a certain prestige in code-sorting while others saw it as another encroachment from an 
impersonal Headquarters. Where industrial relations were poor, mechanisation tended to receive greater 
criticism. Discerning trends in the staff response was therefore problematic, prompting fresh IR research 
seeking first to compile staff opinions about code-sorting and then attempting to understand their political 
meaning. In September 1970 R.M. Tabor of the University of Warwick’s School of Industrial and 
Business Studies completed a commissioned report, Industrial Relations Problems of the Management of 
Change in the Postal Business, which examined relations between staff and management during the 
commissioning of MLOS in Croydon (South London) and Newport (near Cardiff in Wales). Based on 
documentation, discussions with management and around 70 interviews with postmen and supervisors, 
Tabor concluded that grievances over code-sorting, ‘which involves the working man more than any other 
of the recent changes’, stemmed both from excessive noise (‘a ubiquitous source of complaint’) and 
isolation from fellow workers. The statement by one Croydon postman: ‘You’re more remote now. We 
seem to be split up somehow’, was agreed by the majority of those questioned.89 He found that coding 
tied people to a single position in the sorting office and made chatting with colleagues more difficult. ‘I 
hate to be told not to talk’, said one postman. ‘I can work as fast when I’m talking and as accurate. I learnt 
to “whistle and ride” a long time ago’. Tabor observed: ‘Here is a thing of value to the man at his work 
which he loses when he moves from the manual sorting frame to the coding desk’.90 At Croydon one 
postman explained: ‘The grapevine says the machines are the guvnors now’. There, almost 70% of staff 
agreed with the statement: ‘The machine is controlling you now: you can’t get away from it’.91 Tabor 
argued that there was still much to do to win over the mass of the rank and file and stressed the need for 
better communication between local staff, management and unions and that Headquarters should pay 
attention to the specific problems raised over the new machines, buildings and practices.  
There is at rank and file level a substantial feeling that mechanisation will generally worsen conditions; a 
feeling which should give cause for alarm… This is the sort of situation which fosters the unreasonable 
view that Post Office “high-ups” are given to an ivory tower optimism untempered by an understanding of 
the full operational effects of their decisions.
92
 
Tabor concluded that more attention to staff views and ideas was needed and that the lessons learned from 
Newport and Croydon should guide future implementation.  
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Knowledge about staff attitudes to code-sorting was becoming well developed at both UPW and 
PO Headquarters by the time of the Embargo. As negotiating stances solidified after the announcement, 
Tom Jackson again emphasised to the Board that, alongside, its potential effects on pay, redundancy and 
the relocation of staff, mechanisation was feared for how it changed the working environment. He 
highlighted again how code-sorting reduced contact with work-mates, brought about mechanical 
monitoring of performance and tended towards excessive noise and poor air conditioning.
96
 David 
Stewart, then Director of Operations who was in regular dialogue with Jackson and his union colleague 
Bill Wolfenden, carried a confident tone in the early meetings, highlighting the many studies underway 
and that ‘the solutions were beginning to become apparent’.97 He explained that reducing heat and noise 
at source had become a priority for design engineers.
98
 He was in communication with de Jong and 
Piggott who reported that Engineering had in hand a range of studies on ‘the cause and reduction of 
machine noise, the investigation of frictional and wearing properties of materials and the relationship of 
these factors to machine reliability’.99 They found that an installation of C6 coding desks accounted for 
approximately 20% of ‘total heat gain’ in a mechanised office.100 Meanwhile parallel studies were 
focussed on tightening up parameters for noise, heat and dust, for the design of future machines as well as 
buildings. Investigations in 1970 and 1972 looked at office ventilation and concluded that MLOs needed 
new systems to supply clean air and extract polluted air at 18.3 cubic meters of fresh air per occupant. 
Alternative materials for mail bags and vacuum cleaning machines were also studied. The German PO 
invited a delegation to visit Braunschweig Sorting Office where a new ventilation system boasted 8.5 air-
changes per hour and a glass wall separated air supply and isolated the mechanised area.
101
 By 1972 the 
PO was contracting in systems filtered for airborne dust (in the 10-30 micron range) capable of 10 air-
changes per hour and was working towards a future of universally ventilated offices.
102
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On noise, a study group established in March 1971 recommended a maximum of 79dBA per 
working position.
103
 In machine design there had already been significant developments in this respect 
and some of the complexities involved were increasingly apparent by the late 1960s. When noise 
absorption materials were first built into machines they had the problem of dissipating heat. Acoustic 
foam in the first generation ALF reduced noise levels in the rear of the machine by 5-6 dBA but increased 
temperatures in the logic racks from 37-40 ºC due to thermal conductivity.
104
 New MLOs had been 
designed to minimise noise, heat and dust. The air breathed in a sorting office was conditioned, refreshed 
and circulated several times an hour thanks not only to ventilation systems but decisions made when the 
buildings were commissioned. From the beginning, a choice between an open-plan and modular layout 
was considered, while special arrangements were used for city constructions to keep out street noise. P.E. 
Marriot of the Planning and Mechanisation Department was a key figure in this regard, reckoning in 1970 
that the clear choice for the future was for a sharper focus on the problems of heat, noise and dust. 
When modern operational buildings are designed, there is rightly great emphasis on the need for early, 
close, and continued liaison between architect, engineers, and user. For mechanized sorting offices this is 
particularly so, and lack of early consultation on engineering services can lead to costly and inefficient 
schemes. The demand for flexibility in planning… restricts the engineering services designer in his choice 
of the most efficient and economic design. …it is very desirable that the second generation of mechanized 
offices should be planned with environmental conditions well to the fore.
105
 
Informed judgement was needed in choosing the best insulation arrangements with the aim of 
keeping room temperatures at 70ºF and a move to solar glass helped prevent overheating during summer. 
At the Maintenance Engineering Conference in May 1973 there were calls to standardise the best of these 
measures and an agreement was reached that every building’s control systems should be ‘automatic, 
protected from interference, and control each room by sensors fitted in the room’. Where early decisions 




The engineers of R14 and PMBD certainly took these issues seriously, as evidenced by the very 
particular limits placed on component design as well as by the growing proportion of projected 
production costs taken up by heat-, noise- and dust-reducing innovations. For example, in 1973 the track 
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speed of the belts in the second generation Multi Selection Automatic Sorting Machine (a faster version 
of the ASM) increased from 150 to 195 feet per minute. Higher speeds were desirable and achievable 
(although other requirements such as the need for orderly stacking also placed limits on belt speed) but 
were refused on the grounds that this would make machine noise unacceptably high.
107
 Senior engineer T. 
Pilling told the maintenance conference that noise reduction at source was a long term project, 
commenting that ‘…the cost of noise reduction on an ALF was about 10% of the total cost of the 
machine’. In discussion, one attendee pointed out that more could be done about noise absorption via the 
choice of building materials and singled out Cannon Street and Euston railway stations in London as 
successful examples. It was agreed that Headquarters experts on noise should hold a two day seminar to 
raise awareness of these points among regional management.
108
 
Much of this dovetailed with the wider research programme of the revalidation. The Board’s 
understanding of staff attitudes to mechanisation as expressed in the final report was better researched and 
more nuanced than that which came before, with greater emphasis on the UPW’s requests for improved 
environmental conditions. The report acknowledged the increased noise and heat generated by machines 
but asked that the negatives be weighed against positive effects such as the fact that mechanised sorting 
reduced heavy lifting. It was also observed that the arrival of code-sorting had been a catalyst for 
ergonomic scrutiny. 
At the present time there is more staff awareness than in the past of environmental conditions in sorting 
offices whether or not mechanised procedures are introduced. However, mechanisation has brought these 
misgivings into focus and it is right that the Post Office should give assurances to its employees that they 
will be given the best practicable working conditions.
109
 
Further, there was recognition that rank and file expectations about working conditions had risen across 
British industry and that the PO needed to move with the times. 
With the improvements in the standard of living which have taken place over the years, the environment in 
which people live has become more important. Staff are no longer willing to work in conditions which are 
physically uncomfortable and are very sensitive to any change which might worsen existing manual office 
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The emphasis given to these statements was probably a product of the Board’s need to show they had 
listened to the growing waves of complaint from each UPW conference since 1971. These and similar 
passages were penned with a resolution to the embargo in mind and the report was submitted to the UPW 
before their special mechanisation conference in May 1975. If the Board could be faulted for its failure to 
adequately address these issues earlier, the wide range of ways in which ergonomic and environmental 
design rose to prominence in this period – as measured by the surge of discussion and research into 
building and machine design summarised above – suggests a certain justification for their rhetoric. Even 
so, by the Board’s own admission, part of the challenge of making the shift in design priorities effective 
was the wide variety of grievances and the difficulty of ordering and defining what mattered to staff in the 
aggregate. The wider improvements in communication and consultation at the PO after 1969 were 
extended to include design choice and design processes. 
 
Union consultation on technical design 
 
Among the new channels of communication opened and strengthened during the course of the 
revalidation was a series of consultations covering the specifics of technical and environmental design. 
Union officials routinely visited Calthorpe House to discuss the latest developments in coding desk and 
sorting machine design.
111
 This benefitted both sides by facilitating a more nuanced, detailed and precise 
understanding of their respective positions and paid dividends in healthier politics and design solutions 
better suited to their intended environment. At a technical level, a “case law” of testing consultation was 
compiled from 1972. In parallel with the wider consultation framework emerging at the PO in this period, 
technical consultation was formalised and extended and, by 1975, had matured to cover three different 
levels of concern. At a network level, the unions were informed in greater detail about fluctuations in 
funding, the methods and content of costing and the overall plans for the pace and character of 
implementation. At a work-environment level, the focus was on heat, noise and dust. On the technical 
level, consultation was used to fine-tune experiments and trials. More broadly, it enabled design 
objectives to take account of the overall pattern of union concerns, encouraging the prioritisation of sub-
projects in ergonomics. A number of committees were formed over this period specifically to provide 
union input on the particulars of noise, heat, dust and the design of machines and their components. This 
contributed to a growing body of knowledge on the human effects of code-sorting and served to underpin 
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a union-management dialogue by embedding a more systematic level of staff-side scrutiny into the design 
process, helping to reposition and tighten the boundaries of design outcomes. 
Environmental conditions in sorting offices became a formal area of consultation after a special 
meeting in 1965. Regular discussions took place every two months thereafter at Norwich, in order to be 
among the machines, until May 1967 when the first Joint Committee was established. Its purpose was to 
involve unions at an earlier stage in design and planning.
112
 This resulted in more closely-defined joint 
studies producing agreed limits and standards on temperature, noise, dust and fenestration, culminating in 
a joint statement in 1975. On temperature, a minimum 16°C was established for all MLOs and a 
commitment was made by the PO to take into account the likely dissipation of heat from machines at the 
design stage. Similar assurances were made regarding noise in acoustically remodelling walls, floors and 
ceilings and using rubber instead of metal in machine components where possible. Similar agreements 
were struck over ventilation and lighting.
113
 Following several joint visits to operational MLOs, the UPW 
told the Board early in 1973 that, in general, the staff response to this was positive, though complaints 
continued. The change in the working atmosphere following an installation was often adverse, with many 
staff saying they felt isolated from their co-workers while on code-sort duties. Steps had been taken to 
alleviate this, such as setting maximum coding stints at two hours and ensuring that mechanised working 
was mixed with other manual duties to provide variation. This was reported in The Post alongside the 
announcement of the revalidation, the purpose of which not only to improve existing buildings and 
machines but to eliminate problems at source in future. Trials using nylon bearings on diverters to help 
reduce noise were promised, as were more water vending machines, rest rooms and shower facilities such 
as those at the newer MLOs in Southampton and Cardiff.
114
  
Roland Worth took the lead as COPOU negotiator in these matters after a long record of service 
with the UPW as Branch Official and District Organiser. He became Secretary of the Departmental Staff 
Side in 1963 and was involved in negotiations over the PO Act, 1969.
115
 Worth made a formal request for 
consultation on R&D during the first meeting of the Joint Committee on Buildings and Mechanisation 
(BMC) on 28 April 1972.
116
 When the BMC met again after the embargo, a new set of procedures for 
technological consultation had been drafted. All new or altered technologies involving changes in 
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working practice were to be subject to local and national consultation. Part of the purpose of opening up 
the engineering process in this way, it was agreed, was to build up a ‘case law’ for understanding changes 
in working practice, and a (non-legally-enforceable) statement titled ‘Postal Mechanisation Experiments 
and Field Trials’ guaranteed this. Laboratory work, once brought to the brink of initial trials in live 
sorting office conditions, would be reviewed by the BMC for COPOU scrutiny. The relevant engineering 
branch controller was required to provide details of an experiment’s aims, methods and duration. Each 
was thereafter reviewed periodically and the results discussed before an implementation decision was 
made.
117
 By the year’s end reports on visual perception, short-term memory, and the ability to learn and 
apply the basic principles of coding were discussed. Moreover, COPOU learned more about the second 
generation project. Bonnett explained this would ‘enable the Postal Business to move towards a firmer 
plan which … would allow marked progress on the mechanisation front’.118 
The resulting case law grew over the following two years. One example is the trials of LOCUM 
(Letter Office Computerised Monitor) in which a computer system originally designed to monitor the 
performance of ALFs and ASMs produced information for maintenance engineers. It was later adapted to 
collect additional information for work measurement and operator productivity, though this was received 
cautiously by the union as it could feed into a future work measurement system. Another example was the 
live trials with electronic solid-state memory controllers at Norwich in January 1973; just one aspect of a 
long-term sub-project aiming to settle designs for a cheaper and more reliable alternative to the pin-wheel 
memory system used in sorting machines. Through trials and consultation, problems were exposed and 
defined, precipitating a new design of printed circuit board.
119
 This was of great significance to PO 
engineers as it led to the first use of micro-electronics in British industry.
120
 John Piggott, speaking at the 
Committee for the last time before his retirement, took the opportunity to expand on his philosophy of 
development and at which points in the process he felt consultation was appropriate.  
An idea for a change of practice could originate from any source. The change foreseen might range from an 
alteration to a technical spec. (e.g. different materials used) to a new operating or maintenance procedure. 
The idea might first be tested in the laboratory in embryo, where there would be no changes in working 
conditions so that the experiment would not necessarily be included on a notification list at that stage. 
(Ideas were sometimes abandoned after first test). If the tests were encouraging, a further step could be to 
try out a manufactures prototype at the factory, again not necessarily involving a change in working 
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practices for PO staff. If, however, the next stage was to test live mail at the factory, or on PO premises, 
this would of course involve a change in practice requiring prior notification.
121
 
Piggott stressed he was keen to ‘separate changes in design technology from changes which would affect 
working practices’, pressing for clearer criteria governing which types of R&D should be added to the 
case law.
122
 Such fine tuning of communication channels had been an objective of the revalidation which 
had in turn been characterised by the PO’s wider commitment to embedding new joint forums into IR 
machinery in the post-civil service years. PO unionism of course had distinctive traditions of bargaining 
and communication and had long played important roles whenever operational changes took place, but 
the LPP was unprecedented in its scope and duration and, through first and then second generations of 
technology, a strengthened consultative format evolved to match. The benefit of this as it applied to case 
law was its avoidance of unnecessary consultation at the laboratory stage. Piggott’s message was to 
continue the conversation about how to streamline the process of change, while balancing effective, 
timely innovation with the need for methodical, good-willed consultation, which acknowledged the 




After the package deal was agreed in 1975 a new wave of installation projects began. In October, staff at 
Redhill operated the first batch of Easy-View coding desks. These were connected in banks which fed 
coded mail to new high speed automatic sorting machines, which utilised a new computer system based 
on micro-electronics to translate codes into correct sortation. Second generation installations were tied 
together with individualised sorting plans running from a central system enabling speeds of 20,000 letters 
per hour. Redhill soon successfully handled 300,000 items a day, which encouraged the Board to make 
bulk orders in the following years.
123
 Immediately after the launch, the Letter Mechanisation sub-
committee of the BMC convened to discuss how this would unfold, focussing on phasing in letter 
concentration upon existing MLOs and bringing new offices into the emerging system, starting 
immediately with Cardiff, London (West Central District Office) and York, Doncaster, Dartford (briefly, 
before further union opposition) and Guildford followed. Eric Hills voiced his gratitude to the staff ‘who 
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helped during the difficult days of laboratory trials’.124 Bill Wolfenden (UPW) agreed that the 
collaboration had resulted in an improved system which changed the working environment for the better. 
Second generation machines were more cost effective, more reliable and provided an elegant solution to 
the problems of letter presentation. The pre-reading technique previously involving a drop-down, two-
window arrangement – a longstanding feature fashioned at great expense in mechanical complexity – was 
replaced in the Easy View provided ‘for free’ thanks to the horizontal easel which was integrated with a 
destacker to deliver smoother, seamless presentation of letters in ‘a single simple system without the need 
for mechanisms to stop, start, or change the axis of movement of the letters’.125 This was a radical 
departure and a reflection of the premium placed on faster speeds, lower costs and a more comfortable 
and conducive experience for its operators. 
 Connections between the politics of mechanisation and its re-engineering in the second 
generation of buildings and machines, found expression in the adaptation of an engineering philosophy 
which emphasised solving the human problems of code-sorting. The participation of staff and unions in 
this process became more explicit and involved in this period, as the views of staff representing all 
effected grades were probed with questionnaires and through consultations. This had a tangible impact on 
the objectives established and the outcomes reached. It also coincided with funding reductions which 
prompted the Engineering Department to reprioritise its projects and refocus the field of postal 
automation by drawing on its institutional resources in telecommunications and computing and making 
new connections between basic research, operational inquiries and the translation of ergonomic theories 
into practice. Subsequent external audits of code-sorting confirmed the benefits of the post-revalidation 
working environment, though for years serious reservations remained over the appropriateness of 
instituting data-entry work in factory conditions. In 1985, a six-month study by the University of 
Nottingham’s Department of Production Engineering and Management analysed operations at eight 
MLOs. They found that problems remained with the ‘paced, repetitive, low-initiative nature of the tasks, 
the pressure from performance targets, and some inadequacies in feedback’.126 Their recommendations 
highlighted again the fundamental dilemma of code-sorting in that ‘the result was similar to setting up a 
typing pool in the middle of a factory shop floor’.127 The remedy was to cultivate an ‘anthropomorphic’ 
approach and grapple again with the ‘social wellbeing of workers’ by eschewing the idea that new 
technology determined the nature and shape of jobs, adopting instead a ‘human-centred rather than 
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technocratic approach’.128 The concentration required for effective and comfortable coding was ill-suited 
to a busy, noisy, warehouse-type environment. 
The problems can be seen to be largely the result of the fairly drastic and rapid transition, by the Post 
Office, from its long tradition of manually orientated work. Such a change necessitates greater 
environmental and organisational alterations than the Post office perhaps planned.
129
 
This in effect restated the problem of the man-machine interface for which long-term R&D into CCTV 
coding and, ultimately, OCR reading continued. For all its improvements, redesigning sorting office 
machinery could not resolve the inherent flaw in the code-sort concept which was the incongruity of the 
job with its environment. However it did provide another stepping stone towards increasingly satisfactory 
solutions. From this perspective, the Easy-View was a transitional technology that helped bridge the gap 
between the full automation envisioned in 1948 and the obsolescence of the coding desk in the early 
twenty-first century. The transition from planning to implementation is a theme taken up in the final 
chapter which addresses the question of how staff were trained for the code-sort era. 
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This chapter focuses on the history of staff training for mechanisation in the 1960s and 70s. It describes 
how training of rank-and-file staff and the Inspectorate (Head Postmasters and sorting office managers) 
was changed in order to operate MLOs, the concepts and techniques used in developing teaching 
programmes and how their criteria were entwined with the political and operational realities of both 
sorting office life and of the wider institutional context. Training was a crucial component of the broader 
mechanisation project and the final stage in equipping the staff with the knowledge and skills required to 
make the revalidated system functional. The negative consequences of ineffective training, even in the 
smallest degree, could be long-term and have wide ranging consequences and, as will be shown, new 
methods were chosen after several years of experiment and debate during which questions of worker 
psychology and the relationship between the machines and the wider system were paramount. The critical 
area was teaching staff to use coding desks but this also formed part of a raft of measures for all affected 
staff-types. MLO managers found that clearing a day’s post presented new challenges compared with 
their traditional responsibilities, while ancillary workers were needed to mind the machines and feed them 
with letters. In each case, training was important in shaping the content of people’s work and their 
attitudes towards it. The resulting policies were informed by new philosophies about training which 
entered the organisation in the mid-1960s. Thereafter the Board supported a more scientific “programmed 
learning” approach, encouraged from 1965 by McKinsey’s and, in code-sorting, found that the postal 
service was presented with its first major opportunity to develop training schemes based on new 
techniques in behavioural science and systematic research. Again, engineering played a critical role in this 
process, most notably in pushing the frontiers of keyboard ergonomics and in the creation of specialised 
training machines. However, because the greatest challenges to successful recruitment and training were 
found in workplace politics and the employment market, tensions between the Engineering and Personnel 
Departments grew. These and a number of related developments are appraised here in an effort to better 
understand the transition from planning in the late 1960s to wider implementation after 1975. 
 Due to its high labour-intensity, the postal service has a long history of developing and improving 
its policies for recruitment and instruction and in the twentieth century this became a major, multifaceted 
educational undertaking, predominantly organised internally but supplemented by universities, colleges 
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and business schools. In total, education cost the PO around £50m per year in the mid-1970s.
1
 However 
the specifics of how it took place in the postal service and how it was adapted to the entrance of new 
technologies have not been explored. What policies were developed and how were they shaped by the 
different stakeholders? How did the attitudes and goals of management, staff and engineers differ over 
training? The chapter begins with an investigation of new ways of thinking about training entering the 
industry in the 1960s and how this contributed to an enrichment of management education. Attention is 
then turned to a series of projects for developing the technology of training. The need to incorporate a 
motivational message and to understand the psychology of keyboard operation highlights how 
programmed learning was balanced with a human centred approach concerned with improving industrial 
relations. The role of postal engineers in developing the code-sort training programme is analysed, with 
emphasis placed on trials in keyboard ergonomics and efficiency; on their efforts to design a training 
machine; and how this led to their hitherto driving role in mechanisation being questioned, as the 
Personnel department assumed wider responsibilities. Finally, some of the difficulties in recruitment and 
selection and the links between training and the labour market are summarised. 
Some historians, economists and industrial sociologists have noted that poor training provision 
contributed to the British productivity problem and that international comparisons are unfavourable.
2
 Paul 
Chapman states that ‘It has become widely accepted that one of the major factors in the poor economic 
performance of the UK economy has been the inadequacy of VET [vocational education and training] 
policies’, yet notes that our understanding of industrial training processes is limited.3 Ewart Keep and Ken 
Mayhew have observed that the human capital shortcomings in the 1990s had deep historical roots and 
that debates about the role of the state in training have been live for over a century.
4
 Before the 1960s, 
training in Britain was mostly left to individual firms and institutions until the need for a more systematic 
analysis was highlighted by the Ministry of Labour and National Service in 1958, eventually leading to 
the Industrial Training Act, 1964. A White Paper in 1962 outlined the goal as enabling ‘decisions on the 
scale of training to be better related to economic needs and technological developments’.5 Industrial 
Training Boards were established to advise on programmes and offered a levy-grant funding scheme in 
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which firms could claim refunds on their taxes provided certain training standards were met.
6
 In the 1970s 
there was understood to be a ‘duel aspect of training’ covering both the economic gains to individual 
firms and ‘the social importance of wider opportunities for individuals’.7 The Donovan Commission saw 
training as a prime example of the inefficient use of manpower, where craft tradition and obstructionism 
were in play, and it recommended strengthening the resources of industrial training boards.
8
 During the 
1970s and 80s, more and more money was devoted to training systems. Many analysts viewed this as a 
by-product of the long-term shift to white collar employment and the diffusion of automated systems. 
Management surveys showed that the purpose of training was ordinarily linked with the pursuit of 
organisational efficiency, and, in general, automation created jobs requiring new forms of training.
9
 
Industrial sociologists began to note in the 1980s that training rank and file staff in automated factories 
tended to include education about the wider workings of a technological system because operators 
endowed with a contextual understanding of the larger process tended to be more competent and 
motivated than those limited to narrower forms of training.
10
 This chapter argues that, although the PO 
was not covered by the remit of the first training boards and was largely left to manage its own training, 
several developments in the fields of behavioural science, education and human capital during the period 
of reform had considerable effects in the postal service. 
  
Programmed learning and behavioural theory in management training 
 
 ‘I suggest that the invention stage of postal mechanization is ending and we face larger problems, such as 
maintenance and operator training’, stated Geoff Copping to colleagues at the first international postal 
engineering conference in 1970. ‘With [the development of] new training equipment we shall have a 
splendid opportunity to learn more about the vital man-machine interface’.11 But the notion of applying 
advanced training equipment in the postal service was a far cry from traditional discussions about how the 
training of postmen might be improved. In the 1950s, the central issue was how to move beyond the 
widespread tradition of ‘on the job’ training where new entrants learned their craft from those with 
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experience. A typical recruit would receive two hours of instruction on his conditions of service and two 
more on postal geography, before being given a tour of the office to meet his colleagues and superiors. He 
might then be taught about the differences between classes of mail or between inward and outward 
sorting, or work on his sorting technique using practice cards before his first duty began, but by and large 
these arrangements had not fundamentally changed since the nineteenth century.
12
 Once sociologists and 
work study experts began entering the workplace before the shift to Corporation status, and with radical 
changes expected from mechanisation, it became obvious that, although many of the traditional methods 
of induction would remain, a new set of techniques was needed. The Board realised this required a change 
in attitude and believed this should begin with the Inspectorate who would oversee the implementation of 
change on a day to day basis. This would bear a resemblance to superimposing the new MLO network 
onto the traditional mail flow system, insofar as new techniques for managing change needed to be 
mapped onto the traditional methods. The old ways, impressed on the inspectorate through experience, 
would be supplemented by a new curriculum based on management theory and behavioural psychology. 
The argument here is that these developments prepared the ground for mechanisation training. The key 
changes were the adoption of programmed learning methods, later applied to code-sort training, and the 
retraining of the inspectorate in behavioural theory and socio-technical systems so that they would be 
prepared for the industrial relations impact of mechanisation. 
Ideas for improving training were always alive in the postal service but they received more 
sustained and systematic attention during the mid-1960s modernisation movement.
13
 Concerted research 
began alongside an influx of work-study specialists following the approach outlined by McKinsey’s 
consultants: to apply ‘systematic, objective and critical examination of all the factors governing 
operational efficiency’ – specifically including staff and management training.14 The 1964 Annual Report 
noted the introduction of a comprehensive series of courses for all grades; including those designed for 
systems analysts and others whose work was being changed by the use of computers.
15
 In 1965 a group of 
senior PO officials visited the USA to learn how “Programmed Learning” (PL) was being applied across a 
range of industries. The phrase was popularised by the behaviourist B.F. Skinner in 1958 who was 
interested in applying systematic, social-scientific research to ‘manage human learning under controlled 
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conditions’.16 The field was burgeoning in America with several large businesses hiring specialists to 
design training plans through preliminary analysis of an occupation’s behaviour and psychology and 
reverse engineering this into feedback-based courses (or, “programmes”) divided into distinct sections 
(“frames”) and in some cases involving bespoke teaching machines. The PO spoke to publishers, 
researchers and training managers on a visit organised primarily for French business executives by the 
consultants CEGOS. Used at 300 of the largest 500 US firms, and pioneered in the pharmaceutical 
industry in teaching sales staff their product ranges and sales techniques, American developments in PL 
impressed PO delegate D.H. Pentecost who returned to London believing that lecture notes, reference 
books and intuition were no longer sufficient for management training and envisioned broad applicability 
of these new methods to many PO occupations. 
...there is now wide recognition that the key to real success with programmed learning lies in the 
thoroughness and skill with which the training job is analysed, breaking down the skills and information to 
be taught in great detail, and building up these skills in the program by using psychologically sound 
teaching techniques.
17 
He saw how this was deployed in the US Postal Service and visited IBM who used over 30 programmed 
courses in data processing, 25 in engineering and six in products, where remote learning by computer was 
being trialled. AT&T was spending 10% of its training budget in a similar way and had also begun to use 
teaching machines, as had the US Navy. At Kodak they witnessed a demonstration of camera assembly 
using a slide-projector synchronised with an instructive audio-tape, with the speed of presentation 
controlled by the student using a foot pedal. There, audio-visual aids and adaptive teaching machines 
evaluated student responses individually or as a group, adjusting the pace and content accordingly. All of 
this encouraged the Board back in Britain, who had already begun commissioning similar programmes for 
selected PO occupations. Their conclusion was that the US influence should continue. 
The Post Office is one of the pioneering organisations developing the business use of this technique in the 
UK, and I suggest that the more advanced work now being done in America should be a major influence in 
our approach since, at the moment, we have little to learn from other British organisations. Contacts with 
sources of information in America, therefore, should be fostered by Training Branch to maintain the present 
pace of our development... Firms like IBM, Univac, Kodak and General Electric continuously surveyed 
existing training methods with a view to adopting improved techniques, and clearly regarded training as 
                                                     
16
 B.F. Skinner, ‘Teaching Machines’, in Science, Vol. 128, No. 3330, 24/10/58, pp.969-977. 
17
 POST 63/42, Visit to the USA to study the business use of programmed learning, April 1965, report by D H 
Pentecost, 1965, p.11. 
213 
 
subject to the same standards of economy and efficiency as any operational activity… These are also 
currently very important objectives of British industry and the PO in particular.
18 
On the strength of Pentecost’s report a research group with expertise in behavioural psychology was 
established to work on automatic keyboard instruction, speed reading, audio-visual training techniques, 
computer-based instruction, and teaching machines. 
 In 1967 the Training Division published GPO New Training Developments: Systems Analysis in 
Training, a pamphlet designed to ease management concerns over the increasing introduction of PL 
courses. The message was clear: training programmes needed to serve management’s strategic objectives 
using systematic techniques. The aim was not to over-elaborate but to organise training with distinctive 
phases, including defining the problem, searching for the facts, choosing between alternatives and 
evaluating the results. The training sequence should be planned, a programme drawn up outlining 
methods, and a syllabus designed, leading to a costed training plan with clearly defined targets. Similar 
care was urged in selecting instructors, choosing accommodation, and in the use of audio-visual aids, 
machines, models or rule books.
19
 Systems analysis also borrowed from “critical path methods” being 
used in telecommunications, in which a network was ‘constructed’ on paper to anticipate the formation of 
the real networks of cooperation necessary for the completion of complex projects.
20
 At a conference of 
Operational and Planning Controllers the following year, D.J. Jarman presented a paper on the subject. 
‘There [has] been traditional disinterest in training and it could be argued that this – together with a 
tendency to provide supplementary training on an unscientific basis – [has] cost us dear’.21 During 
discussion it was suggested that a lack of enthusiasm for training would be a problem, with counter 
training in London cited as an example of the rank and file valuing the length of training over its content 
for the time it gave them away from normal duties. A programmed learning approach was subsequently 
adopted before decimalisation for retraining counter staff in general knowledge, cash handling and 
changes in procedure. Something similar took place on a smaller scale for metrication, involving the 
conversion of 78,000 weighing machines over two years from 1972.
22
 Meanwhile, it was held that 
management tended to view attending courses as ‘routine chores’. The key point raised was that under 
rapidly changing conditions, more regular courses on mail circulation would be required and that 
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supervisors at the larger mechanised offices would benefit from a more scientific approach to their 
training. 
 The changes that came with PL were therefore more extensive than the jargon might suggest. 
Nowhere was this clearer than in the evolution of the curricula taught at the new Postal Management 
College (PMC) at Coton House, Rugby. ‘Our main aims are to convince students’, read the Annual 
training report one year before the PMC opened, ‘that the purpose of life of managers is to help to achieve 
the objectives of the undertaking which employs them… That management is not a combination of hunch, 
intuition and inspired guesswork… but is capable of being tackled in a systematic, methodical, orderly 
way’.23 In its first year Coton House taught over 300 students through dozens of courses. It was the first 
permanent establishment for training management – from Chief Inspector to Head Postmaster – and the 
product of a decision to increase the quantity and quality of management training in the postal service. As 
was outlined to the Hardman Committee in 1971, this was done for several reasons, chiefly to foster 
healthier industrial relations and to facilitate the changes anticipated in mechanisation and the shift to 
Corporation Status. 
This [the establishment of the PMC] has provided an opportunity to expand training, for example in the 
behavioural sciences, in ways which are relevant to and practical within the business. A major aim is to 
underline the importance of good human relationships recognising that results will be obtained in a labour 
intensive industry only if there is a willing commitment to business objectives by the work force. The 
philosophy of the Postal Management College is that change is inevitable and frequently uncomfortable; 
that it is important to win the consent of those directly involved; that participative management is, 
therefore, an essential goal. Problems associated with change are a main theme in training programmes.
24 
One of the courses, titled “The Managerial Grid”, encouraged students to recognise the ‘conflicts of 
interest between the needs of production and the feelings and aspirations of people. It is about attitudes 
and management styles, and the effect which particular styles have or are likely to have on subordinates’. 
Students were asked to consider the wider picture of British industrial relations and heard from union 
officials invited to talk on the courses. By the 1970s, EC members of COPOU were invited to speak at 
each of the twelve general management courses. (Union training was encouraged through leave with pay 
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for a range of courses).
25
 Other outside speakers included the Oxford industrial relations academics 
Arthur Marsh and G. Bowen Thomas. As the Hardman Committee heard, much of this was done with one 
eye on coping with the changes mechanisation would bring. ‘The Post Office is particularly seeking 
expertise on how to integrate the effects of mechanisation, concentration and more sophisticated control 
systems with the need to develop the organisation in a way that will achieve better staff participation and 
greater commitment’.26 Indeed, during the 1971 crisis, a Board Paper argued that those running the PMC 
should liaise more closely with the Board so that training programmes and the selection of new managers 
could be better informed by likely future industry developments.
27
 
 Over time, the curriculum at Coton House was broadened in scope and enriched in its use of 
theory. Industrial relations remained the PMC’s centralising concept. All students attending the Industrial 
Relationships course received a historical guide to PO unionism. It made clear that one reason for the PO 
Act 1969 was to institute more progressive IR and described how the ad hoc system subsequently gave 
way to formal consultative machinery.
28
 By the mid 1970s the curriculum included a history of scientific 
management; an analysis of human needs at work including the motivational theories of Elton Mayo; and 
courses on the informal organisation of industry, management styles, and Job satisfaction. The core text 
was Basic Motivation Theory, later summarised in the pamphlet, Human Behaviour at Work. This began 
by explaining the history of Taylorism and how this was applied in the PO through time-and-motion 
studies; the functional division of departments; work sequencing; and the basic tenets of business 
administration such as planning, coordination and control. The PMC, it stated, was above all concerned 
with delivering a rounded management education by teaching progressive forms of scientific management 
which recognised that people had a hierarchy of needs and that workers’ motivation had a social 
dimension. 
Taylor was right in one respect. The worker wants money. All the money he can get. But the worker wants 
more from a job than just a pay packet. He wants social satisfactions from participation in group activity. 
He wants psychological satisfactions too … The blind spot of the scientific management approach is the 
failure to realise that the work does not need to be allocated by basic elements just because it has to be 
studied in that way... The need to be accepted and liked by one’s workmates is as important, or even more 
important, than the financial incentives offered by management. The apparent nonsense, chatter, gossiping, 
kidding and clowning about is in fact often the way in which the boredom of work is tamed 
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…Organisations cannot be made to function effectively merely through a mechanical observance of 
figures, time-cards, motion studies, bonus schemes and the like. To make it work, it is also necessary to 
understand the nature of people as the human components of industry … Man is a wanting animal and as 
soon as one want is substantially satisfied he finds a new one.
29
 
Herzberg’s development of basic motivational theory was then presented to argue that beyond pay people 
tended to seek challenging work, good prospects for advancement and an understanding boss. The point 
was that managers needed to work with rather than against the informal networks and bonds that workers 
created. In a bid to reformulate the carrot and stick approach, two predominant styles of management 
were presented within a grid, ranging from ‘Theory X’ (people are lazy, unambitious, resistant to change, 
disliking responsibility) to ‘Theory Y’ (people are mature, self-motivated and cooperative). Finally, the 
PMC aimed to make all managers comfortable with the concept of “Socio-Technical Systems”, as being 
particularly useful in understanding the changing postal system and the need for a participative approach. 
‘In adapting to, designing and implementing change it [the concept] seeks to take account of the needs of 
the technical or operational systems and, just as important, the needs of social systems as well.’30 
The influence of behavioural psychology and programmed learning on management training was 
therefore considerable and its role in preparing the ground for mechanisation training – from code sort 
operators to MLO managers – was made explicit before the LPP began. The particular lines of research 
and consultation accommodated by and running in parallel with this change in philosophy are explored 
below. 
 
Staff motivation and the keyboard trials 
 
While the thrust of training at the PMC was reoriented, several specific programmes were in development 
for the different grades expected to conduct their daily work in MLOs which drew heavily on the new 
ideas. Of these, the most important – operationally, financially and politically – was training for the code-
sort position. Designing effective teaching methods for coding desk operators was widely acknowledged 
as being of critical importance. In 1971 it was predicted that an approximate total of 100 million finger 
movements would take place at coding desks every working day once the system was fully 
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 The aim was therefore to create the most effective possible training method for coaxing 
productivity out of the rank and file, divided into methods for selecting the best candidates and for 
teaching those chosen to code with accuracy, pace and stamina. This involved programmed learning, 
training machines, coding desk simulators and group tuition. Though this was a collaborative 
departmental effort throughout, it is clear that before 1974 research was driven by senior postal engineers. 
By then, two major issues were settled: the design of the keyboards to be used for coding and the 
technical arrangements (computers, audio-visual aids and simulators) used for selection and training. 
After this point, responsibility for refining code-sort training moved out of the hands of in-house postal 
engineers and into the hands of others – principally Personnel Department, Training Division and outside 
contractors – with Engineering playing a supporting role. This and the following section address these 
issues, which, taken together, formed the main elements of the training package in place by 1975. 
 Leading the attempt to implement code-sort training at the end of the 1960s was Head of 
Mechanisation, Nick de Jong, who emphasised the need for industrial relations sensitivity within a 
systematic framework for staff-training. His approach found expression during 1968 as he took control of 
the creation of a film aimed at introducing sorting staff to mechanisation as a first step in training. Most 
staff had no experience of sorting machines, let alone their integration within the workings of a network 
of MLOs, and measures were needed to allay fears and inspire enthusiasm. 
Conscious of the fact that we have embarked on the largest building and equipment programme ever 
tackled in Postal History, we have been giving considerable thought to our training needs for postal staff at 
the large mechanised offices now in building or advanced stages of planning. All of these offices will house 
substantial amounts of mechanised equipment and several will include complex central control and 
signalling systems… Future schemes are much more ambitious and involve an entirely new era in sorting 
office working; indeed, with the opening of these offices we will be passing from the era of manual sorting 
office into the “factory” sorting office of the future… We cannot escape the fact that the average rank and 
file man suffers not only from a lack of knowledge about the machines but he also tends to view 
mechanisation with some suspicion and fear that its sole purpose is to take away his job. It involves him in 
a change which he has not sought affecting almost every aspect of his job and it brings about vastly 
different working conditions to those he has been accustomed to for many years. It is absolutely vital, 
therefore, that the training sets out not only to show how the machines should be used but also to win over 
the staff to the many advantages for them so that they enter the new era in the right frame of mind.
32
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Training, on this view, had three objectives. First, to give an overall appreciation of mechanisation with 
its various machines, general goals and effects upon staff conditions. Second, to provide knowledge about 
local arrangements, such as where machines would go, their function and layout. Third, to give individual 
job instruction on a ‘need to know’ basis.33 For job instruction there was scope for increasing the 
‘Programme Learning type techniques’ being trialled at the Manchester MLO due to open in August 
1969.
34
 It was agreed early in the film’s production that the overall goal should be to ‘foster a spirit of 
enthusiasm and interest in the staff realising that they are in a forward looking, modern industry’.35 
The film itself began life as a treatment called “Beasts of Burden” written by outside consultants 
whose narrative equated the new technology with societal progress and economic responsibility. Largely 
under de Jong’s influence, it was re-titled “Tomorrow’s Post” and whittled down to become a more 
straightforward explanation of the machines, the strategic reasons for code-sorting and a detailed 
interview between de Jong and Tom Jackson addressing UPW concerns. The technical ingenuity of the 
machines and their role within the wider system was explained with reference to the economics and 
operational facts underpinning the decision to mechanise. The final treatment sought to persuade staff that 
the Letter Post Plan was in their interests, that it was of great value in modernising the postal service – 
and by extension a contribution to British society – and that they had an important part to play. The film’s 
final words typify its motivational tone. 
New machines, in new places, with new ideas behind them: these are fundamental to the success of our 
future but still only a small part of it. However it is recognised, the service we give the public will always 
be personal; human. Any enterprise is only as good as the men who make it work, and to maintain the 
character of that service we need, from everyone, a genuine willingness to accept new ideas and the 
changes they bring. In other words, the success of the 1970s, as of every other decade, depends upon your 
co-operation and your enthusiasm.
36
 
Though completed, it is not known what became of the Tomorrow’s Post or whether it was widely 
screened, despite costing about £20,000 to produce. There were requests for copies to be used abroad for 
selling British machines but these were vetoed by the UPW who had been consulted throughout and 
wished to limit its circulation to its original training purposes. Tom Jackson’s views, in particular, were 
sought in scripting the interview in which questions regarding redundancy, deskilling, movement of staff, 
pay and working conditions were addressed. However the memos and correspondence for Tomorrow’s 
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Post indicate that de Jong had substantial control over most aspects of the film, again demonstrating the 
power of Engineering to intervene in the politics of mechanisation.  
 The Engineering Department’s central role in shaping code-sort training followed naturally from 
the history and standing of postal engineering in the late 1960s. When in 1956 he posed the question 
‘What is the best training method?’, the former Director General Sir Gordon Radley continued a tradition 
of linking the design of machines with the design of training which can be traced at least as far back as 
the Transorma trials at Brighton in the 1930s. Under Radley’s Chairmanship of the Mechanical Aids 
Committee in the 1950s, this question stimulated research into the psychological and physiological 
circumstances of code-sort working, involving filming operators at work and studying their hand-to-eye 
coordination, their movement and posture and the knowledge and concentration utilised in letter-sorting. 
New training ideas, such as audio-visual cues and performance measurement, were in consequence taken 
up.
37
 While Radley’s question also contributed to successive redesigns of the seating arrangement, the 
layout and lighting of the work station and the materials used in production, the aspect of design most 
aligned with the question of the effects of training methods on operational efficiency was that of keyboard 
design. As Geoff Copping mused in 1958, keyboard design was complex and critical to the prospects of 
implementing mechanised sorting in Britain. There were, he said, ‘various ways of employing a keyboard 
to control the encoding of information, the optimum distribution of addresses on the keys so as to relate 
the heaviest traffic loadings with the easiest keying strokes, and of course the spatial layout, pressures and 
strokes of the keys themselves’.38 Though there appeared to be a relationship between different keyboard 
layouts and different rates of learning by operators – and this would be a determining factor in future 
levels of productivity – the actual nature of the relationship remained largely unknown.  
 The choice of keyboard, the ergonomics of the coding desk and the design of a training 
programme for code-sort operators were therefore seen from the late 1950s as being interlinked. 
Investigations began in the 1960s under Copping’s guidance and following his recommendation that due 
weight should be given to psychologists and physiologists of the Medical Research Council. A search, he 
said, was underway for ‘scientifically obtained proof’ of the psychology of the coding desk; all in the 
service of the long-term imperative: ‘the overall efficiency of the man/machine combination’.39 In 
discussing the various possibilities for designing experiments to establish the best keyboard strategy, 
Copping made the link with training explicit: 
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On a snap appraisement it would appear that the typewriter keyboard would be the slowest method of 
injecting information, the Canadian binary board faster and the Dutch board faster still. However training, 
finger dexterity, the pulsating nature of the physical load and many other factors must be considered before 
the correct decision can be reached. An apparently unimportant factor is the different psychological effects 
of training an operator in an art which is generally useful, such as normal typing, or of training him to 
perform a task which has no other application.
40
 
Internationally, different approaches were being applied to these problems. The Americans were 
committing to machine-paced coding, while the Japanese were holding out for OCR. The Canadians were 
following a similar path to the British, while many other countries imported solutions from other 
countries. Copping saw that the choice of training scheme was largely determined by the method of data 
entry and that, in Britain, just as empowering operators with pace-control presented the most challenging 
R&D path but with the prospect of high returns in productivity, so too with the design of training courses. 
...the economic viability of mechanized sorting is dependent on the rate achieved by coding desk operators. 
The operator’s job must therefore be as simple as possible and he should be able to absorb the intelligence 
from the address at a glance. It is this practice – “glance extraction” – which enables operators in Madrid 
using British machines to deal with 5200 letters in an hour....
41
 
When this was discussed at the first international postal engineering conference, a consultant from 
Plessey Pacific in Sydney, V. Magnusson, spoke about the attitude to training in Australia. There, codes 
were used for a small amount of mail allocated to railway lines serving wide areas. (In the outback there 
was an average of seven postmen per office). ‘We use female keyboard operators; in general males are 
not psychologically fitted to keyboard operation’, he said. ‘In a period of three to four weeks these girls 
are trained to sort at a passing-out rate of 2000 letters per hour on a one-hand keyboard’.42 de Jong 
responded pointedly: 
Mr Magnusson states that for keyboard operation women are better than men. In Britain we are aiming at 
complete equality of opportunity between the sexes, and selection will be on the basis of standards of 




Mr. S.G. Young, Head of Postal Research R14, stated that the central idea in Britain was to perfect the 
ergonomics of the coding environment as a means of accessing the highest coding rates over the long-
term. 
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There is no shortcut to accuracy in human factors; one must use relatively large samples of human subjects 
– we are thinking of 20 per sample, and the samples must be standardized and one must avoid pre-
conditioning. The process is therefore a fairly long and expensive one. Results obtained with a few 
laboratory assistants, or ladies from the office, are, I am afraid, just not good enough. The samples must 
represent as near as possible the actual people available. Somewhat similarly, in work on the configuration 
of machines and sorting offices, many factors are interrelated. The service standards, the type of mail, the 
siting and shape of offices, and the machines themselves are just examples of the many interacting factors. 
It is difficult to make a fundamental change in isolation.
44
 
  Geoff Copping spent much of his career in search of the perfect balance between a keyboard with 
which operators would be familiar, such as the QWERTY typewriter, and one best adapted to the length 
and form of a typical postcode. The character-length and alpha-numeric form of the postcode were 
evolved with the productivity of future coding desk operators in mind. Certain characters and numerals 
(i.e. “O” and zero) were not used at all and others were used more heavily depending on where coding 
took place in the country’s mail-flow. Outgoing mail from Lincoln would have different mail circulation 
from that in Brighton, with predictable differences in finger movement for each. Furthermore a given 
proportion of letters going through a coding desk, where address information was lacking, would be 
“passed” for manual sorting or receive an “extract code” in which the operator, seeing no postcode 
appearing on the envelope, reverted to a generic set of rules for creating a short code based on the first 
three and last two letters of the town name. For example “Birmingham” would be extract coded as 
“BIRAM”. In similar fashion, extract codes for locally addressed “inward” mail used the first and last two 
letters of the street name instead. Additionally, the facility for “short codes” was added, developed for 
frequently used destinations. Birmingham thus changed from BIRAM to Bs/c, ‘two key strokes instead of 
five’.45 
Following four years of collaboration with the Applied Psychology Unit of the Medical Research 
Council, Dr. R. Conrad and Dr. D. Longman were credited with the creation of a concept keyboard 
known variously as the Conrad, Cambridge or CHORD keyboard.
46
 However, on balance no clear benefit 
was established and Copping returned to improving the keys and electronics of the QWERTY, preferring 
its ease of training, the ability to train part time staff familiar with typing and ‘the lack of any proven 
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alternative’.47 However, when attention returned to keyboards in 1968 before the expected 
implementation of the LPP, he became convinced that the coding target of 2,100-2,500 iph could not be 
consistently achieved using QWERTY. The number of districts and the prominence of mail concentration 
in the later versions of the LPP, combined with the national breadth of the postcode, led him to believe 
that either the keyboard or the code would need altering. ‘Unfortunately conditions and requirements have 
subtly and slowly changed... it is suggested that a very serious situation is developing in respect of the 
rate and accuracy of coding desk operation’. As an overall pattern emerged of the distribution of 
postcodes across towns, districts and regions it became clear there would be a greater than expected use of 
numerals, making it more difficult for operators to extract code accurately and rapidly. Concerns grew 
that the financial returns of mechanisation would be jeopardised, resulting in ‘urgent requests’ to R14 for 
a new series of keyboard experiments.
48
 ‘One indisputable requirement emerges from the change in the 
form of the postcode; we must dispense with the typewriter keyboard. With two or three numerals in 
every code, the numeral keys must be brought closer to the “strong” fingers and nearer the “home” 
position of the fingers’.49 Copping therefore began considering alternative solutions, arguing at first for a 
30-key keyboard; the replacement of extract coding with the use instead of full town names; and “linking” 
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An experiment was designed to gather evidence about which keyboard provided the best 
performance from operators over a series of mock training sessions. Several new configurations were 
ventured within R14, whose staff found that departmental politics and operational tensions collapsed into 
the keyboard problem. Postal engineer J.H. Fletcher remarked in 1972, in an internal history of keyboard 
development, that no single option presented a clear solution at the outset because different stakeholders 
were pressing for different outcomes. ‘The comparison of keyboard layouts is complicated by the large 
number of possible variables and the different weightings that may be attached to their relative 
importance by different interested parties’.53 Nevertheless, to help give the experiments direction, a set of 
ideal characteristics was outlined: 
- Speed: the faster the better. Speed depends on ‘key positions, reaction and thinking times, the 
number of keystrokes per item, and it may also be a function of the code-form. Hence, the best 
keyboard layout for office A may differ from that for office B where the distribution of expected 
code-forms is different from those of office A’. 
- Accuracy: different layouts produce different results. Again, this can be location-sensitive. 
- Ease of use: minimise fatigue and location-sensitive. 
- Ease of learning: minimise training time. 
- Cost should be minimised: ‘This implies the optimisation of the interacting variables, number and 
function of the keys and control electronics, under constraints imposed by characteristics 1-4’.54 
Added to this was the known disparity between theory and real-world complexity. The Medical Research 
Council pressed the point that workers rarely experienced ideal conditions and high levels of motivation 
could not be assumed. Variation should be expected.
55
 The experiment’s overriding principle was 
therefore to minimise variation in its pool of subjects in order to reduce ambiguities in the statistical 
results obtained. They sought a uniform group of volunteers with minimal variation in skills, knowledge 
and attitudes. 
 Knowing not only that the results could end up determining a highly significant, long-term 
technological choice for the postal service, but also that the findings would form a contribution to the 
literature on keyboard ergonomics, extensive preparations were made. They looked to outside experience 
in training punch-key, computer data operators and qualified typists to see how learning curves related to 
actual performance under stress, boredom and changes in environment. All published results of such 
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aptitude tests were studied.
56
 The lessons learned were later compiled by the Parcel Mechanisation Branch 
in a lengthy report examining industrial coding projects outside the Post Office. An eclectic and rich 
literature review drew together all manner of writings, from statistical evidence to ergonomic case studies. 
Of particular interest were studies which said something about the relationship between engineering and 
economics, or, the ‘obvious interaction [of] ergonomic and engineering considerations and cost’.57 This 
led into considerations of efficiency and productivity. The literature on commercial Morse Code 
communications showed that it was common when training operators to find plateaus in their learning 
curves, representing phases during learning where subjects consolidated their new skills before moving to 
the next level. Similar findings on the ‘acquisition of higher habits’ came from studies of typists, adding 
machine operators, telephonists, and stenographers. The consensus was that short-term memory was the 
most important skill for coding of all types.
58
 The research came predominantly from universities and the 
R&D departments of dozens of large organisations including IBM, Honeywell, Navy Electronics Lab, 
Aerospace Medical Research Lab (Ohio), USN Electronics Lab (San Diego), EMI Electronics and 
Durham University Psychology Department.
59
 The key point for the Post Office was the importance of 
learning curves in selecting their keyboard. In other words the best keyboards elsewhere in industry were 
those which delivered the best training results. 
 In setting up the experiment, several problems arose with selecting postmen as subjects. Special 
payments would be expected and negotiations with the UPW would be time-consuming. Moreover, the 
existing rank and file could be expected to bring mixed preconceptions, skills and experience, going 
against the requirement for subject-homogeneity. It was decided to recruit housewives with children of 
school age on a part-time basis, with a pilot study scheduled for early November 1972 to avoid half-term. 
It was believed that typing work ‘naturally appealed’ to this group and they were readily available in the 
Ipswich area, near to the Research Station.
 
Local population constraints favoured the choice of 20-35 year 
old women. In a bid to further limit variation, specifications required subjects never to have used a 
typewriter before, to speak English as their first language, to be married, having left school at fifteen, and 
to have a husband employed in manual labour.
60
 The pilot study comprised fifteen hours of training 
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spread over three weeks. Eight subjects sat in front of display panels which included an oversized layout 
of the experimental keyboard and a large screen displaying postcodes. Exercises were paced by a tape 
recorder playing spoken instructions while another tape carried a pulse to synchronise the computer 
program. For each subject, a headset sounded a pulse whenever a mistake occurred. The initial course 
taught them to touch type step by step; beginning with the “home” keys, while in later exercises the 
display panel was phased out in favour of the projector to encourage touch typing. By lesson thirteen the 
pace was increased from 0.7 keystrokes per second to 1.3. Thereafter sessions became increasingly 
unpaced. The film being projected showed 1,000 envelopes, two per frame, and as each was “coded” the 
film stepped on to drop the top letter to the bottom of the screen as a simulation of the way a first 
generation coding desk presented letters from top to bottom.
61
 Their keyboards plugged into a visual 
display unit with a record of each subject’s performance recorded on paper tape with every keystroke, 
making it susceptible to a predefined set of statistical analyses. The whole process was repeated with 
separate groups, each trained on one of seven different experimental keyboards.
62
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Once finished, the keyboard trials left behind substantial data for analysis. Postal Engineer G.D. 
Panton concluded in the final report: ‘This has been a complex experiment in which we have tried to 
ensure that different subjects, tested at different times and in different places, were treated identically for 
all but their keyboards’.66 However, for all the precautions taken to keep data free from contamination, 
subject-variety kept creeping back in. Initial disruptions were caused when industrial action at a nearby 
power station and a strike by local council workers led to the temporary closure of some schools, 
preventing a number of subjects from taking part.
67
 While in total more than 200 housewives participated, 
many were in fact Irish and some were only partially literate. In the early training sessions the plan was to 
have no supervision and to rely entirely on recorded instruction to avoid the variation likely to result from 
different personalities interacting with their supervisors. However the absence of direct supervision 
encouraged subjects to interact with each other, creating variety in the extent to which groups discussed 
their activities. ‘In one class the degree of interaction appeared to be significant. Similarly, without 
supervision, many of the subjects tried “hunt and peck” typing despite reminders from the taped lessons 
[not to look at the keys]’.68 The biggest problem was that it proved impossible to train subjects to code 
fast enough. Their performance differed markedly from actual staff, largely because the real world 
structures of pay, discipline and teamwork were impossible to simulate. Attempts to counteract this 
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included displaying a “high score” to encourage a sense of competition and the use of weekly 
questionnaires to probe subjects’ attitudes to training so they might feel their efforts more highly valued.69 
When trying to draw conclusions, analysts became overwhelmed by the sense that the artificial nature of 
the experimental environment tainted the results and that when applied to the real world the data become 
of less obvious value. It was also felt that the use of housewives in the trials was problematic. 
As more data is analysed it is becoming clearer how people work keyboards and how their technique 
changes with training and experience. With naïve subjects, each element of the task is separate and distinct, 
but as the task becomes more automatic then it may no longer be possible to consider simple elemental 
processes. The elements are chained together, and do not behave independently... When considering 
different mixtures of ability, and their relationship to an ideal keyboard, one is naturally drawn to speculate 
on the probable differences between the female subject employed to date, and postmen operators. It is 
probable that postmen will be more familiar with postal information processing, but not so nimble fingered 
as the women. In a sense the two types may be diametrically opposed, at least in training.
70
 
Later reflections on the experiments and how the ergonomic press discussed them noted a lack of 
confidence in the methods and techniques employed: 
Comparative studies that involve training and the acquisition of high levels of motor skills are notoriously 
difficult to perform and analyse... Hindsight suggests that a very large number of variables need to be 
monitored for a really definitive study and to date it appears that nobody has had adequate resources or 
“hindsight prediction” to be able to conduct such a study... Thus the use of simple human factors 
experiments yields little definitive information.
71
 
By October 1974 a decision was needed about which of the keyboards should be adopted and, though 
there were slight performance differences between the seven, the data was not robust enough for a 
decision. As Panton explained, QWERTY remained the best compromise choice due largely to the variety 
present both in national postcode distribution and in the skills and attitudes of the rank and file. 
How great an improvement can be gained from keyboard optimisation depends on the language. In the 
code-sorting application this is a mixture of extract codes and postcodes. If one were to ignore the problems 
of training and staff mobility then the optimum solution would be different for each office. When one takes 
these into account then a standardised national design becomes more attractive, and no layout could be 
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It was also observed that QWERTY had originally been designed so that letters most commonly found 
together in written English were separated as far as possible to minimise clashing of type-bars. This 
clearly applied far less to postcodes which only faintly corresponded to common language.
73
 Moreover, 
the problems of staff turnover in 1974 favoured QWERTY, the keyboard that was easiest to learn.
74
  
 It should be stressed however that although the primary objective was not met, the experiments 
did provide the PO with a wealth of new insights into the nature of coding desk work and how people 
responded to different training approaches in different environments. After three of the best performing 
subjects were invited back for a week on operational coding desks, for instance, they were able to explain 
which they preferred using – the machine or the simulator – and why; namely the ‘psychological sense of 
achievement that resulted from seeing real letters actually move’.75 Much was made of these secondary 
benefits. It was noted that out of a ‘system for performing subjective comparisons of keyboard layouts, an 
effective method of teaching touch typing to naïve subjects has been produced’.76 Moreover, much was 
learnt about how people went about honing their mental activities during coding. Reading, deciphering 
information, sorting through options, co-ordinating this with muscular movements in fingers – and 
merging these into a seamless performance with rhythm, pace and stamina (Figure 6.6). These 
“peripheral” benefits in fact delivered detailed knowledge useful for short-term decisions about training 
methods and adding to the body of knowledge about the “psychology of the coding desk” which had been 
built up since Copping used the phrase 15 years earlier. The Engineering Department’s annual review of 
research in 1975 pointed out that one of their main preoccupations during the year had been devising and 
applying aptitude tests for the selection of trainee coding desk operators, based largely on the experience 
gained in the keyboard trials.
77
 And there were other ways in which the experiments and the wider goal of 
designing the code-sort training programme went hand in hand. 
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Courses, hardware and the Adsum dispute 
 
Possibly the greatest tangential benefit of the keyboard trials for the Engineering Department was the 
opportunity to test the technical arrangements for the operator training programme, then being developed 
in parallel. The keyboard trials, as we have seen, used a variety of hardware both for selecting suitable 
candidates and delivering each part of the training sequence. This included projectors, dummy keyboards, 
coding desk simulators and computerised lesson-delivery and performance-measurement systems. 
Striking the right balance was a delicate matter. Over-reliance on basic hardware such as the dummy 
keyboard/projector combination was ineffective compared with computer-controlled training machines 
which produced better results, but these were highly specialised and expensive.
79
 By 1974 there was a 
question mark over whether DD1 – the design division hitherto responsible for training equipment – was 
approaching a limit in terms of its contribution to deciding the final arrangement. The imminence of 
wider implementation shifted responsibility for this decision further into the hands of Training Division 
who favoured buying machines from outside sources, and adapting them to DD1 specifications. The key 
contributions of DD1 are outlined below, followed by examples of growing tensions between the two 
departments, as the leaders of in-house engineering resisted having their influence diminished. But first, 
building on the themes and developments already laid out in this chapter, a more comprehensive 
description of the actual content of the code-sort training programme is offered. Here, two important 
issues are evident in understanding the balance struck between technical and political considerations. 
These are that the design of training constituted a striking example of programmed learning, and that the 
thrust in programme design came from a recognition that the policies adopted needed to motivate staff 
and promote healthy industrial relations as a means of delivering and sustaining high productivity levels. 
 Training in existing offices had seen successive improvements in the early 1970s and, although 
the application of selection testing was still in its infancy,
80
 policies for teaching postmen to use coding 
desks had by 1972 been developed to a state of high sophistication. In that year, PA Management 
Consultants – the firm auditing the costing models – conducted an investigation into training 
requirements in MLOs. Comments written by officials reviewing the success of training in the late 1970s 
suggest that PA Management’s analysis was taken seriously and their recommendations, in confirming 
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the existing Headquarters thinking, largely enacted. PA also had experience of training male keyboard 
operators in other areas of industry. They observed four distinct sections in the existing course:  
- Introduction and indoctrination 
- Skill development and fault analysis 
- Speed and stamina build up 
- Transition to the production environment.81 
They argued that, although this structure was well thought through having been shaped by a 
philosophy that was balanced and well-informed,
82
 the focus on managing the human aspects of change 
should be more heavily emphasised and the whole course should be expanded over ten stages. The first 
step was to explain to trainees the overall purpose of mechanisation and stress the importance of their 
contribution. ‘Operators of coding desks may feel that they are in the “battery hen” situation of having a 
continuous stream of mail presented to them and being required to press buttons to send it, by some little 
understood means, to its destination’. Fear and cynicism could be eroded, they said, by providing 
‘Knowledge of how the individual contributes to the total pattern’.83 At each MLO, four hours of lectures 
on this subject were recommended, delivered by a senior member of the local management. Trainees 
could then proceed to mock coding desks linked to teleprinters for their first lessons in touch typing, 
spread over 12 one hour sessions. Assisted by slides and audio recordings, their aim was to achieve 3,500 
keystrokes per hour in a five minute test. The next three lessons repeated this, having removed all visual 
aids. They would now be expected to have a maximum 3% error rate. Fourteen lessons should then focus 
solely on increasing speed up to a target of 7,000 keystrokes in a five minute test. Next, 36 hours should 
be devoted to increasing this figure to 12,000 keystrokes, this time replacing recorded verbal instructions 
with a “bleep” signal and aiming for a maximum 1% error rate. Instruction should then be given in 
reading addresses quickly and accurately before moving onto lessons in the principles of extract coding 
using a computer programme that progressively removed assistance until trainees could extract-code 
unaided. The same process would then be repeated for short codes. It was recommended that the final 
lessons should return to increasing speed and stamina, using a simulation of live mail-flow before 
transferring students to operational coding desks for a probationary spell.
84
 The PA report reminded the 
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PO that in implementing this scheme it would be ‘vital... that careful and painstaking development work’ 
make use of the insights of people with significant experience of training postmen.
85
 
 Their recommendations went on to stress the importance of having the operator training 
programme integrated within the broader context of MLOs and the wider system. They noted with 
approval developments in retraining the Inspectorate, observing a policy that went beyond simply 
explaining how the machines worked. Training Division had devised a new course which recognised that 
Postmasters might now have responsibilities over more than one floor and their offices would be filled 
with mail constantly on the move through machines. The tradition of seeing piles of unsorted mail 
needing clearing before a certain time now applied less. New management skills – both technical and 
personal – needed mastering. The key, as PA saw it, was to avoid teething troubles leading to a cynical 
perception that the changes were unnecessary. They recommended a five-part course using role-play to 
simulate likely problems encountered in the office, such as a drop in coding rates, machine faults, staff 
motivation, discipline and control systems.
86
 They warned against allowing Head Postmasters too much 
autonomy during the transitional phase to mechanised sorting, when targets and measurement defined 
centrally, in London, would better keep different offices at a good, uniform standard. The Mechanisation 
Section of the Training Division advised Head Postmasters on the selection of local Assistant Inspectors 
to become trainers who were taught how to train staff using a typewriter based training course using the 
considerable research underpinning course content and layout.
87
 PA’s overall conclusions emphasised the 
difficulties still to overcome in retraining a significant proportion of the rank and file in a workforce 
characterised by great diversity in age, experience and attitude. 
We believe that this training task with its concern for people, their motivation and attitude to change, 
represents a greater challenge than the problems, already overcome, of designing and producing the 
mechanical equipment. A realisation of the scale of the problem followed by a determination from all 
concerned to organise for, develop and control the training programme is the only road to success... Greater 
concentration on the management, organisational and human problems of change is urgently required... The 
mechanisation programme represents, for the Postal Service, a very large capital investment. Without 
improvements in the training of Post Code Operators, and the Inspectorate, which in turn are dependent on 
an improved organisation for training, the return on that investment will fall well short of both the budgeted 
potential and the full amount that is achievable.
88 
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The need for a multifaceted, centralised, ongoing effort in policy management was likely to have been the 
main reason for moving some of the responsibility for training from engineers to people with more 
dedicated experience of management and administration. The fact that responsibility was spread across 
departments was acknowledged by PA Management who saw the concentration of effort on creating 
better-adapted training machines ‘on what appears to the outsider to be almost a competitive basis’ as the 
next key development in operator training.
89
 
 DD1 began work on this in 1968 and outlined some general specifications for a computer-based 
training system the following year. They planned to use a time-shared central data processor with several 
training positions comprising presentation units and keyboards. This would amount to a simulation of the 
coding desk and was aimed at producing reliable performance data establishing a pass-out target for each 
trainee.
90
 This was conveyed to the staff-side in the internal newspaper, The Courier, which stated on its 
front page in July 1970: ‘“Robot” teaches sorting by keyboard’.91 Postal engineer K.L. Spence reported in 
1971 that computerised selection methods should pre-test trainees (in reading, memory, dexterity, 
accuracy of finger movement, reaction time, information extraction and fatigue),
92
 trials with equipment 
for the full training programme began in 1972 at Croydon and London’s West Central District Office.93 
These provided better results than more rudimentary methods in typewriter training which only pushed 
trainees up to 50% of the desired performance, which tended to fall by about 20% when transferred to live 
work, before slowly building up again. The great benefit of the computer-controlled simulator was that a 
trainee’s performance could be tracked and the lessons were automated and tailored in pace to individuals 
or to groups. Additionally, the constant stream of observations of how people new to coding eased their 
way in was valuable to improving the ergonomic design of operational coding desks.
94
 The computer-
controlled system could accommodate multiple users simultaneously (up to 40) and was considered 
‘unique and far in advance of any comparable method’.95 Many features resembled advanced versions of 
the training machines witnessed by PO Officials in America five years earlier. The lesson plan comprised 
500 ‘training blocks’ each with progressively more challenging speed and accuracy targets, though not 
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necessarily in a linear sequence. The programme was structured to incorporate ‘branching techniques’ 
where each stage of teaching was determined by previous performance.
96
 
At some point between 1972 and 1974 a decision was passed down to invest primary responsibility for 
the code-sort programme in Training Division (connected with the Personnel Department), with the 
Engineering Department relegated to a support role. Training Division was staffed by Personnel officials 
and the department driving the training machine project was PP1 (and later PP4) where the decision was 
made to outsource to Adsum Ltd (formerly Computer Peripheral Equipment Ltd (CPE)). Adsum were 
commissioned to produce the “Teleprinter-and-Coding-Keyboard-Linked-Equipment system”, known as 
TACKLE.
97
 Adsum’s first prototype hardware fell short of what was needed in being suited only to group 
learning, in failing to clearly identify errors in printouts and, it was alleged, prone to escalating 
maintenance costs. With second generation equipment in the pipeline, Adsum proceeded to develop a 
prototype Coding Desk Simulator/Teaching Machine (CDS/TM) involving information storage on a 
magnetic drum, TV screen display and printer. Because CDS/TM could accommodate any type of 
keyboard and display unit it had wide industrial applicability and featured in a “Training For Work” BBC 
education series. Adsum were asked to adapt the CDS/TM system for training staff on the Easy-View 
coding desk.
98
 Another company in discussion with the PO about a training machine was Honeywell who 
also had experience in computerised training. K.L. Spence would later work with the Honeywell 
hardware to produce a scheme for a new machine (Figure 6.7) which had an array of indicator diode 
lamps representing the keyboard layout, and a row of eight alpha-numeric display panels. His goal was to 
offer both paced and unpaced learning, using displays and a headset for immediate error feedback. The 
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Clearly, there was a complicated range of people, departments and outside organisations involved 
in developing training machines. It is also clear that, before 1975, no standard, uniform solution 
materialised. The debate over training hardware continued throughout the 1970s and tended to revolve 
around how to balance costs against performance and around who within the industry had most expertise 
to control this aspect of training. A running dispute developed, as senior engineers repeatedly voiced 
criticism of the Training Division, beginning in 1971 when Copping wrote to David Harvey to complain 
about the quality of a training experiment the latter was conducting at Croydon Head Post Office. The 
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performance of operators, Copping said, was not being monitored in enough detail and the results needed 
to be broken down into more discrete categories. There were too many inadequately prepared instructors 
and the pre-selection of trainees was poor.
103
 Once Training Division and Adsum gained primary control 
over training R&D, internal correspondence between senior PO engineers recorded their displeasure, as 
notes between Keith Phillips and Eric Hills in March 1976 make clear: 
Alex Bennett has highlighted ONE area in which R&D work proper to your division is being implemented 
elsewhere – and not very effectively at that! If we are to make best use of our resources to the advantage of 
the Postal Business it is NOW time to take steps to ensure that ALL R&D activities are directed by the 
R&D divisions… I emphatically agree with Alex Bennett that we should now impose some discipline on 
the organisation and implementation of Development work.
104 
Alex Bennett intervened with a reminder that his policy was to ‘not get involved’ with training equipment 
‘for various historical reasons and because it costs money’.105 However he and his colleagues had serious 
reservations about the ability of other departments to make engineering judgements. This included their 
choice of outside contractors and the suitability of Adsum in particular. The group even went public with 
this view in a letter to The Times in September 1976, in which they argued that the latest Adsum 
proposal... 
...is that of a clever undergraduate essay. It has an undergraduate’s broad arguments and sweeping 
conclusions; it has an undergraduate’s use of supposedly telling quotations from a limited number of 
sources of differing value. It has the undergraduate’s combination of superficial plausibility with the 
absence of any real grasp of the subject matter. It has the undergraduate’s lack of a sense of proportion so 
that trivial details, themselves introduced as evidence of research effort, are accorded equal weight with 
matters of great importance.
106 
An internal report on the issue written by Cliff Wicken in September reiterated their frustration. By this 
stage the matter of operator productivity at operational MLOs was becoming an even greater concern as 
the figures suggested a lower rate of coding than that forecast in the revalidation costings. Reports from 
the ground indicated that many operators were having difficulties bringing their technique to maximum 
capacity. Those who were hitting their targets tended to develop quickly a good flow of touch-typing and 
“reading ahead”, i.e. mentally processing the next letter in line while simultaneously entering the code of 
and dispatching the previous letter. Wicken and his colleagues believed that training should focus more 
on developing core touch-typing skills which were difficult to forget later, and less on the formal teaching 
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of reading-ahead, which, they felt, was picked up naturally once in the job. Wicken spelt out Adsum’s 
failings in capitals: 
THE TEACHING OF KEYBOARD SKILLS IS THE MAIN AND MOST IMPORTANT PART OF A 
CODING DESK OPERATOR’S TRAINING. IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT OPERATORS 
ACHIEVE A VERY GOOD STANDARD OF TOUCH TYPING AS THE HABIT OF LOOKING DOWN 
AT THE KEYBOARD IS VERY TIRING AND DAMAGING TO THROUGHPUT.
107
 
The Adsum contract was eventually cancelled due to cost and ‘obsolescence’. This was not the end of 
debates about training machines, but by late 1977 opposition to the idea of an Easy-View simulator was 
growing. It was pointed out that to be useful it would need to match similar specifications to, and would 
be more expensive than, an operational coding desk.
108
 
 These disputes continued into the 1980s as new people in both departments entered the business 
and grappled with these complexities afresh.
109
 One interesting observation was that the closer training 
machines got to simulating a real coding desk, the more complicated and inflexible the training system 
became.
110
 However it is clear that the distribution of responsibilities for developing and maintaining the 
mechanisation training programmes underwent changes during the early- and mid-1970s. In this regard 
the Adsum dispute is illustrative. Senior engineers such as Copping and de Jong were at the end of their 
careers and witnessing cuts to the R&D budget, with more solutions being purchased externally. The in-
house demand for fundamental research in sorting machine and infrastructural design subsided, replaced 
by people with more management experience. K.L. Williams is a good example. He had considerable 
experience and knowledge but did not share Copping and de Jong’s faith in mechanisation. Williams was 
given overall responsibility for mechanisation training in 1970, part of a new Training Division 
established in 1967.
111
 He had spent most of his life observing postal operations having joined as an 
engineer in 1937. He ended his career managing the London Postal Region (LPR) in the 1980s. When in 
October 1980 he recommended methods of improving management communication in the LPR, he 
illustrated the problem of overbearing management with the analogy of a husband constantly pestering his 
wife while she prepared dinner: persistent requests to be updated on progress, he said, might result not 
only in the enquirer gaining ‘a thick ear’ but in the ‘potatoes being overcooked’. His view was that the 
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workplace functioned better when down-to-earth communication was used and he supported team-
building projects in which management and workers participated on equal terms. ‘The Postal Business is 
a rather earthy organisation which employs the human machine more than anything else’, he wrote. ‘It is 
best controlled with the personal touch’.112 He regarded the mechanisation programme with caution: ‘At 
the present time I feel that unless a reliable form of OCR can be introduced into the letter mechanisation 
programme in the near future at an acceptable cost in terms of concessions to the UCW, the whole 
exercise has been and remains of somewhat doubtful value’.113 
 
Personnel and the labour market 
 
The prevailing philosophy among postal engineers on questions of training was therefore similar to that 
concerning systems modelling and machine design: one guided by the search for the most cohesive 
system of technology and people. However, this had come to coexist with a growing appreciation of the 
nuances involved in the human problems of industrial change. This was well summarised by an 
engineering representative at an international postal conference held in Paris in 1973: 
Before a new mechanised office is opened we mount a comprehensive training programme aimed not only 
at teaching particular machine operating skills but also at familiarising all members of the staff with the 
broad concepts of mechanisation and the reasons for its introduction. Despite extensive consultation with 
the Unions at the planning, design and construction stages of large projects we have found that individual 
members of the staff are often nervous, and sometimes resentful, of the upheaval and change in working 
methods that is involved in a move from a manual to a mechanised working environment; a soundly based 
familiarisation programme can substantially reduce these adverse effects of change. For the large projects a 
small team of two or three training specialists is set up early in the construction stage. They commence 
their task with an analysis of how the office as a whole will operate, how the major work areas will 
function individually and how each contribute to the overall plan for the office. Local management is 
closely involved and consulted during the analysis stage and, of course, need to agree the outcome of the 
team’s studies.114 
As the first MLOs became operational after 1969, the staff and managers at the newly equipped offices 
found themselves exposed to the problems of adapting to a radically new work system, and their feedback 
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on training was collated by policymakers in London for review. The primary concern was to ensure that 
technical changes did not outpace the capacity of staff to adapt. 
The other side of the training question was recruitment and selection, which were the concern of 
the Personnel Department. The political and economic context of the industry worsened in 1974 
following the Miners’ Strike and the change of government, with implications for postal wages and the 
labour market, which had knock-on effects for selection and training policies for code-sorting. The central 
feature of the postal service’s labour market was the shortage of staff. Vacancies stood at between 5-
10,000 in the mid-1970s leading to extremely high overtime levels. The problem had been building since 
the mid 1960s
115
 and was linked to the so-called “productivity gap” which had been criticised in 1971 
Hardman Report. Productivity per capita had fallen in real terms since 1969, principally due to inadequate 
resources for dealing with the continual increase of the number of houses in Britain. Each new house 
added an extra “delivery point” to be served by a workforce that did not grow in proportion. This was 
thought to add to the stresses of rank and file work and contributed to ever higher turnover rates. In 1973 
around 7,000 postmen left the service, 4,600 of them within their first six months.
116
 Pay was low, the 
work involved unsocial hours and it was commonly thought that young recruits lacked sufficient staying 
power and competence. The Personnel Executive, Dorothy Fothergill, was struck by the claim that 
postmen on the lowest earnings were paid close to what a married man with two children on benefits 
received from the state.
117
 ‘In light of this it is not difficult to understand why postmen recruitment may 
be falling off!’118 As discussed by Campbell-Smith, better pay and conditions elsewhere in the economy 
had caused fundamental changes to the labour market.
119
 
During 1974, the Psychological Services Division made investigations. The traditional 
advantages of PO work, such as security of employment, pensions, sick and annual leave were now 
matched elsewhere, the relatively low pay combined with shift and weekend work and overtime 
bargaining was helping to perpetuate vicious circles of recruitment shortage at blackspot offices. New 
entrants tended to get the worst walks and duties, while ‘physical working conditions were in many, but 
not all, cases, relatively poor, with cramped, outmoded sorting offices’.120 This conspired to destabilise 
working groups with constant rotation of supervisors leading to the view that training effectiveness was 
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being harmed as staff were deprived of adequate guidance. A climate of wastage meant that supervision 
was deemed by the old guard to be lenient in order to ‘keep their men’. Wastage rates at Wigan and 
Altringham were then running at 50%.
121
 There was a general consensus among all managers that the 
quality of staff had declined steadily since the mid-1950s, although the investigating psychologists 
questioned whether this was reality or perception. While analyses of recruitment aptitude tests showed 
competence was on average slightly lower in the cities than in the provinces, there was no solid evidence 
as to whether there was any differential over time. It was widely believed the PO had a poor image and 
publicity could not help improve matters. Morale in general was reported to be low. Many longstanding 
managers claimed postmen worked only for pay and that pride in the profession had diminished. ‘They 
suggested that men no longer mentioned with pride that they worked for the Post Office and if possible 
concealed the fact’.122 
In brainstorming sessions during November 1974, young executives wrestled with these problems 
and asked how they would affect recruitment for code-sorting. Their attentions were soon focussed on the 
selection and training of staff. They recognised the overriding purpose of code-sort training was to equip 
operators with the skills and motivation needed for high throughput rates and that this was essential for 
the future economic viability of the system. Trainees, they agreed, needed to stay in the job for a 
minimum time to reduce training costs and to build up skill. In selecting operators they favoured youth, 
but they knew that applicants who were too young were less likely to stay, making the preferred age range 
24-45. The problem was finding such people. ‘In Southampton for instance a serious shortfall of operators 
led to an area trawl in January 1973. This resulted in 2 applications one of which was found unacceptable. 
A subsequent trawl in April 1973 in the area, after removing the minimum 1 year service qualification, 
resulted in no applications at all’.123 Several criticisms were made of existing training methods in 
mechanised offices, which tended to be done on overtime at end of day when staff were often too tired to 
give their full concentration. The pass-out examination needed redesigning because many were still not 
up to the demands of “live” mail. It was also found that practice deviated from theory. National standards 
were for staff to rotate between manual and coding work with four weeks spent coding for every week of 
manual work. In reality offices such as Cambridge were operating a 3/1 ratio. Weekly hours on coding 
were supposed to amount to 25-30, but in practice the average was 20 hours with coding stints lasting 1½ 
rather than the desired 2 hours. These problems were seen as the most detrimental to throughput rates 
which they believed could in principal be doubled from the target of 1,600 items per hour (iph) then in 
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They saw the heart of the problem as the nature of coding itself, described as ‘basically tedious 
and stationary desk work’.125 The view was that inherent flaws in job-design contributed to high turnover 
and absenteeism, offering workers strategic advantages in negotiations with management by leaving a 
crucial part of the mail flow system vulnerable to staff disruption. 
We asked ourselves if coding desk work provided a well balanced interesting job. We do not think it does 
and feel that great care must be taken to develop staffing policies which allow coding work to be balanced 
with ancillary tasks in the mechanized area. Our aim would be to avoid the sort of overdeveloped division 
of labour which plagues the motor industry.
126
 
In visits to Cambridge they ‘sensed a rift’ between coding operators and manual staff and argued that the 
Mechanisation Branch, whose revision of training procedures was then underway, should take note of this 
and develop methods for better ‘selling’ mechanisation to the whole sorting office, emphasising the 
virtues of team working between manual staff and machinists.
127
 In particular, ancillary staff – those who 
culled and fed letters to the operator positions – would identify with their colleagues if they too had 
coding experience. Moreover, the rank and file and inspectorate would gel as the common level of postal 
knowledge and understanding of the code-sort system improved. 
Supervisors in the mech-area need new skills, and have to familiarize themselves with new sources of 
information on which to base their minute by minute decisions. They also face the problem that those they 
are supervising know far more about the detail of the jobs in the mech-area than the supervisors do …The 
creation of a team spirit may well improve what is essentially a boring, repetitive job, resulting in increased 
motivation and job satisfaction and the lessening of the minor irritations which can, in a machine 
environment, lead both to conflict between staff, and conflict between staff and management.
128
  
Their discussions ended by listing the qualities of an ideal operator, which the selection tests then being 
designed were seeking to apply in the real world. Because a trained operator was more difficult to replace 
at short notice than a conventional postman, general good health was desired. Eyesight should be good at 
2-3 feet, and hands should be agile and free from deformities. Touch typing and a sense of rhythm 
favoured the selection of typists, telegraphists and pianists, or indeed anyone with good hand-to-eye 
coordination and quick reactions. Those already possessing some depth of postal knowledge should also 
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be sought, but caution was urged when considering a candidate’s general level of intelligence. ‘Operators 





In Summary, a wide range of political and technical measures were put in place at the PO before and 
during the launch of mechanisation, with mixed results. The decision to stand by the QWERTY keyboard 
layout, albeit in modified form, was important and in part taken on the basis of learning curves and its 
familiarity to the majority of prospective trainees. But this was just one part of what was later termed a 
‘total package’, with a number of distinct parts. MLO management was catered for at the Postal 
Management College providing three-week modules in planning, commissioning and operation which 
began up to two years before a new office was opened. Here, Head Postmasters studied the key concepts 
of mechanisation and how to manage new types of workflow. A six-week course was in place for 
“training the trainers”. Future instructors learned how to train coding desk operators effectively in local 
sorting offices where they learned about the keyboards, instruction techniques and the general uses of 
sorting office technology. Detailed measures were in place for auxiliary duties, while exhibitions and 
displays prepared all staff before moving to a new office. A full 100 hour programme was established for 
coding desk operators and, in addition to the specialised hardware described above, metronomes and 
music were added to reinforce rhythmic, touch-typing skills.
130
 
This achievement, its importance and the progressive approach which shaped it was well 
summarised by engineer J.P.G. Foley when a new round of training reappraisal got under way in 1977. 
It is now almost a cliché to say that the advent of mechanisation in the postal business is the greatest 
change to face those of us employed in the business since 1840. However, like so many clichés, it is true. 
Mechanisation represents a change in long standing practices, it is a challenge and traditional wisdom 
seems to find difficulty in readily accepting that the brave new world of mechanisation is necessarily a 
better world. This is understandable because existing staff are so familiar with the existing mode of work 
and they are suspicious of change. Given this background there is a two fold duty for training to fulfil. It is 
necessary not only to teach those who are to manage and work in mechanised offices how the equipment 
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works, the planning of its introduction, the skills needed to run and control it including the change in 
methods and attitudes required, but also to bring about a commitment to mechanisation. This is the total 




This is not to say all problems were overcome. First, the continuing difficulties over keying rates and 
training machines were serious concerns and were not solved in 1975. Second, the fundamental flaws in 
the concept of code-sorting could not be fixed no matter how thorough the training provision. Finally, 
certain general criticisms of the design of training schemes made by contemporary sociologists may have 
some application in considering the PO case. One argument was that those designing new schemes often 
took a one-dimensional ‘rational’ approach, without fully appreciating that perceptions of occupational 
skill were tied up with status within grade hierarchies. As a result, once implemented, their designs might 
have unforeseen consequences.
132
 Certainly, some naivety of this kind was evident in the keyboard trials 
which looked less and less like a good investment when contemporary thinking in human capital was 
pointing out that workers tended to react more positively to general rather than specific training. Belatedly 
reverting to the QWERTY keyboard tacitly acknowledged this by utilising and enhancing existing 
skills.
133
 However, considering the industrial climate of mid-1970s Britain and the staffing issues this 
created for the postal service – and remembering the scale on which the training package applied and the 
long-term, industrial relations-sensitive nature of the R&D invested across several fields of inquiry – 
there are reasons to commend the PO’s record in producing a sufficient provision of training policies in 
demanding conditions
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has revealed and documented a particular realm of systems-building in a major British public 
utility in the twentieth century with a special focus on the interrelation of technological and political 
changes in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the course of a transition from planning a new system to 
its belated implementation. The introduction of new technology in the British postal service had profound 
effects on the political economy of the industry and on the working lives of many thousands of its staff. 
Its history has here been recorded, thanks largely to the preservation of much of the original 
contemporary institutional documentation at the British Postal Museum & Archive. This thesis provides 
an empirical case study based on hitherto unresearched primary material. The resulting findings and 
themes have been related to debates in the fields of the history of technology, the history of 
communications, institutional and business history, contemporary British history and industrial sociology. 
This work adds to a growing historiography of the modern Post Office in Britain and engages critically 
particularly with arguments in the works of the historians Martin Daunton, Alan Clinton and Duncan 
Campbell-Smith. 
 Although relatively little has been published on the fortunes of the mechanisation programme, 
contemporary commentary and subsequent reflections have been predominantly negative. This is 
understandable considering that attempts to introduce code-sorting on a national basis coincided with a 
politically and economically turbulent period in modern British history – in which the nationalised 
industries were heavily implicated. These conditions served to undermine some assumptions in the 
original plan, leading to a series of reappraisals, further problematised by acute financial crises and 
protracted industrial disputes, most notably the national postal strike in 1971 and the subsequent three 
year embargo. It is also relevant that when journalists and economists reported these events, and when the 
Hardman and Carter Committees published their in-depth reports, the postal service was widely believed 
to be in decline. Critiques of the plan’s implementation featured in subsequent studies which were highly 
critical of the postal industry, particularly the work of Michael Corby, and similarly unfavourable 
references can be found in appraisals of financial and productivity performance in the public sector by 
economists and politicians in the 1980s – all some years before the full benefits of the decision to 
mechanise were understood. Among historians now approaching this period afresh, the historiography 
with anything to say about the postal service is, quite reasonably, drawn to a cluster of highly visible and 
serious problems with industrial relations and the role which the 1971 strike played in national politics. 
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 During preliminary research in the primary sources, three flaws in the existing account of the LPP 
became apparent. The first and most obvious was that not only had little been written from a historical 
perspective (Campbell-Smith’s Masters of the Post was not even conceived, let alone published at that 
point), but also that what was available on the subject failed to convey the ambitious and profound nature 
of the changes being tabled in the 1960s, the extent of planning involved or the central importance of the 
LPP in defining a new framework for industrial politics in the industry for the rest of the century. Nor was 
there sufficient recognition that the mechanisation of sorting offices formed the technological 
underpinning of the mail’s most important structural reform of the last 150 years. The second flaw took 
longer to reveal itself but became the unifying argument. Published reports can lead one to believe that 
the LPP was a failure and both PO management and unions were culpable. Though strong cases of this 
sort have been made in the context of contemporary and ideologically inflected critiques of state 
enterprise, they did not provide a rounded assessment of the financial, political and operational effects of 
the new technology, nor did they advance understanding of the reasons for its implementation. In short, 
this approach failed to consider the historical significance of the LPP other than in relation to financial 
performance, or to explain retrospectively the putative decline of the British labour movement. Finally, it 
became increasingly clear that, rather than constituting a litany of managerial incompetence and union 
obstructionism – and contrary to more general, popular conceptions of the period – the sources 
consistently indicated that there were constructive and progressive aspects to this troubled period, in 
which real achievements were made in both the operational and political spheres, and that the co-
evolution of technology and industrial relations was an important and unifying perspective, previously 
obscured. 
Establishing whether or not such a reappraisal is justified has proved complex, made all the more 
difficult by the bureaucratic nature of the primary records. Committee minutes, departmental research 
reports and Board papers were all created with particular purposes in mind and were shaped by potentially 
unknowable agendas. Institutional documentation tends to include subtle self-justification, rationalisation 
for past decisions, and may in some instances appear to be apologetics for the goals and policies of the 
day. As research questions were posed and reformulated in the light of archival work, it became apparent 
that the line of argument was potentially open to the criticism that an endorsed institutional perspective 
was colouring my historical interpretation. I trust I have guarded against this by cross-checking sources, 
by representing the content and context of the documents fairly, by allowing the historical actors their 
own voice and by acknowledging contrary arguments. This has been an ongoing subject of discussion 
with archivists at the BPMA, at conferences and with fellow postgraduate students. Each of the chapters 
wrestle with this tension to some extent and some explanations are offered in order to reconcile any 
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remaining apparent incompatibilities with the findings of other scholars. Firstly, thematic connections 
between the different chapters are discussed. 
 Three internal groups were influential stakeholders in mechanisation – loosely defined as 
management, staff and engineers – and each had their interests and actions represented by leading figures 
such as William Ryland, Tom Jackson and Nick de Jong respectively. The history of their interactions and 
the pursuit of their differing objectives was charted over the course of six roughly chronological chapters, 
each emphasising a particular theme, though these reappeared in various forms throughout. In the 
introduction it was suggested that these themes were: design, planning, conflict, reappraisal, consultation 
and training. They were treated chapter by chapter, reflecting the sequence of overlapping phases 
involved in the transition from the pre-1969, years when the LPP was formulated, to the post-1975 period 
of its nationwide implementation. Chapters 1 and 2 offered two levels of explanation for the formation 
and execution of the Letter Post Plan in 1969. The first, dealing with technical design, highlighted the 
ways in which long-term IR considerations were important in establishing the design-path. The second 
approached political and economic planning, looking at how the specifics of the plan were settled and 
justified in the context of the preoccupation with modernisation in the 1960s. 
However, it is possible to step back and see the decision to pursue a nationally integrated and 
automated processing capability as a response to two broader impulses which have animated the 
institutional evolution of the PO since the famous reforms of the nineteenth century, if not earlier. The 
first was the longstanding pursuit of higher speeds and capacity in public communications. As discussed 
in chapter 1, the world of postal logistics in the modern era underwent repeated re-engineering in the light 
of experience and through reforms which had the ultimate goal of improving systems-efficiency. Since 
the establishment of the six post roads emanating from London in the seventeenth century, through the 
mail coach and, subsequently, railroad and motorway eras, a slow evolution in efficiency and integration 
has been punctuated by major reforms. These include those associated with Rowland Hill and the 
universal Penny Post, which facilitated countless communications through the industrial revolution and 
prompted several decades of unfailing increases in mail volumes and an enlargement of infrastructure and 
labour to match. The following century saw the phasing in of motor transport and the revolution in mail 
circulation this entailed, and, as we have seen for the post-war period, the introduction of automated 
processing and control systems and the design and superimposition of a network of factories for the mass-
processing of coded correspondence. In a century in which Britain became a technologically networked 
society and amidst a sometimes bewildering proliferation in the marketplace of communication mediums, 
the demand for the collection, processing and delivery of letters continued to grow, from approximately 
five billion per annum in 1900 to ten billion in 1960 and, after a plateaux in the 1970s, to approaching 
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twenty billion by the year 2000. Higher speeds and capacity were the goals of systems engineers across 
other fields of public technology, such as energy supply and transport. The PO specialised in data 
transmission and, although telephones and banking grew in relative societal significance, the postal 
service, too, was subjected to successive waves of reform and the Letter Post Plan was an important phase 
in this. 
 Overlapping with the pursuit of efficiency, the automation of postal services was motivated by 
the remarkably durable ideals of public service. The engineers who developed the code-sort concept after 
1945 were stirred by a desire to see the achievements of technologists during the war applied in 
peacetime, and to see the successes of systems engineering in the telephone network replicated elsewhere 
in civil infrastructure. As the rhetoric and artwork associated with the early postcode campaigns testify, 
the PO reached out naturally to a public sense of duty, cooperation and joint improvement. The public 
service ethos also involved embracing the virtues of giving the public a reliable service at universally and 
uniformly subsidised rates, providing the economy with the facilities required for growth, and giving 
postal staff – still civil servants in a government department when the project was conceived – a less 
burdensome and more comfortable working life. The coding of the mail and the creation of automated 
sorting offices promised to deliver on all these fronts while increasing the system’s capacity during a 
period of long-term growth in demand while reducing dependence on unusually high levels of labour. The 
Letter Post Plan was, on this view, a response to deep seated economic and social forces in British 
society. 
 Chapter 3 took up the theme of conflict, culminating in an account of the UPW special 
conference in the summer of 1972 when, against EC advice, members voted for an embargo on 
cooperating with further installations. Two lines of opposition to the spread of mechanisation were 
articulated. The first held that staff were not persuaded that, in an altered post-strike environment, 
management had met their obligation to offer a sufficiently comprehensive, adjusted plan for the code-
sort programme. The staff-side wanted a robust and compelling reappraisal of how the new technology 
should best be applied and requested greater involvement in its production. The second was that the UPW 
wanted more than a promise of a future share in the savings expected of the LPP – hence their desire for a 
more specific reappraisal. This is best explained as a bargaining tactic shaped by the loss of earnings and 
trust resulting from the strike. Though unease existed about the apparent drift towards commercialism that 
many suspected was an implication of the PO Act, 1969 – and suspicions about mechanisation tied in 
with this – the causes of the strike were largely external in that the government held firm in effectively 
freezing postal wages in a bid to control inflation. Conflict has been a characteristic of postal IR in the 
post-civil service era and the avoidance of conflict as a motivating factor in the approach of management 
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and engineering is prominent in this thesis and is evident in everything from extensions to the framework 
of consultation to the design specifications of machines. 
Chapters 4 and 5 were concerned with reappraisal and consultation in the realms of policy and 
technology respectively. This was a learning period for those involved as things went wrong, a natural 
consequence of attempting something new in offices which had traditionally gone by the book and were 
unnacustomed to change. Reappraisal was especially necessary after 1971, but this is equally an 
inevitable theme in any long-term, large-scale, phased investment project. The concept was built into the 
financial machinery used to forecast and monitor performance on a rolling basis, and was connected with 
the need to continually revise the industry’s knowledge of its changing environment. Improving the 
methods of knowledge-acquisition enabled reappraisal to be shaped by better-informed predictions about 
the future, which led to path breaking innovations in modelling. Advances in computing and long-term 
forecasting opened up the possibility of equipping the industry with a total-systems model and the 1973 
revalidation is best understood within the unfolding of this process. In its widest definition, model-
building can be fruitfully applied to understanding the policy stances developed by all three groups – 
management, staff and engineering – in that any group desiring a stake in industrial restructuring must 
operate according to a conceptual simulation of the wider mail system, its political economy and its 
interaction with society. Management strategy had increasingly and sometimes painfully to come to terms 
with the complexities of investing in and measuring performance in a socio-technical network, often 
understood by benchmarking with developments in other utility institutions at home and abroad. The 
union’s conception of political economy was centred on the exercise of bargaining power in the pursuit of 
higher pay, political influence or factional dominance. The lesson of the revalidation was that it paid to 
involve all three groups on as equal a basis as possible. 
The engineering field was best at explicitly articulating the broad applicability of modelling 
which found an interesting expression in the “philosophy of development” cultivated in the formative 
decades of postal R&D. This conceived of coding and sorting systems in adaptationist and cybernetic 
terms. The only viable technologies were those that met certain standards of speed, reliability and 
environmentally determined specifications. Broadly, three such “environments” are evoked in the 
technical literature. The wider public/commercial environment presented particular problems which 
included the need to structure postcodes in order to make them acceptable to commerce, attractive to 
public psychology and amenable to machine processing. It also included such parameters as service 
standards for speed of delivery and legal limitations on the carriage of mail. The operational environment 
presented special problems of designing hardware which could be produced, installed and maintained 
economically in an integrated, national network. “Software” for the programming of sorting plans needed 
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to meet local and wider network requirements, while belt systems needed to accommodate heterogeneous 
types of mail affected by dust, moisture and static with extremely low error rates, again for systemic 
reasons. The workplace environment was perhaps the most challenging as it involved trying to understand 
the mental processes of letter sorting and their coordination with body movements. Moreover, the 
ergonomic adaptation required sustained research into the complex effects of different hardware 
arrangements on the morale of the workforce. The R&D behind the Easy View Coding Desk in the early 
1970s, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, built on the lessons of this long history and the philosophy of 
development underwent a new wave of adaptation in response to unprecedented financial constraints and 
a more combustible political environment. A key innovation was the formalisation of union consultation 
on the R&D process which, in turn, was part of a separate rise in the formalisation of IR machinery 
discussed in the introduction and in Chapter 3. 
The final chapter presented a history of the training programmes devised for the MLO era. The 
findings were that training was separated from formal state intervention when Training Boards were 
established in the 1960s, but it was nevertheless influenced by new ideas with roots in behaviourism 
which were becoming popular in American corporations. What emerges is the story of how the two sides 
of industry – labour and the inspectorate – were trained in different but overlapping packages of education 
and instruction involving both IR-heavy, college-style courses and highly specialised on-site inductions 
using training machines. These were designed to run simulations of sorting under “real world” conditions 
which demonstrates again the importance of model-building but showed, too, that the ascendance of 
engineers in systems-building – or at least in the primacy of in-house R&D – was under threat from two 
sources. The first was that their models were reaching the limits of their usefulness, as suggested by the 
failure of the keyboard experiments to yield decisive results and as the messy human realities of 
implementation came more fully into view. This meant that managing the process of change came to be 
more equally shared with the Personnel Division which had grown enormously since 1969. The second 
threat came from abroad. 
In the international context, the PO was the “first mover” in the market and, as we have seen, 
pioneered code-sorting in its formative years. By the late 1960s, the British led the world in the export of 
sorting equipment and postal mechanisation expertise. The troubled 1970s led to a reduction in funding 
and an adaptation of the R&D programme to match this, meaning that short term problems and “easy 
wins” received much greater attention. Since that time, American, Japanese and German corporations 
have moved ahead of Britain in the market for automated postal solutions. However, this was a gradual 
process and, in the late 1970s, long term research continued into CCTV coding in which mail was filmed 
in situ and the images fed to a separate office filled with white-collar staff at PC-style keyboards with 
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monitors. Alongside this were trials with OCR technology, intended to reduce and eventually graduate 
beyond reliance on coding desks. OCR trials in the early 1980s sparked industrial action at Mount 
Pleasant which triggered a threat by management to introduce the technology unilaterally. The Union of 
Communications Workers (successor to the UPW) – less powerful at that stage, having had their 
membership reduced after the split with telephones, their powers curbed by the government and their 
consultative rights curtailed by a more hawkish and corporate management approach – were backed into a 
corner over the issue leading to the acceptance of a range of work measurement and temporary labour 
policies. However in the 1990s OCR began to prove operationally viable and the introduction of 
Integrated Mail Processors followed. The exponential growth of computing power was critical in making 
postal automation based on OCR a success in the long run. The last Easy-View ceased operation in 2003. 
Though modern processing technology is now ubiquitous in the Royal Mail, its industrial relations 
continue to be shaped by disagreements about the use of new technology, modernisation drives and work 
measurement systems, and is still framed by a national debate about the balance between public 
ownership and privatisation, as the strikes in 2009 clearly showed. 
Nevertheless, the structure of Royal Mail’s operations today is based upon a backbone of Mail 
Centres whose basic arrangement was determined when the embargo was resolved and the revalidated 
LPP was approved in 1975. This returns us to the question of whether the PO’s critics were justified in 
claiming that mechanisation was a mistake, or at least whether it was poorly conceived and executed. 
With the benefit of hindsight the answer to the first question is clearly no. Almost all the world’s major 
postal systems now rely on automated processing and many of the subsystems such as mail segregation 
and the principles used in the manipulation of letters originated in post-war Britain. OCR delivered on its 
promises and the vision outlined by Carter and Gemmel in the late 1940s was largely achieved, although 
manual sorting is still universally used for a proportion of unmachineable mail. The question of whether 
the PO’s record of managing change in the 1960s and 1970s should be characterised in negative terms is 
open to interpretation, as it very much depends on how one chooses to measure success or failure. The 
evidence presented in this thesis indicates that a robust case can be made to the contrary. The questions 
posed and critiques levelled by contemporary journalists, economists and parliamentary inquiries seem, 
with hindsight, to be either ill-posed or products of the political environment of their time, relics of the 
period under study. Regardless of mistakes in the code-sort design and the considerable delays and 
disputes which characterised its implementation, the judgement that automated sorting was a worthwhile 
goal and that, over the long-term, the PO needed to become accustomed to the entrance of new 




It should also be noted that by the 1990s, outside researchers into the use of postcodes, while 
interested in their many unintended commercial and social uses (such as for censuses, marketing, 
insurance, schooling, healthcare, house prices, local economic analysis and business and infrastructural 
planning) acknowledged that the introduction of widespread and detailed postcodes was originally 
intended to assist mechanised sorting and concluded that, ‘...from the viewpoint of Royal Mail, the 
exercise has been an extended but successful one’.1 The geographers Raper, Rhind and Shepard found 
that automatic sorting had become more common across the world and usually used the same technique: 
the translation of written postcodes into machine-readable codes enabling simpler machines to 
automatically identify and direct the mail. Only the UK and Canada used alphanumeric codes. In the 
1960s, the US criticised the UK for this because alphanumeric codes were harder for machines to handle. 
Now, computing has improved making this a non-issue and the British system is now equally workable 
but easier to remember and more user-friendly.
2
 
There were serious and persistent problems with IR throughout this period, something Bill Cockburn and 
other former senior figures have dwelt on in interviews.
3
 Much of the resistance to the LPP was rooted in 
a widely held view among postmasters as well as the rank-and-file that the PO was a service organisation 
and that it was unsuited to profit-seeking, efficiency drives and technological change. However an 
extremely wide range of consultative arrangements were designed and adapted to help alleviate disputes 
and try to bridge the identity gaps and conflicts between the different grades and departments. As the 
liberal pluralists recognised, the labour-intensive industries in the post-war period were structured by 
inherently divergent interests which tended to be exacerbated during severe social and economic 
turbulence. Cockburn has referred to the ‘transformative power’ on IR of the mutual rewards of 
management sharing the savings of productivity and mechanisation schemes with the staff.
4
 The trade 
unionist Mike Hogan (who came to adopt a Darwinian understanding of the adaptations required in 
organisations), was proud of the effects of improved working methods in London and Manchester, which 
were in his view very poorly managed before their introduction. Nevertheless, he remembers that some 
managers had a reputation for overestimating the effectiveness of close supervision, resulting in ‘paralysis 
by analysis’.5 Others have recalled that management’s faith in organisational theories was at times naive.6 
                                                     
1
 J. F. Raper, D. W. Rhind and J. W. Shepherd, Postcodes: The New Geography (Harlow: Longman, 1992), p.49. 
2
 Raper et al., Postcodes (1992), pp.63-4. 
3
 BL, NSA, An Oral History of the Post Office, Interview with Bill Cockburn, C1007/56/01-02. 
4
 Ibid., Tape 5 (F11703) Side B. 
5
 BL, NSA, An Oral History of the Post Office, Interview with Mike Hogan, C1007/116/01-07, Tape 6 (F13462) 
Side A. 
6
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Several similar shortcomings have been assessed in the preceding chapters and it is hoped that the 
supporting evidence has put these in a more realistic and empathetic context. 
Finally, several lines of research were conducted during archival work for this thesis that are not 
represented in this text, but, given space and time, could have been followed up. As noted in the 
introduction, the periodisation concentrated on the critical years of transition around 1969, hence the early 
history of the formation of postal engineering in Britain could only be summarised in Chapter 1. The 
papers of the Mechanical Aids Committee in the 1920s-1960s warrant further scholarly attention and 
would provide multiple case studies in the intricacies of mid-century R&D. Similarly, this thesis focussed 
primarily on the planning and transition of the LPP and the story of its implementation in the later 1970s 
and 1980s is yet to be told. One topic in particular which had to be cut was that of maintenance 
engineering. Implementation of the LPP created a new grade of sorting office technician for the 
maintenance of machines. Thousands were employed in this role and their presence altered the dynamics 
of the working environment and of wider grading and wages issues. During the final year of my study, 
when attention had turned away from primary research and towards writing, a sizeable tranche of records 
from the 1970s which has been under “2nd Review” by archivists for the past few years began to be 
catalogued. Though I was able to sample some of this material there was not time to conduct in depth 
research and a large amount of paperwork on several of the themes and issues addressed here is presently 
being made publicly available. It will be for future historians to mine these resources and come to terms 
with how the postal service continued its adaptation to the changing political and technological 
environment of the 1980s, 1990s and early twenty first century. Finally, it would be interesting to develop 
the findings of this thesis in the context of a broader history of British communications in the post-war 
period. The history of technological evolution in the telephone network would make fascinating reading 
should it be undertaken and, based on the telecoms R&D records encountered during this study, the 
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